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Introduction and Summaries
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD degree in Finance.
Admittedly, the thesis is more closely related to the field of maritime economics and focuses on
crude oil tanker markets. This thesis studies freight rates, which have sparked the interest of
maritime economists at least since the seminal work by Tinbergen (1931) and Koopmans (1939).
This thesis has special emphasis on how freight rates evolve, how they are linked to oil prices
through the floating storage arbitrage relationship, and how they reflect the relative bargaining
power of shipowners and charterers. The thesis consists of three chapters, which can be read
independently.
Summaries in English
The Eye in the Sky - Freight Rate Effects of Tanker Supply
with Professor Nikos K. Nomikos
This paper studies how the evolution of crude oil tanker freight rates depends on the employment
status and geographical positions of Very Large Crude Oil Carriers. We construct a novel measure
of short-term capacity combining geospatial tracking data from vessels’ Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS) with information on vessel fixtures.
First, we characterize the geographical fixing pattern, i.e., where vessels are located when
they are ’fixed’. Next, we make heuristic rules, which label each vessel as either available or
unavailable based on the vessel’s position, self-reported loading condition, self-reported destination,
and employment status. The capacity measure is then a proxy for the percentage of vessels in the
fleet which are available to take an order. The capacity measure is negatively related to the weekly
change in freight rates. Our findings suggest that AIS measures can explain a part of the freight
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rate evolution. We find that there is a considerable economic magnitude of our measure. We see
that a standard deviation decrease in our capacity measure (decrease of 14 available vessels) leads
to an increase in the freight rate level of $0.56/mt. This corresponds to an increase in the gross
freight revenue equal to $151,200 for a typical cargo size of 270,000mt.
Crude Oil Contango Arbitrage and the Floating Storage Decision
with Professor Roar Adland
In the second chapter, we evaluate the economics of the floating storage trade and the floating
storage decision of charterers. The floating storage trade is a simple cash and carry trade in the
crude oil futures market. In addition to oil futures, the trade includes the leasing of an off-shore
storage facility, in our case a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC). A necessary condition for the
floating storage trade to be profitable is that the oil futures curve is upward-sloping, i.e., the fu-
tures curve is in contango. We find violations of the no-arbitrage condition using both time-series
of time-charter rates and time-charter rates from fixtures.
We investigate storage profits across storage horizons. We find that in the aftermath of the
Financial Crisis profits for short storage horizons exceeded profits for longer horizons. During the
Oil Glut, we see the opposite picture, namely, that the profit associated with long-term storage
(above one year) exceeds short-term storage profits. We attribute the difference to the distinction
between oil supply and demand shocks. The Financial Crisis served as a negative oil demand shock
and pushed down both the short end of the oil futures curve and spot freight rates. In contrast, the
Oil Glut served as a positive demand shock to oil which pushed down the short end of the oil fu-
tures curve but stimulated spot freight rates through increased demand for transportation services.
We evaluate the ex-post usage of chartered ships using geospatial (AIS) ship-tracking data. We
find that charterers are reluctant to use vessels for floating storage even in cases when they would
have had positive profits. We compare the storage profits with the alternative strategy of using the
vessel for transportation but hedging the market exposure using Forward Freight Agreements. We
set forth the alternative trading strategy as a possible explanation for why vessels on time-charter
are sailing when they would have had positive storage profits during the Oil Glut. The alternative
trading strategy consists of three steps. First, the charterer time-charters a vessel and pays the
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time-charter rate. Second, the charterer employs the vessel in the voyage charter market earning
voyage charter freight rates. Third, the charterer hedges the voyage charter freight rate exposure
from the second step by entering into the paper-based freight derivatives Forward Freight Agree-
ments. In absence of basis risk, the profit of the trading strategy is the FFA time-charter spread.
We derive the excess storage profits above the FFA time-charter spread and find that it is
a significant predictor of charterers storage decisions. A possible explanation for this finding is
that the charterer simply chooses the most profitable trading strategy. However, the FFA hedged
time-chartering strategy is subject to basis-risk and we also find that vessels with an age above
15 years are more likely to be used for floating storage. Panellists are specifically instructed to
exclude vessels with an age above 15 years when they make their Baltic panel spot rate assessment
i.e. their assessment of the FFA settlement rate.
Bargaining Power in Crude Oil Tanker Markets
In the third chapter, I study the relative bargaining power of geographical traders and shipowners
in the crude oil tanker market. Recent studies by Brancaccio et al. (2017), Brancaccio et al. (2018),
Parker (2014) and Tvedt (2011) look at the equilibrium search and matching between geographical
commodity traders and shipowners in bulk shipping markets. An important aspect of the search
and matching models is the subsequent bargaining process and the relative bargaining power of
the involved parties.
I set forth a simple model of the matching between shipowners and geographical traders. In
the model, shipowners make dynamic ballasting choices to maximize their continuation value.
The model differs from the model by Brancaccio et al. (2017) in two important aspects. First,
shipowners are able to re-evaluate which loading region to ballast towards along their ballast leg.
Second, the matching function is estimated parametrically using an EM algorithm to account for
unreported fixtures. Furthermore, I utilize information on refining margins earned by geographical
traders to find the relative bargaining power. I find that geographical traders are generally in pos-
session of more bargaining power than shipowners. On average I find that shipowners’ bargaining
power coefficients, i.e., the proportion of the total value that the shipowner is able to extract is
24%.
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Danske resume´er
The Eye in the Sky - Freight Rate Effects of Tanker Supply
Medforfatter professor Nikos K. Nomikos
I det første kapitel ser vi p˚a, hvordan fragtrate udviklingen for olietankskibe af klassen Very Large
Crude Oil Carriers (VLCCs) afhænger af skibenes geografiske placering samt deres arbejdsstatus.
Vi fremsætter et m˚al for kapacitet, der er baseret p˚a en kobling af information om skibenes po-
sitioner fra skibenes Automatic Identification Systems, samt information p˚a skibenes bilaterale
handler.
Vi starter med at beskrive det geografiske handelsmønster i VLCC markedet. P˚a baggrund af
det observerede handelsmønster fremsætter vi en heuristisk regel, som angiver, hvorvidt et givent
skib er tilgængeligt p˚a markedet. Den heuristiske regel baserer sig p˚a 1) information om skibenes
position, 2) et selvrapporteret m˚al for, hvor dybt skibet ligger i vandet, 3) en selvrapporteret
angivelse af skibets destination, samt 4) information om hvorvidt skibet allerede har indg˚aet en
handel. Vores kapacitetsm˚al giver en indikation af, hvor mange skibe, som er i stand til at indg˚a
en aftale om transport af en last, opgjort i procent af det samlede antal skibe. Vores resultater
angiver, at en nedgang i vores kapacitetsm˚al p˚a en standardafvigelse (ved gennemsnitsværdier
svarer dette til, at der er 14 færre skibe ledige p˚a markedet) medfører en forøgelse i fragtraten p˚a
$0,56/mt. Dette svarer til en forøgelse p˚a $151.200 for en typisk last p˚a 270.000mt.
Crude Oil Contango Arbitrage and the Floating Storage Decision
Medforfatter professor Roar Adland
I det andet kapitel ser vi p˚a en arbitrage handelsstrategi, hvor man køber olien ’spot’ og sælger
olien p˚a et fremtidigt tidspunkt via en futureskontrakt. I den mellemliggende periode lagrer man
olien i en lejet Very Large Crude Oil Carrier. En nødvendig betingelse for, at handelsstrategien
er profitabel er, at oliefutureskurven har en positiv hældning. N˚ar vi ser p˚a time charter raterne
fra broker indeks og time charter fixtures ser vi, at der har været mulighed for at opn˚a en positiv
arbitrageprofit.
Vi ser ogs˚a p˚a, hvordan profitten forbundet med at lagre olie ser ud p˚a tværs af tidshorisonter.
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Efter finanskrisen ser vi, at profitten ved at lagre olie var højere for kortere horisonter end for
længere horisonter. Finanskrisen fungerede som et negativt efterspørgselsstød, der pressede b˚ade
den korte ende af oliefutureskurven og fragtratekurven ned. Modsat fungerede Oil Glut perioden
som et positivt udbudsstød, der pressede den korte ende af oliefutureskurven ned, men stimulerede
den korte ende af fragtratekurven gennem den øgede efterspørgsel efter transport.
Vi benytter AIS information til at se p˚a ex-post anvendelse af de lejede olietankskibe. Vi
ser, at lejerne af skibene undlader at bruge skibene til at lagre olie p˚a trods af, at det ville have
medført en positiv profit. Vi sammenligner profitten forbundet med at lagre olie med en alternativ
handelsstrategi. Den alternative handelsstrategi best˚ar af tre skridt. Først lejes en VLCC p˚a
time-charter og aktøren betaler time-charter rater. Dernæst anvendes VLCC i voyage charter
markedet, hvor aktøren tjener voyage charter rater. Til sidst hedges eksponeringen mod udsving i
voyage charter raterne med Forward Fragt Aftaler (FFAs). Vi udregner, hvor meget profitten ved
at lagre olie overstiger FFA time-charter rate spændet og ser, at dette er en signifikant prædiktor
for lejernes beslutning om at benytte de lejede skibe til at lagre olie.
Bargaining Power in Crude Oil Tanker Markets
I det sidste kapitel, ser jeg p˚a den relative forhandlingskraft mellem r˚avarehandlende agenter og
skibsejere. Studierne af Brancaccio et al. (2017), Brancaccio et al. (2018), Parker (2014) og Tvedt
(2011) ser p˚a ligevægtsjobsøgningsmodeller for agenter, der handler geografisk med r˚avarer og
skibsejere. Et vigtigt aspekt i jobsøgningsmodellerne er forhandlingen af fragtraten mellem de
involverede parter.
Jeg opstiller en simpel matching model mellem skibsejere og de r˚avarehandlende agenter. I
modellen vælger skibsejerne dynamisk, hvilken region de vil sejle i ballast til, s˚aledes at valget mak-
simerer ejerens fortsættelsesværdi. Modellen adskiller sig fra modellen i Brancaccio et al. (2017)
p˚a to afgørende punkter. For det første tillader modellen, at skibsejerne kan genoverveje deres
valg af region under ballast sejladsen. For det andet estimeres matching funktionen, der beskriver
matchingen mellem arbejdsgiver og arbejdstager, parametrisk ved brug af en EM-algoritme for
at imødeg˚a problemet med ikke rapporterede handler. Endvidere bruges profitten fra rafinering
af r˚aolien til at bestemme den relative forhandlingskraft mellem skibsejere og de r˚avarehandlende
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agenter. Resultaterne angiver, at de r˚avarehandlende agenter generelt besidder en højere forhan-
dlingskraft end skibsejerne. Skibsejerne f˚ar i gennemsnit 24% af handlens værdi.
x
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Chapter 1
The Eye in the Sky - Freight Rate
Effects of Tanker Supply
Frederik Regli and Nikos K. Nomikos
A revised version of this chapter has been published in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics
and Transportation Review
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2019.03.015
Abstract
We show how the evolution of crude oil tanker freight rates depends on the employment
status and geographical position of the fleet of very large crude oil carriers (VLCCs). We pro-
vide a novel measure of short-term capacity in the voyage charter market which is a proxy for
the percentage of vessels available for orders. We find that our capacity measure explains parts
of the freight rate evolution at weekly horizons, where traditional supply measures are uninfor-
mative. The fact that freight rates directly influence shipowners’ profitability and charterers’
expenditures makes our measure particularly relevant for these groups of market participants.
Keywords— AIS, Crude Oil, Forward Freight Agreements, Freight Rates, Tanker Markets, VLCC.
1.1 Introduction
Tanker freight markets are central to the distribution of crude oil which is the largest component of
global energy consumption1. The tanker shipping industry is a cyclical and highly volatile industry
1According to of World Energy (2017) oil covered 33.27% of the global energy consumption in 2016. Oil is followed
by coal and natural gas covering 28.11% and 24.13%, respectively, of the global energy consumption in 2016
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characterised erratic fluctuations in freight rates - a stylized fact which is often attributed to short-
term fluctuations in the balance between supply and demand. Recently, geospatial information on
vessel movements has become available from the radio signals sent by vessels’ Automatic Identifi-
cation Systems (AIS). AIS information enables freight market participants to track the movement
of vessels within any commercial segment providing them with a detailed view of the supply side
in freight markets. We study the voyage charter market for very large crude oil carriers (VLCC).
We combine AIS information with information on vessel fixtures and propose a novel measure of
available short-term capacity. Our capacity measure is negatively related to change in freight rates
over a weekly horizon, where traditional supply measures are uninformative. Furthermore, we show
that our capacity measure adds to the freight rate price discovery above and beyond what is already
explained by the FFA price. The fact that freight rates directly influence shipowners’ profitability
and charterers’ expenditures make our measure particularly relevant for these market participants.
In tanker markets, the international trade of crude oil determines the demand for tanker ser-
vices. The merchant fleet supplies charterers with tanker services, and the balance between demand
and supply sets the level of competition. Stopford (2009) advocates a distinction between long-run
supply and short-run supply of shipping services where our measure focuses on the latter.
In the long-run, the merchant fleet evolves with the levels of investment and scrapping. The
pioneering works of Tinbergen (1931), Tinbergen (1934), Koopmans (1939), and Zannetos (1966)
describe the cyclical interdependence between ship investment and freight rates. In the cycle, high
freight rate levels stimulate shipbuilding which in turn puts a downward pressure on freight rates
as it increases the size of the fleet. The early work laid the foundation for the structural equa-
tion models of the four shipping markets: the freight market, secondhand market, newbuilding
market, and scrap market, (Hawdon, 1978; Norman and Wergeland, 1981; Charemza and Gron-
icki, 1981; Strandenes, 1984; Beenstock and Vergottis, 1989; Tvedt, 2003; Adland and Strandenes,
2007; Karakitsos and Varnavides, 2016). Recent studies by Papapostolou et al. (2014), Kaloupt-
sidi (2014) and Greenwood and Hanson (2015) look at investment sentiment and outcomes in dry
bulk market. Kalouptsidi (2014) shows the effect of time-to-build on investment in newbuildings
and scrapping of existing vessels. Greenwood and Hanson (2015) develop a behavioural model
in which shipowners over-invest. The over-investment is partly caused by over-extrapolation of
6
demand shocks and partly by the negligence of competitors’ investments in newbuildings.
In the short-run, the size of the merchant fleet is fixed or predetermined by the order book for
new vessels. In a perfectly competitive market, freight rates are set such that they just compensate
the operational costs of the marginal vessel. Demand is inelastic with respect to the freight rate,
and the supply curve consists of two regimes, (Stopford, 2009). For low demand levels the supply
curve is very elastic as spare tonnage with similar operational costs is easily available. However,
as demand increases vessels with higher operational costs, typically older vessels, enter the supply
schedule. This continues to the point where no spare capacity is available. When the fleet is fully
utilized, supply can only increase if vessels speed up operations. By increasing speed vessels can
increase the number of ton-miles supplied over a year. However, increasing speed also increases
the operational costs as bunker consumption is convex in speed. We study the case of weekly
fluctuations in supply. We argue that in the short-run some vessels are unavailable for charterers.
A vessel may already have found new employment, it may lack the geographical proximity to a
specific loading area or its course and reported destination may suggest that it is heading for an-
other loading region.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study how AIS derived capacity measures can
be used to explain the evolution of freight rates. The previous literature based on AIS information
include Aßmann et al. (2015) and Adland and Jia (2016) who empirically investigate vessels’ speed
decisions in a Ronen (1982) model framework. In addition to being an important supply metric,
vessel speeds are a key determinant of vessels’ bunker consumption and thereby vessels’ emission
of greenhouse gases. Aßmann et al. (2015) study the speed relation for VLCC tankers, and Adland
and Jia (2016) study the speed relation for Capesize carriers. Both studies find that owners do
not set speed in accordance with the Ronen (1982) model. Adland and Jia (2016) suggest that the
deviation from the economic theory is caused by weather conditions and contractual frictions such
as charter party speed clauses2. Adland, Jia and Strandenes (2017) find that AIS-based volume
estimates for tankers align well with custom-based export numbers. Jia et al. (2017) estimate
potential fuel savings by calculation of the optimal virtual arrival point for vessels, which limits
waiting time of vessels at port. Closely related to our paper, Prochazka (2018, Chapter 1) looks
2A charter party speed clause specify the speed at which a vessel must operate during a voyage charter. See
Devanney (2011).
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at contracting decisions in the VLCC tanker market. In the paper, they find a contemporaneous
relationship between the freight rate level and the distance from the fixture location to the loading
port. This suggests that oil buyers secure tonnage earlier during strong tanker markets, i.e., when
the freight rate is high. The methodology and aim in our paper are fundamentally different from
their approach as we consider different types of AIS measures. Furthermore, we aim to explain
the evolution in freight rates rather than the contemporaneous relationship between AIS measure
and freight rates.
Brancaccio et al. (2017) use AIS information to study search frictions and the interplay between
endogenous trading costs and trade flows in dry bulk markets. They find that the matching be-
tween exporters and ships is subject to search frictions. In contrast, we do not model the matching
between exporters and ships or the dynamic ballasting choice of shipowners. Instead, we show that
the observed number of seemingly unmatched ships explains parts of the freight rate evolution. In
a follow-up paper, Brancaccio et al. (2018) study the impact of oil prices on world trade. They
show that the elasticity of world trade is asymmetric and flattens out as fuel costs decline. Their
explanation for the flattening out is that shipowners’ bargaining power increases as relocation of
the vessel becomes cheaper. Parker (2014) sets up a matching model between VLCC tankers and
cargo traders. In the sample period used in Parker (2014), the AIS data lacked coverage especially
in regions with a high number of ships transmitting AIS signals. Parker (2014) uses AIS data as
a validation tool for the speed outcomes of the matching model.
In addition to traditional supply measures, FFA prices have been shown to contain important
information regarding the price discovery of spot freight rates3. The FFA literature has looked
FFAs ability to forecast future spot freight rates (Kavussanos and Nomikos, 1999, 2003; Batche-
lor et al., 2007), their hedging efficiency and the volatility transmission between the FFA market
and the physical freight market (Kavussanos, Visvikis and Batchelor, 2004; Kavussanos et al.,
2010,0; Alizadeh, Huang and van Dellen, 2015; Alexandridis et al., 2017). We find that our AIS
measure contains additional information about the freight rate evolution above and beyond what
is already incorporated by the FFA price. Supply measures influence on the freight rate volatil-
ity is studied in Xu et al. (2011). They analyze how the freight rate volatility depends on the
3Whenever, we use the term spot rates we mean voyage charter freight rates.
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size of the commercial fleet. However, studying the volatility transmission between our AIS sup-
ply measure and freight rates is beyond the scope of our paper and therefore left to future research.
In summary, the existing AIS based papers have studied ship-operators dynamic speed choice,
the presence of search frictions in the matching process between ship-operators and charterers,
or the contracting decision by charterers. The approach and findings of our paper deviates from
the existing papers. We create an empirical proxy of the level of supply in tanker markets. Our
classification of vessels as available or unavailable is based on the historical fixing pattern in the
VLCC spot market. Based on the fixing pattern, we set up our measure of spare capacity. We
show that our is able to explain the evolution in freight rates at short horizons where traditional
supply measures are uninformative. Furthermore, we show that our spare capacity measure is able
to explain the evolution in spot rates above and beyond what can be explained by FFA prices.
The economic magnitude of our results shows that at the average freight rate level in our sample,
a standard deviation decrease in our capacity measure (decrease of 14 available vessels) leads to an
increase in the freight rate level of $0.56/mt. This corresponds to an increase in the gross freight
revenue equal to $151,200 for a typical cargosize of 270,000mt. Interestingly, we also see that the
lagged change in the average speed of vessels sailing in ballast significantly predicts the evolution
in the spot freight rates. This implies that vessels sailing in ballast on average decrease(increase)
speed prior to an decrease(increase) in freight rates.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 describes how we construct our
capacity measure and describes the AIS data; section 1.3 contains summary statistics, time-series
plots and unit root tests; section 1.4 shows the estimation results; and section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Construction of the capacity measure
The traditional structural econometric models of freight rates 4 are estimated using realized de-
mand and the available fleet capacity. In these models, supply is measured by the size of the
commercial fleet. The traditional models relies on realized ton-mile demand and does not consider
spatial factors determining the availability of vessels such as distance to a loading area or the
4See Hawdon (1978), Norman and Wergeland (1981), Charemza and Gronicki (1981), Strandenes (1984), Been-
stock and Vergottis (1989), Tvedt (2003), Adland and Strandenes (2007), and Karakitsos and Varnavides (2016)
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employment status of the vessels. Our measure seeks to incorporate exactly these two features.
We seek to identify the vessels that are available to provide tanker services irrespective of whether
they end up supplying tanker services in equilibrium.
To fix ideas, let us consider supply and demand in a perfect competitive tanker market. Un-
der perfect competition, each individual shipowner will supply transportation services when she
breaks even, i.e. is offered a freight rate which compensates the shipowner’s voyage costs5. Voyage
costs consist of fuel expenses, port charges, and possibly canal-dues. The main voyage cost is the
fuel-expense which increases along with fuel prices and speed. The aggregate supply curve for all
vessels will then, for any given level of ton-miles, reflect the fact that the freight rate only just
compensate the marginal shipowner her voyage costs. Our approach differs from the traditional
supply and demand models as we proxy the potential future supply rather than using past real-
izations of supply.
Figure 1.1 shows the short-run equilibrium freight rate and ton-miles quantity. The figure
shows the effect of a demand shock for low and high levels of demand when spare capacity is low
and high, respectively. We consider the effect of a positive demand shock which can be caused by
either an increase in cargo quantities, an increase in the average voyage haul or both. The shape
of the supply curve depends on bunker prices, bunker consumption which in turn depends on the
level of vessels speeds, and the number of vessels available as spare capacity. In Figure 1.1, we
assume that the only difference between the two supply curves is the number of vessels which are
available to charterers.
We start by considering a positive demand shock when the level of demand is low. This is the
case in Figure 1.1 where a positive demand shock shifts the demand curve from D1 to D2. The
positive demand shock has negligible freight rate effects as both supply curves are almost perfectly
elastic. By contrast, a positive demand shock in the high demand case shifts demand from D3
to D4. This causes a substantial increase in freight rates in the low-capacity case. In the short
5In practice, shipowners needs to generate income to cover their capital expenditures. This implies that vessels
have positive earnings measured by their time-charter equivalent. Koekebakker et al. (2006) show that earnings are
stationary such that earnings mean-revert towards a certain level above the voyage costs. Adland and Strandenes
(2007) show how freight rate levels occasionally deviate significantly from the cost of the marginal vessel. This is
uncontroversial as ship-owners will also need to cover crew wages and capital expenditures in the long-run.
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run, spare capacity in a given loading region will depend on the geographical proximity of vessels,
whether they are sailing laden or in ballast, and their trading status. We set forth a proxy for the
number of available vessels using AIS and fixture information. The number of open vessels are
influenced by past trades as vessels can only transport one cargo at a time. Furthermore, a vessel
needs to satisfy geographical proximity restrictions to be open for an order at a given loading
region. We proxy the number of vessels open for a fixture by:
Available V esselst = Kt(1− λunavaiblet ) =
Kt∑
i=1
(1− 1{Fixi,t = 1}) · 1{Proximityi,t = 1}, (1.1)
where Kt is the active
6 stock of fleet, λunavaiblet is the fraction of vessels in the fleet which are
unavailable, 1{Fixi,t = 1} is an indicator function which equals one when vessel i is employed,
and 1{Proximityi,t = 1} equals one when vessel i satisfies a proximity restriction. We normalize
our measure of open vessels with the size of the fleet. Before we get to the econometric model and
the results, we will describe our data and explicitly show how we set up our capacity measure.
Figure 1.1: Supply and demand:
This figure shows the static supply and demand equilibrium for short-run tanker services under conditions
of perfect competition. The supply curve equals the operational costs of the marginal vessel for a given level
of ton-miles per year.
ton miles per year
freight rate SHigh capacitySLow capacity
D1 D2 D3 D4
6Active vessels are vessels which have been delivered for service and have not yet been scrapped. We exclude the
fleet of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) which faced embargo restrictions in our sample period. NIOC
does not publicly report their fixtures.
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1.2.1 Data and sample
In this section, we describe the data. The data consists of vessel specific information, voyage
charter information, and time charter information from Clarkson’s Shipping Intelligence Network
(2016), Automatic Identification System information has kindly been provided by MarineTraffic.
We use voyage charter fixtures data, and time charter fixtures data from Bloomberg L.P. (2016).
Forward Freight Agreement data is from the Baltic Exchange.
Spot freight rates are provided by the Baltic Exchange. Each day the Baltic Exchange pub-
lishes a range of freight rate indices for a variety of routes and ship segments. We look at the
TD3 tanker route, which is a VLCC route for a 265,000 mt cargo of crude oil from Ras-Tanura in
the Arabian Gulf to Chiba in Japan7. The voyage roundtrip has a distance of 6,654nm for both
the laden leg and the ballast leg. The roundtrip voyage takes approximately 50 days assuming a
laden speed of 13.5 knots, a ballast speed of 12 knots, a sea margin of 5% and 4 port days. The
TD3 index is an index based on daily assessments regarding the prevailing spot rate provided by a
panel of ship brokers. We use rates published each Friday to construct a weekly time series of the
spot rates. Spot freight rates are denominated in Worldscale (WS) and have been converted to
$/mt using the corresponding flat rates published by the Worldscale Association. We also include
the Forward Freight Agreement price for the TD3 route. FFAs are a derivative contracts trading
over the counter (OTC). The FFAs are cleared via a clearing house. The 1-month FFA contracts
are settled in cash against the average of following months realized spot rates. See Alizadeh and
Nomikos (2009) for a detailed description of FFAs and their usage.
Our measure relies on terrestrial and satellite-based AIS information. The International Mar-
itime Organization’s revision of the Safety for the navigation of life at sea (SOLAS) made it
mandatory for vessels engaged on international voyages and weighing more than 300 gross tonnage
to install an AIS transponder. This also applied to all passenger ships. We observe AIS reports at
varying frequencies. Most of the time, we observe a vessel at high frequencies, such that adjacent
observations are two to three minutes apart, but in a few cases observations can be days or even
weeks apart. We clean the data for outliers, i.e., observations where the vessel position briefly
7The TD3 route is the benchmark route within our sample period. The route has recently, since 22 January 2018,
been replaced by the new TD3C route which loads in the Arabian Gulf and discharges in China.
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jumps far away from the vessel’s trajectory only to return to the trajectory at the next obser-
vation. We group intraday observations into daily observations for each vessel with an average
speed and average draught. The draught of a vessel is the distance between the waterline and the
bottom of the hull. Within our sample period from November 2014 to August 2016, we have AIS
information on 676 VLCCs out of the 688 vessels present in the Clarkson’s database. The AIS
reports contain a time stamp as well as the vessel’s latitude, longitude, course, speed in knots,
self-reported draught, and self-reported destination. The self-reported fields are manually typed
by a crew member. Occasionally, the self-reported fields are not up to date and at time they are
even deliberately misleading. For instance we observe that crew members in certain areas report
that they have armed guards on board in their destination slot. In the period where the crew
signal that they have armed guards on board, they often also change their draughts to reflect that
they are sailing in ballast. Loaded vessels are closer to the water surface where the vessel is easier
to board by pirates. This obviously introduces some noise into our measure. However, we do not
believe that the noise strengthens our results.
Table 1.1: AIS data summary statistics
This table shows summary statistics for 360,350 daily vessel observations on the loading condition and vessel
speeds.
Median Average Std Laden(%) Ballast(%) Unknown(%)
Speed 11.41 8.87 5.51
Ballast speed 10.86 8.70 5.69
Laden speed 11.72 9.01 5.35
Loading condition 53.59 44.20 2.21
We have translated the manually typed destinations into geographical regions. Some destina-
tions are straightforward to translate into regions as seen in the example in Table 1.2. Others are
translated using port codes, e.g., AE FAT is translated into the Arabian Gulf as AE is the country
port code for the United Arab Emirates. Sometimes, we are unable to translate the destination
message into a geographical region. This is the case for messages such as ARMED GUARDS O/B,
AVOID TYPHOON, DIVING OPERATION, FOR ORDERS, SEA TRIAL, etc.
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Table 1.2: Translation of destinations into regions example
This table shows an example on how manually typed messages for vessels heading to Rotterdam are trans-
lated into a geographical region.
Destination Translated region
ROTTERDAM, NL UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAM,NETHERLAND UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAM.NETHERLAND UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAM.NETHERLANM UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAME UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAMM UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAM-MET UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAM-OPL UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAN UK AND CONTINENT
ROTTERDAR UK AND CONTINENT
The sample period is from November 2014 to August 2016. We note that within our sample
there is almost no coverage in the period between 23-27 May 2015. We determine the loading con-
dition of the vessels from their reported draughts. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of draughts
and vessel speeds for daily observations. The figures show two-humped distributions. For draughts
we use a cut-off point of 13 metres to distinguish between laden and vessels in ballast. For vessel
speeds, we also see a bimodal distribution with a mode around zero knots and a mode around
12.70 knots.
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Figure 1.2: Loading condition and speed distribution
This figure shows the distribution of reported draughts and speed density curves for daily data. The speed
density curves are plotted for all vessels, laden vessels, and vessels in ballast. In panel (a), the vertical
dashed line at 13 metres indicates the cut-off above which we consider vessels as laden. Panel (b) shows
that the speed curves also are bimodal. There is a mode around zero knots and a mode for sailing vessels
at approximately 12.70 knots.
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In our analysis, we use the average speed of the fleet. We calculate each vessels average speed
over the week and then calculate the average fleet speed as the average across all vessels.
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We use information on fixtures from Clarkson and Bloomberg. Clarkson’s shipping intelligence
network contains 4582 VLCC voyage charters from 1 January, 2014 to 31 August, 2016 and provides
information on the day of the fixture, the start and the end of the laycan period8, the loading region,
the discharge region, the agreed voyage charter rate, the charterer, the shipowner, and the cargo
quantity. The Bloomberg dataset comprises voyage charter and time charter information. We use
data from both sources to increase our coverage of observed trades. The use of multiple sources also
introduces duplicates of trades. Often, the day a voyage charter is reported differs across different
sources. The Bloomberg dataset only contains information on the beginning of the laycan period
and not the end. We will use the fixtures to determine whether a vessel is available or whether she
has already entered into a new charter party. For this purpose, we use the ship’s IMO number,
the date that the fixture is reported, and the end of the laycan period for Clarksons fixtures, and
the beginning of the laycan period for Bloomberg fixtures. A set of voyage charter duplicates will
mark a vessel as fixed in overlapping periods. Within the sample, 212 voyage fixtures cannot be
matched to a vessel. For 178 of the voyage charter fixtures, both the vessel and the owner group
is unknown whereas the owner group is known for the remaining 34 voyage charters.
1.2.2 Trading Locations
In order to define our measure of availability, we analyze the geographical distribution of the re-
ported fixtures. As we focus on freight rates for the route between the Arabian Gulf and the
Far East we are interested in vessels we can label unavailable for voyage charters with a loading
port in the Arabian Gulf. When labeling vessels as available we combine both AIS information
and information from fixtures. We incorporate AIS information on the vessels’ positions, their
self-reported draughts and their self-reported destination. We combine the AIS information with
the fixtures information to proxy which vessels that have already found new employment. We
use information on the day the fixture is reported and the laycan period. When a vessel enters a
fixture, it will be considered unavailable from the day the fixture is observed until five days past its
laycan. On the sixth day after the laycan period, the vessel will still be considered unavailable if
it is not sufficiently close to its discharge region. Our measure is set up to mimic the geographical
trading locations of VLCCs which are loading in the Arabian Gulf. In this section, we show that
8The laycan period is the time window within which the shipowner must tender notice of readiness to the charterer.
The notice of readiness ensures the charterer that the ship has arrived at the loading port and is ready to load the
cargo.
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vessels which are ”fixed” (entering into new voyage charter contracts) to load a cargo of crude oil
from the Arabian Gulf are typically sailing in ballast back from the Far East and the South East
Asian region. However, laden vessels which approach their discharge destinations also enter new
fixtures.
We start by looking at the trading locations for vessels sailing in ballast. Figure 1.3 shows
1064 positions for vessels reported as ”fixed” with a loading port within the Arabian Gulf. The
locations are graphed on the day where the fixtures are reported. We have translated the self-
reported destinations into destination regions. The trading pattern shows that vessels are entering
new fixtures throughout the entire ballast leg. In 614 of the cases, vessels report the Arabian
Gulf as their destination when their fixture is reported. However, east of the Strait of Malacca
vessels also report either the Southern Pacific Oceania Region (SPORE)9 or the Far East as their
destination. Vessels heading for the SPORE region continue their ballast leg towards the Arabian
Gulf. Three hundred and sixteen have the SPORE region as their reported destination when the
fixture is reported. The Far East comes in third with 74 reports. The Far East vessel reports
consist of two types. The first type consists of vessels still in port. The second group comprises
vessels which have started sailing their ballast leg but have not yet updated their self-reported
destination. As mentioned earlier, some of the self-reported entries are not always up to date at
all points in time. The vessels with unknown destination reports typically report that they have
armed guards on-board, or that they are open for orders10.
We turn to the trading locations for laden vessels which ”fix” with a loading port within the
Arabian Gulf. Figure 1.4 shows the location for laden vessels at the time when their fixture is
reported. The figure shows how laden vessels enter into new voyage charters as they approach
their destination region. We see vessels heading for West India and East India entering new trades
along the East African coast. Additionally, vessels approaching Sikka, Vadinar, and Jamnagar in
the Gulf of Kutch enter new trades. Vessels closing in on Visakhapatnam and Paradeep in the Gulf
of Bengal enter new fixtures as well. We see similar patterns for vessels heading for the SPORE
9SPORE consists of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
10Figure 1.8 in appendix 1.6 shows the fixing pattern for vessels in ballast which will load in West Africa. We
distinguish between vessels heading for the Arabian Gulf and West Africa by adding a condition. We categorize
vessels with a southwest bound course, positioned south of the latitude of 3.9 degrees as vessel heading towards West
Africa even if they report a destination within the Arabian Gulf.
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Figure 1.3: Locations where vessels in ballast enter fixtures with a loading port in the
Arabian Gulf
This figure shows the trading locations for 1064 voyage charters for vessels in ballast with a loading port
within the Arabian Gulf. The distribution of the reported destinations is 614 within the Arabian Gulf,
and 316 within the SPORE region. The SPORE region consists of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Seventy-four are heading towards the Far East which covers China,
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Thirty-two has an unknown destination, 14 are heading for the East
Coast of India, 6 for West Africa, 3 for West Coast of India, and 5 have other destinations. The vessels with
an unknown destination signal that they are open for orders or that they carry armed security guards.
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Figure 1.4: Locations where laden vessels enter fixtures with a loading port in the
Arabian Gulf
This figure shows the trading locations for 495 voyage charters conducted by laden vessels. The voyage
charters all have a loading port in the Arabian Gulf. One hundred and fifty-three are heading for the
Far East which covers China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. One hundred and fourth-three are heading
for the SPORE region, which consists of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam. Ninety-seven are heading for West India, 38 for East India, 24 sits in the Arabian Gulf, 17 has
an unknown destination, and 23 have another destination. The vessels with unknown destination mainly
signal that they have armed guards on-board.
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region and the Far East. They also fix as they get close to their discharge port. Vessels going
towards the SPORE region start trading just west of the tip of India whereas vessels heading for
the Far East trade from just east of Singapore. A few laden vessels sitting in the Arabian Gulf are
also being chartered. In the smaller region segments, there are vessels heading for Egypt within
the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden11.
In summary, vessels in ballast enter into new voyage charters along the entire ballast leg from
the Far East and South East Asia to the Arabian Gulf. We also see that laden vessels enter new
voyage charters as they get close to the port of discharge. We will now set up the availability
measure based on the geographical trading patterns we have described in this section.
1.2.3 Construction of the Capacity Measure
In this section, we define our availability measure. The measure reflects the number of vessels
open for a voyage charter with a loading port within the Arabian Gulf divided by the number of
active vessels. The measure reflects the trading patterns as well as the employment status of the
fleet. The geographical component is based on AIS information and is chosen to match the trading
patterns described in section 1.2. The ratio is the percentage of vessels available for spot trading
divided by the of all active vessels in the VLCC fleet:
Ratiot =
Available V esselst
Active V esselst
. (1.2)
We expect the level of competition to increase when the ratio increases, as the number of
VLCCs available for spot trading increases with the ratio. The ratio is one when all active vessels
are also available for spot trading; this reflects a scenario of fierce competition among shipowners
for cargoes going out of the Arabian Gulf. The opposite extreme is when the ratio approaches
zero. In this case, all vessels have either already found new employment or are not satisfying the
geographical restrictions. This resembles a situation where cargo owners in the Arabian Gulf face
difficulties in securing ships for their cargoes and are forced to pay premium rates in the spot
market.
11In Figure 1.4 it looks as if a vessel is laden in the Suez channel, which is not possible for a VLCC. This is not
the case, however, as the tip of the arrows indicates the exact location of a vessel. VLCCs do use the Suez channel.
When they do, they oﬄoad part of their cargo which then gets transported by a pipeline and later reloaded onto
the vessel.
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Active vessels
At any given point in time, we consider a VLCC active if she has been delivered for service and
is trading in the market. We discard the vessels of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
Before 16 January 2016, Iran faced embargo restrictions from the European Union and the United
States of America. From the AIS data, we can see that NIOC vessels carry out voyages to the
Far East both before and after 16 January, 2016. They do not show up in our sample of publicly
reported fixtures, however, and for this reason, we discard the NIOC vessels from our analysis.
Available vessels
We characterize a vessel as available if she satisfies certain geographical restrictions and has not
already entered into a new voyage contract. Starting with the geographical restriction, a vessel is
available if she is either sailing in ballast towards the Arabian Gulf, or carrying cargo and about
to reach her destination. To be explicit about our restrictions, a vessel is available if:
1. She is in ballast and within a sailing distance of 6264 n.m. of the Arabian Gulf12, which is
equivalent to 18 days of sailing at 14.5 knots. Furthermore, she has to have a self-reported
destination within the Arabian Gulf or the SPORE region13. We exclude vessels heading
towards West Africa by removing vessels in ballast positioned south of the latitude of 3.9 on
a southwest-bound course, i.e. courses between 90◦ and 270◦. In addition, we also consider
vessels in ballast with a self-reported destination in the Far East within 2000 n.m. of Chiba.
We do this to account for the vessels in ballast that fix from a port in the Far East, and the
vessels which have started their ballast leg but not yet updated their destination status.
2. She is laden, has a self-reported destination within West Coast India or East Coast India,
and is within 4000 n.m. of Sikka1415.
3. She is laden, has a self-reported destination within the Far East16, and is within 2000 n.m.
of Chiba, Japan17.
12Figure 1.9 in appendix 1.7 illustrates the boundary.
13Some vessels use the self-reported destination field to indicate that they are available. An example is a self-
reported destination being ”FOR ORDERS” or simply ”ORDERS”. These are considered available in addition to
vessels with destinations within the Arabian Gulf.
14Figure 1.10 in appendix 1.7 illustrates the boundary.
15Vessels sailing along the East Coast of Africa typically change their destination to signal that they have armed
guards on-board. To mitigate this feature, we also consider laden vessels less than 4000 n.m. from Sikka as available.
16The Far East covers China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
17Figure 1.11 in appendix 1.7 illustrates the boundary.
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4. She is laden, has a self-reported destination within the SPORE region and is within 1740
n.m. of Singapore18.
Lay-up and floating storage
A vessel will also be unavailable to charterers if she is in lay-up or used for floating storage. Vessels
in lay-up will typically switch off their transponder and are therefore not included in our sample
of available vessels; at the same time, a vessel in hot lay-up near Singapore will potentially be
misclassified as available when she satisfies the geographical restrictions. Similarly, vessels on time
charter, which are reported to be used as floating storage facilities are classified as unavailable.
Trading status
In addition to the geographical restrictions, we also limit availability based on the trading status
of the individual vessels. Vessels can be unavailable for charterers if they have already entered into
a voyage charter or a time charter. A voyage charter contract yields a lump sum payment for a
voyage from port A to port B, and the shipowner is responsible for paying port fees, fuel costs,
and crew wages. In the case of a time charter, the charterer leases the vessel for a specific pe-
riod, which can range from a couple of months to several years. The charterer pays the shipowner
a daily hire and is responsible for paying port fees, and fuel costs, in contrast to the voyage charter.
It is obviously harder to determine whether a vessel on a time charter is competing for voyage
charter fixtures. As an example, consider a vessel which is time-chartered by an oil company. The
vessel can then be internally employed and will not be competing in the voyage charter market.
However, if the oil company is unable to employ the vessel internally they have the option to let
the vessel compete for fixtures in the voyage charter market. We have chosen to consider vessels
which are time-chartered by oil companies as unavailable. However, we do consider vessels which
are time-chartered by shipping companies or operators as available.
We will now turn to the availability restrictions for vessels in the voyage charter market.
Naturally, once a vessel enters into voyage charter, it is expected that she will stop being available
in the spot market. This is not always the case. There are cases of a vessel being reported as
18Figure 1.12 in appendix 1.7 illustrates the boundary.
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fixed, only for this to fall through after a few days (in which case the charter is said to have ”failed
on subjects”). We therefore observe vessels entering into multiple voyage charters within time
windows that do not allow for both fixtures. We do not have data on which fixtures that fail on
subjects. We disregard this issue and consider a vessel ineligible for additional trading once she has
secured employment. We use the reported day of the fixtures and information on the laycan period
to capture the feature that vessels become unavailable once they have traded. The laycan period
is the time window within which the shipowner must tender notice of readiness to the charterer.
The notice of readiness announces that the ship has arrived at the loading port and is ready to
load the cargo. We consider a vessel as restricted from trade from the day the fixture is reported
and until 5 days after the last known laycan day. The five days are added as vessels do not always
update their self-reported draught immediately after loading. Most vessels continue to carry out
their fixture five days past the last laycan day. They should therefore not be considered available.
This is picked up by the geographical restrictions. Five days past the last known laycan day, the
vessels have changed their draught report and will then be considered laden. Whether the vessel
is then considered available depends on its sailing distance to its destination region.
1.3 Summary Statistics
We will now provide summary statistics and unit root tests for the time-series. Figure 1.5 and
Figure 1.6 show time series plots of the TD3 spot, the FFA rate, the Ratio, the average speed of
the fleet in knots, the average speed of laden vessels in knots, the average speed of vessels in ballast
measured in knots, bunker prices in $ per metric ton, fleet size measure in the number of vessels,
and Clarkson’s time-series of vessels due to arrive in the Arabian Gulf within the next four weeks.
Table 1.3 lists the range, median, average, and standard deviation for both the levels and log
differences of the series. The voyage charter freight rate has an average over the sample period
of $14.9/mt and ranges between $6.5/mt and $24.9/mt. The ratio has an average of 33.8% and
ranges between 28.3% and 39.5%. The average speed for the entire fleet is 12.3 knots on average
and ranges between 11.6 knots and 12.7 knots. For the differenced series, averages do not differ
significantly from zero. Jarque and Bera (1980) tests reject the null hypothesis that the skewness
and kurtosis of the spot rates, FFA rates, and the ratio match the skewness and kurtosis of a
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normal distribution. Table 1.4 shows Dickey and Fuller (1981), Phillips (1988), and Kwiatkowski
et al. (1992) unit root tests. The results show that spot freight rates, FFA rates and bunker prices
are non-stationary while their log differences are stationary. On the other hand, the capacity ratio,
the average total speed, the average ballast speed and the average laden speed are stationary.
Figure 1.5: Time series plots 1
This figure shows the TD3 Spot and TD3 FFA series in $ per mt. The Ratio is the ratio of available vessels
to active vessels. Speed is the average speed of the fleet in knots for vessels sailing above 6 knots. The
sample period runs from 14 November, 2014 to 26 August, 2016, and the sampling frequency is weekly.
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Figure 1.6: Time series plots 2
This figure shows the average speed in knots for both the laden vessels and the vessels in ballast, and the
380 cst Fujairah bunker price in $ per mt.
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Figure 1.7: Time series plots 3
This figure shows the fleet size and Clarkson’s measure of vessels due in the Arabian Gulf within the next
four weeks.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics. The sample period runs from 14 November 2014 to 26 August 26,
2016 and time-series have a weekly frequency. Both the TD3 Spot and TD3 FFA series are in $ per mt.
The Ratio is the ratio between available vessels and active vessels. Speed is the weekly average of the fleet’s
speed in knots for vessels sailing above 6 knots. Similarly, the ballast speed and laden speed are the average
speeds for the vessels sailing in ballast and laden respectively. Fuel is the 380 cst Fujairah bunker price in $
per mt. Fleet size is the number of VLCCs in the fleet and vessels due are the expected number of vessels
which will reach the Arabian Gulf within the next four weeks. The sample period is from the 14 November,
2014 to the 26 August, 2016, and the sampling frequency is weekly.
Panel A: Levels
Average Std Median Min Max
TD3 Spot 14.9 4.5 15.6 6.5 24.9
TD3 FFA 14.1 3.5 14.7 7.5 20.6
Ratio 33.8 2.1 33.8 28.3 39.5
Speed 12.3 0.2 12.3 11.6 12.7
Speed Ballast 12.2 0.2 12.2 11.5 12.6
Speed Laden 12.4 0.3 12.4 11.6 13
Bunker Fuel Price 268.3 78 251.5 139 465
Fleet Size 651.1 14.4 650 633 677
Vessels Due 100.2 13.5 101 48 131
Panel B: ln Differences
Average Std Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis J-B Statistic J-B p-value
TD3 Spot 0.003 0.05 0.002 -0.1 0.3 1.9 10.3 473.2 0
TD3 FFA 0.002 0.04 0.001 -0.2 0.2 0.5 6.8 184.0 0
Ratio -0.002 0.1 -0.002 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7
Speed 0 0.01 0.001 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 1.0
Speed Ballast 0 0.01 0 -0.03 0.04 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.9
Speed Laden 0.001 0.01 0.001 -0.04 0.03 -0.3 1.7 13.6 0.001
Bunker Fuel Price -0.01 0.1 -0.02 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 3.5 0.2
Fleet Size 0.001 0.002 0 -0.002 0.01 2.7 7.5 344.6 0
Vessels Due 0.001 0.2 0.02 -0.5 0.6 0.4 2.7 33.5 0
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Table 1.4: Unit root tests
This table shows test statistics for unit root tests. ADF is the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981) test.
The lag order is chosen by minimizing the SBIC criteria, Schwarz (1978). The ADF regression includes an
intercept. PP is the Phillips (1988) test. The critical values for the ADF and PP test are -3.51 at a 1%
level, and -2.89 for a 5% level. KPSS is the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) unit root test. The null hypothesis
in the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test states that the time series is stationary. The critical values are 0.463
at a 5% level, and 0.739 at a 1% level. We use log differences for the unit root tests of the differenced time
series. Asterisks denote significant tests such that ** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, and *
indicates significance at a 5% level.
ADF L ADF D PP L PP D KPSS L KPSS D
TD3 Spot -2.494 -7.925** -2.580 -10.127** 0.914** 0.097
TD3 FFA -1.435 -7.473** -1.238 -9.213** 1.093** 0.164
Ratio -3.618** -9.381** -5.460** -15.168** 0.224 0.053
Speed -2.834 -8.402** -3.537** -11.024** 0.688* 0.597*
Speed Laden -3.368* -9.184** -4.339* -14.153** 1.400** 0.216
Speed Ballast -2.392 -8.240** -2.960* -12.440** 0.350 0.431
Bunker Fuel Price -2.490 -5.969** -2.603 -9.285** 1.655** 0.270
Fleet Size 0.850 -8.956** 1.158 -11.360** 2.411** 0.408
Vessels Due -4.380** -9.641** -5.506** -14.166** 0.192 0.048
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Comparison with traditional supply measures
In this section, we compare our AIS capacity measure with the traditional supply measures. The
traditional measures are fleet size and the speed of the vessels in the merchant fleet, Beenstock and
Vergottis (1989). The empirical analysis of shipping market supply measures are mainly conducted
with annual and monthly frequencies. Before AIS data was available, the speed of vessels were
unobservable to the econometricians which therefore relied on proxies to capture the dynamics of
the speed of the fleet. In a Ronen (1982) model framework, the natural logarithm of the optimal
speed is linearly related to the natural logarithm of the ratio between freight rates and bunker
prices, (Aßmann et al., 2015; Adland and Jia, 2016). In addition to fleet size and the freight rate
bunker ratio, we also look at the number of VLCCs due in the Arabian Gulf within the next 4
weeks reported by Clarkson’s shipping intelligence network.
Table 1.5 shows predictive regressions for the weekly evolution in freight rates for the traditional
supply measures and the AIS-based supply measures. We find that the traditional measures of
supply are unable to explain the weekly-evolution in freight rates. We find a significant effect from
our ratio of available vessels to active vessels and from the fleet speed of vessels sailing in ballast.
In column (10) we test the joint significance of the ratio and the ballasting speed. The F-test for
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the joint removal is rejected even though the p-value for both variables, (the p-value for the ratio
is 6.61% and similarly the p-value for the ballasting speed is 5.98%.), are insignificant at a five
percent level. In Table 1.6, we show estimation results for predictive regressions of the fleet speed
for vessels sailing either laden or in ballast. First, we see that the ratio between freight rates and
bunker prices is unable to explain the evolution in vessel speeds. Second, we see that the level of
the ratio between freight rates and bunker prices is able to explain some of the variation in the
speed level of the vessels sailing in ballast. In the predictive regression of the speed level of vessels
sailing laden the p-value of the coefficient for the level of the freight rate bunker price ratio is
5.32% and therefore close to being significant. The result that the speed level of vessels sailing in
ballast is more responsive to the freight rate bunker price ratio is consistent with Aßmann et al.
(2015) and Adland and Jia (2016). The missing responses in laden vessel speeds have been argued
to be a result of charter party speed clauses, (Devanney, 2011; Adland and Jia, 2016).
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Table 1.5: Predictive regressions on supply measures
This table shows predictive regressions of the weekly evolution in freight rates on the supply measures: the
number of available vessels over the number of active vessels, fleet size, the freight rate bunker price ratio,
the fleet speed of vessels sailing in ballast, the fleet speed of vessels sailing laden, the number of VLCCs due
to arrive in the Arabian Gulf within the next four weeks. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: ln differences in the TD3 freight rate
∆TD3t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆ lnRatiot−1 −0.567∗ −0.522
(0.284) (0.281)
∆ lnFleetsizet−1 6.892
(9.243)
lnFleetsizet−1 −0.001
(0.003)
∆ ln(TD3/Bunker)t−1 −0.029
(0.102)
ln(TD3/Bunker)t−1 0.001
(0.006)
∆ lnSpeedt−1
Ballast
2.484∗ 2.296
(1.216) (1.205)
∆ lnSpeedt−1
Laden
−1.678
(1.492)
∆ ln(V essels Due)t−1 −0.152
(0.111)
ln(V essels Due)t−1 −0.002
(0.004)
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
R2 0.042 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.0005 0.043 0.014 0.020 0.002 0.078
Adjusted R2 0.031 −0.005 −0.008 −0.010 −0.010 0.033 0.003 0.009 −0.00 0.058
F Statistic 3.994∗ 0.556 0.226 0.084 0.044 4.170∗ 1.265 1.890 0.224 3.870∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 1.6: Predictive regressions of fleet speed
This table shows predictive regressions of the weekly speeds on the lagged ratio between freight rates and
bunker prices. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: ln speed differences
∆ lnSpeedt
Ballast
∆ lnSpeedt
Ballast
∆ lnSpeedt
Laden
∆ lnSpeedt
Laden
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(TD3/Bunker)t−1 0.014 0.009
(0.009) (0.007)
ln(TD3/Bunker)t−1 −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.001) (0.0004)
Observations 93 93 93 93
R2 0.027 0.0002 0.018 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.016 −0.011 0.008 −0.008
F Statistic (df = 1; 92) 2.534 0.015 1.712 0.287
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Dependent variable: ln speed levels
lnSpeedt
Ballast
lnSpeedt
Ballast
lnSpeedt
Laden
lnSpeedt
Laden
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 2.521∗∗∗ 2.654∗∗∗ 2.500∗∗∗ 2.524∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.012)
∆ ln(TD3/Bunker)t−1 −0.004 −0.013
(0.016) (0.010)
ln(TD3/Bunker)t−1 0.046∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.005) (0.004)
Observations 93 93 93 93
R2 0.001 0.514 0.019 0.040
Adjusted R2 −0.010 0.508 0.008 0.030
F Statistic (df = 1; 91) 0.062 96.166∗∗∗ 1.719 3.836
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
1.4.2 The FFA spot rate vector error correction model
In this section, we nest our measure into the VECM framework to see whether the freight rate
price discovery of our measure is already captured by the FFA price. This also allows us to study
the lead-lag relationship between our availability measure and the spot freight rate. Granger
(1981), Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988), and Johansen (1995) introduced the VECM
framework. We start by considering the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model representation. We
set up the VECM from the Vector Autoregressive VAR model with p lags. We assume that all
individual variables are either I(1) (integrated of order one), or I(0) (integrated of order zero) such
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that stationarity can be achieved in all of the k variables by taking first differences. The VAR(p)
model is defined by:
yt =
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i + ut. (1.3)
where yt is a k×1 vector containing the levels of the time series, Ai are k×k matrices of coefficients
for i ∈ {1, · · · , p}, and ut is an error term of dimension k×1. ut is a white noise process and has a
contemporaneous covariance matrix Σ of dimension k × k. By subtracting yt−1 on both sides, we
take the first difference, and since all variables are either I(1) or I(0), this will achieve stationarity.
We then arrive at the vector error correction form:
∆yt = αβ
′yt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γi∆yt−i + ut. (1.4)
where ∆ denotes the first difference operator such that ∆yt = yt−yt−1. αβ′yt−1 is the error correc-
tion term which is related to the VAR(p) model in equation (1.3) by αβ′ = −(Ik−A1−· · ·−Ap)19.
Furthermore, Γi = −(Ai+1 + · · · + Ap) for i = {1, ..., p − 1}. Both α and β are k × r matrices
where r is the number of cointegration relationships. β′yt−1 gives a stationary linear combination
of variables in levels. The FFA spot basis has been used in many studies of vector error correction
models of spot freight rates and FFA prices. It is therefore natural to nest our new availability
measure into a model of this class. See Kavussanos and Nomikos (1999), Kavussanos and Nomikos
(2003), Kavussanos, Visvikis and Menachof (2004), Batchelor et al. (2007), and Alexandridis et al.
(2017) for VEC freight rate models.
We will now show the estimated results of the vector error correction model containing the spot
freight rate, the FFA price, and the ratio. This is the simplest extension of the Kavussanos and
Nomikos (1999), Kavussanos and Nomikos (2003), Kavussanos, Visvikis and Menachof (2004), and
Batchelor et al. (2007) type VECM specification, which contains our capacity measure, in addition
to the spot freight rate and the FFA price.
yt = [lnTD3t lnFFAt lnRatiot]
We estimate a VECM with one lag as Table 1.7 suggests that one lag minimizes the SBIC criteria,
19Ik is the identity matrix of dimension k.
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(Schwarz, 1978). The we test for the number of cointegration relationships. In our specification,
we restrict lnRatiot to zero in the cointegration vector as unit root tests from Table 1.4 suggest
that the ratio is stationary in levels. We then test whether the cointegration rank for lnTD3t and
lnFFAt is zero or one. Both the Johansen (1991) eigenvalue test in Table 1.8 and the trace test in
Table 1.9 suggest that the cointegration rank is one. Furthermore, the over-identification restric-
tion test in Table 1.10 shows that the cointegration relationship can be restricted to be the basis
of the voyage charter freight rate and the one-month FFA price. We then estimate the coefficients
α and Γ1 from equation (1.4), which are shown in Table 1.11. The evolution of the voyage charter
rate is negatively related to the basis of the voyage charter rate and the FFA price. This means
that the voyage charter rate tends to increase(decrease) when the FFA price is above(below) the
voyage charter rate. The voyage charter rate tends to decrease(increase) after an increase(decrease)
in the ratio.
In order to clarify the economic magnitude, we consider a one standard deviation decrease in
our capacity measure. In Table 1.3, we see that the sample average of our capacity measure is
33.8%, corresponding to 211 vessels satisfying the availability restrictions and 624 active vessels
on average during our sample period. A one standard deviation decrease in our capacity measure,
i.e. 2.220 percentage points between period t− 1 and period t, implies an increase in freight rates
of approximately21 3.75%. At the average freight rate level, this corresponds to an increase in the
freight rate of $0.56/mt, which leads to an increase in gross freight revenue equal to $151,200 for
a typical cargo-size of 270,000mt. The evolution in the FFA prices cannot be explained by the
past values of the ratio, voyage charter rates, FFA prices, nor the difference between the voyage
charter rate and the FFA price. The Ratio exhibits negative autocorrelation and also has a neg-
ative relation to the past evolution in the voyage charter rate. This causes a feedback effect such
that the ratio which reflects the number of available vessels decreases after an increase in freight
rates. We interpret this as vessels being more willing to enter fixtures when freight rates increase.
Simultaneously, when fewer vessels are available, freight rates tend to increase.
Our sample period is November 2014 and August 2016. Our sample overlaps with the global
20At the average values, this corresponds to a decrease in available vessels from 211 to 197.
21All other things being equal, a one standard deviation decrease in our capacity measure will, at the sample
average values for the ratio and the freight rate, increase freight rates by 3.75%= −0.558 · ln
(
¯Ratio−sd(Ratio)
¯Ratio
)
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Oil Glut during which oil prices dropped significantly. Expenses for bunker fuel is as mentioned
the main component of voyage costs. A natural concern is that oil price movements are driving
the evolution in freight rates. We control for oil prices in two ways. First, we add bunker prices to
the predictive regression. Second, we look at predictive regressions for the time charter equivalent
freight rate earnings. In table 1.12, we see that when we control for bunker prices the ratio becomes
significant at a five percent level rather than only at the ten percent level. Furthermore, results
in table 1.13 shows that results are statistically even stronger when we look at the time charter
equivalent earnings rather than the freight rate.
Table 1.7: Lag selection
This table shows the SBIC criteria (Schwarz, 1978). The VECM is estimated with one lag as it minimizes
the SBIC.
Lags 1 2 3 4 5
SBIC -14.048 -13.895 -13.778 -13.616 -13.362
Table 1.8: Cointegration eigenvalue test
This table shows the Johansen (1991) cointegration eigenvalue test for yt = [lnTD3t lnFFAt lnRatiot].
The Ratiot coefficient is restricted to zero in the cointegration term as the unit root test in Table 1.4
indicates that it is stationary. ECTt = lnTD3t − 1.24 lnFFAt + 0.58
Eigenvalue test Test Statistic 10pct 5pct 1pct
H0 : r ≤ 1 3.62 7.52 9.24 12.97
H0 : r = 0 17.69 13.75 15.67 20.20
Table 1.9: Cointegration trace test
This table shows the Johansen (1991) cointegration trace test for yt = [lnTD3t lnFFAt lnRatiot]. The
Ratiot coefficient is restricted to zero in the cointegration term as the unit root test in Table 1.4 indicates
it is stationary. ECTt = lnTD3t − 1.24 lnFFAt + 0.58
Trace test Test Statistic 10pct 5pct 1pct
H0 : r ≤ 1 3.62 7.52 9.24 12.97
H0 : r = 0 21.31 17.85 19.96 24.60
Table 1.10: Over-identification restriction test
This table shows the linear restriction test. It tests whether the cointegration vector can be reduced to the
spot-FFA basis.
ECTt = lnTD3t + β1 lnFFAt + β2 Test statistic p-value
H0 : β1 = −1, β2 = 0 3.7386 0.4425
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Table 1.11: VECM estimation
This table shows the coefficients of the vector error correction model from equation (1.4) where p = 2 and
the error correction term is ECTt = β
′yt = [lnTD3t − lnFFAt].
Variance inflation factors VIFi =
1
1−R2i
are
VIF(ECTt−1) = 1.21
VIF(∆ lnRatiot−1) = 1.01
VIF(∆ lnTD3t−1) = 1.61
VIF(∆ lnFFAt−1) = 1.60
Dependent variable:
y
∆ lnTD3t ∆ lnFFAt ∆ lnRatiot
(1) (2) (3)
∆ lnRatiot−1 −0.558∗ 0.028 −0.439∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.192) (0.089)
∆ lnTD3t−1 0.029 0.069 −0.114∗∗
(0.122) (0.086) (0.040)
∆ lnFFAt−1 0.061 −0.231 −0.032
(0.187) (0.133) (0.062)
lnTD3t−1 − lnFFAt−1 −0.343∗∗∗ −0.086 0.050
(0.096) (0.068) (0.031)
Observations 92 92 92
R2 0.191 0.040 0.314
Adjusted R2 0.155 −0.003 0.283
F Statistic (df = 4; 88) 5.205∗∗∗ 0.925 10.074∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 1.12: Predictive regressions
This table shows predictive regressions where the error correction term is ECTt = β
′yt = [lnTD3t −
lnFFAt]. Standard errors are in parentheses. VIFi =
1
1−R2i
in column (6) are
VIF(ECTt−1) = 1.24
VIF(∆ lnRatiot−1) = 1.03
VIF(∆ lnTD3t−1) = 1.84
VIF(∆ lnFFAt−1) = 1.67
VIF(∆ lnBunkert−1) = 1.14
VIF
(
∆ lnSpeedt−1
Ballast
)
= 1.07
VIF
(
∆ lnSpeedt−1
Laden
)
= 1.04
Dependent variable:
∆ lnTD3t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnRatiot−1 −0.544∗ −0.493 −0.523 −0.539∗
(0.263) (0.257) (0.268) (0.267)
∆ lnSpeedt−1
Ballast
2.784∗ 2.603∗ 2.452∗ 2.472∗
(1.119) (1.107) (1.157) (1.155)
∆ lnSpeedt−1
Laden
−1.118 −1.163
(1.395) (1.393)
∆ lnTD3t−1 0.008 0.058
(0.121) (0.128)
∆ lnFFAt−1 0.035 −0.006
(0.184) (0.187)
∆ lnBunkert−1 −0.287
(0.246)
lnTD3t−1 − lnFFAt−1 −0.350∗∗∗ −0.346∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗∗ −0.359∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.358∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.094) (0.094)
Observations 93 93 93 93 92 92
R2 0.149 0.187 0.203 0.234 0.241 0.253
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.169 0.186 0.209 0.188 0.191
F Statistic 16.100∗∗∗ 10.483∗∗∗ 11.602∗∗∗ 9.182∗∗∗ 4.545∗∗∗ 4.107∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 1.13: Predictive regressions for the time charter equivalent earnings
This table shows predictive regressions for the evolution in time charter equivalent earnings. The error
correction term is ECTt = β
′yt = [lnTD3TCEt − lnFFATCEt]. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
∆ lnTD3TCEt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ lnRatiot−1 −0.743∗ −0.673∗ −0.731∗ −0.763∗
(0.338) (0.329) (0.339) (0.335)
∆ lnSpeedt−1
Ballast
3.838∗∗ 3.596∗ 3.224∗ 3.254∗
(1.434) (1.415) (1.466) (1.450)
∆ lnSpeedt−1
Laden
−1.380 −1.472
(1.766) (1.747)
∆ lnTD3TCEt−1 −0.004 0.089
(0.150) (0.157)
∆ lnFFATCEt−1 0.239 0.170
(0.220) (0.221)
∆ lnBunkert−1 −0.534
(0.309)
lnTD3TCEt−1 − lnFFATCEt−1 −0.500∗∗∗ −0.502∗∗∗ −0.517∗∗∗ −0.517∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗ −0.526∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.103) (0.102) (0.100) (0.107) (0.106)
Observations 93 93 93 93 92 92
R2 0.198 0.239 0.257 0.290 0.306 0.330
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.222 0.241 0.266 0.258 0.275
F Statistic 22.783∗∗∗ 14.290∗∗∗ 15.736∗∗∗ 12.253∗∗∗ 6.332∗∗∗ 5.980∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
1.4.3 Evidence from fixtures
In this section, we will look at the evidence from the individual voyage charter fixtures. We will
estimate a freight rate panel-regression for the individual fixtures as in Alizadeh and Talley (2011)
and Adland et al. (2016). In this way we control, for vessel- and fixture-specific characteristics.
We estimate regression coefficients in a fixtures regression where we regress the natural logarithm
of the freight rate on the natural logarithm of the ratio. We also control for the utilization rate of
the vessel given as the cargo size in mt divided by the vessel’s dead weight tons, a dummy equal
to one if the vessel is more than 15 years old, the DWT(in 100,000) of the vessel, the ln distance
from the vessel to the loading region, the natural logarithm of the bunker price at the time where
the fixture is reported, the natural logarithm of of the FFA price at the time where the fixture is
reported, and charterer and owner effects.
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The expected signs of the regression coefficients are the following: We expect our capacity mea-
sure to be negatively related to the freight rate level as rates should be higher when there are fewer
vessels available for orders. The utilization rate is expected to be negatively related to the freight
rate, the reason being that the differences in voyage costs for a fully loaded and partially loaded
vessel are not substantially different. A partially loaded vessel will still need to pay port charges
and sail to the discharge port. Hence, a partially loaded cargo should result in a high freight rate
in $ per ton given the lower amount of tons. Freight rates are expected to be decreasing with
age as charterers’ vetting requirements favor younger vessels. We include a dummy for whether
the vessel’s age is above 15 years. The freight rate is expected to decrease in vessel size given the
increasing returns to scale in size. Freight rates are expected to increase with the vessel’s distance
to the loading region. The intuition here is that when freight rates are high there are few vessels
close to the loading region and the charterers need to book vessels far away to make sure that they
find a vessel for their cargo. Bunker prices are expected to be positively related to the freight rate
as bunker fuel constitutes the main voyage costs. When voyage costs are high, shipowners pass
through costs to charterers by demanding a higher freight rate. Finally, the FFA price is expected
to be positive and close to 1 given the well established long-run cointegration relationship between
spot rates and FFA rates.
We do not include the TD3 index as an independent variable. We leave out the TD3 index
given the recent critique by Adland, Cariou and Wolff (2017) who argue that including the index
itself potentially captures part of the heterogeneity. We estimate the regression coefficients of the
specification:
lnFRi,t = β0 + β1 lnRatiot + β2Utilizationi,t + β31{Agei,t>15} + β4DWTi,t + β5 lnDist to AGi,t
+ β6 lnBunkert + β7 lnFFAt + i,t. (1.5)
The panel regression results in Table 1.14 show that our capacity measure is negatively corre-
lated with the freight rate even after adjusting for vessel-specific effects in the form of vessel age,
size and macro variables bunker prices, and FFA prices. The ratio is insignificant in column (7)
when we estimate both owner and charterer effects22. Most of the coefficients align well with our
22Here the p-value of the t-test is 0.0566. The coefficient estimate is close to the estimate in specification (6) which
only includes owner effects.
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expectations. We see that the utilization rate point estimates are generally negative but insignif-
icant. Vessels, which are older than 15 years, have a negative point estimate, but it is generally
insignificant. The size measured by the vessel’s DWT also has a negative but again insignificant
point estimates in the different specifications. Distance to the loading has a positive but generally
insignificant point estimate. Bunker prices as expected, are positively related to the freight rates.
This is what we expect as higher bunker prices increase voyage costs, which in turn need to be
compensated for through a higher freight rate paid by charterers. Finally, we see that the effect
of our capacity measure is still significant after we control for the FFA price.
Table 1.14: Fixtures regression
This table shows regressions where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of freight rate.
Dependent variable:
lnFreight Ratet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
lnRatiot −0.86∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗ −0.57∗ −0.49∗ −0.48 −0.42∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.37∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Utilizationi,t −1.64 −1.60 −1.91 −1.81 −1.45 0.63 −2.19∗∗ −2.46∗∗ −1.29
(1.51) (1.51) (1.44) (1.44) (1.59) (2.11) (0.70) (0.76) (1.01)
1{Agei,t>15} −0.13∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.08∗ −0.07 −0.08 −0.05 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
DWTi,t −0.55 −0.54 −0.58 −0.57 −0.43 0.16 −0.60∗∗ −0.74∗∗ −0.41
(0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.44) (0.50) (0.63) (0.21) (0.24) (0.30)
lnDistance to AGi,t 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnBunkerPricet 0.31
∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
lnFFAt 1.06
∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Intercept 1.66∗∗∗ 4.79 4.71 3.65 3.39 2.50 −1.44 2.26 2.83∗ 0.71
(0.25) (2.70) (2.71) (2.59) (2.59) (2.91) (3.76) (1.26) (1.40) (1.80)
Owner No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Charterer No No No No No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475
R2 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.27 0.33 0.80 0.83 0.85
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.79 0.80 0.80
F Stat. 13.86∗∗∗ 6.70∗∗∗ 5.41∗∗∗ 14.67∗∗∗ 12.69∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 261.02∗∗∗ 26.14∗∗∗ 18.75∗∗∗
F Stat. df (1; 473) (4; 470) (5; 469) (5; 469) (6; 468) (75; 399) (107; 367) (7; 467) (76; 398) (108; 366)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
1.5 Conclusion
Recently, the vessel movements in the freight market has become observable via the radio signals
sent by vessels’ Automatic Identification System. AIS information enables freight market partic-
ipants to track the movement of vessels within any commercial segment. This paper is the first
to use an AIS derived capacity measure to explain the evolution in voyage charter freight rates.
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Our measure incorporates the geographical trading patterns observed in the VLCC market. We
find that AIS supply measures are able to explain the short-term freight rate evolution where
traditional supply measures such as fleet size are uninformative. Our sample period falls within
the recent Oil Glut where the oil price experienced a severe drop. We find that our results get
statistically stronger when we control for bunker prices or model the evolution in the time charter
equivalent earnings.
Our findings suggest that AIS measures can explain parts of the freight rate evolution, which
is not already explained by traditional supply measures or FFA prices. We find that the evolution
of freight rates depends on the fleet’s geographical distribution as well as its employment status.
We find that there is an considerable economic magnitude of our measure. We see that a standard
deviation decrease in our capacity measure (decrease of 14 available vessels) leads to an increase
in the freight rate level of $0.56/mt. This corresponds to an increase in the gross freight revenue
equal to $151,200 for a typical cargo size of 270,000mt. Furthermore, we also find that the speed
of vessels in ballast explains part of the freight rate evolution. When vessels in ballast start sailing
faster(slower) this is a sign that freight rates will increase(decrease) in the following week. We
encourage future research on the interplay between freight rates and AIS based measures in longer
sample periods and other commercial shipping segments.
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1.6 Appendix: Fixing location for vessels sailing in ballast with
a loading port in West Africa
Figure 1.8 shows vessels in ballast entering into fixtures loading in West Africa. East of Singapore,
vessels are either heading for the SPORE region, the Far East or West Africa. This is similar to
the pattern for vessels loading in the Persian Gulf in Figure 1.3. West of Singapore some of the
vessels are on the direct ballast leg for West Africa, whereas others are following the ballast leg
towards the Arabian Gulf. This gives the impression that some ship operators maintain the option
of entering trades that load in West Africa when sailing towards the Arabian Gulf. They seem
to keep this option to redirect until they pass the tip of India. The small group of vessels in the
Gulf of Kutch and near Ras Tanura have not been sailed in ballast back from the Far East, but
have delivered Oil in the Gulf of Kutch. At first, it seems a bit strange that these vessels fix in
West Africa when the ballast leg to the Arabian Gulf is much shorter. An inspection of the sailing
patterns for these vessels shows that these vessels have just completed voyages to West India and
are picking up bunker fuel at Fujairah before sailing in ballast back to West Africa. Within the
Indian Ocean, there are three vessels having a self-reported destination in South Africa which in
our figure falls within the category: Other.
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Figure 1.8: Locations where vessels in ballast enter fixtures with a loading port in West
Africa
This figure shows the trading locations for 255 voyage charters of vessels which are on their ballast leg. The
voyage charter has a loading port in West Africa. 96 of the vessels report a destination within the SPORE
region which consists of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. 64 are
heading for West Africa, 50 are heading for the Arabian Gulf, 12 towards the Far East which covers China,
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 10 are unknown and 23 report other destinations.
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1.7 Appendix: Boundary conditions
This section contains plots of the boundary conditions.
Figure 1.9: Arabian Gulf proximity boundary for vessels in ballast
This figure shows vessel positions with a sailing distance to Fujairah (the big black dot) between 6124 n.m.
and 6264 n.m. which is illustrated by the small black dots. The small black dots gives an indication of
the boundary of availability condition 1. The triangles are positions of vessels which enter a fixture loading
in the Arabian Gulf. The colors of the triangles indicate whether the self-reported destination region is
SPORE or the Arabian Gulf.
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Figure 1.10: India proximity boundary for laden vessels
This figure shows vessel positions with a distance to Sikka (the big black dot) between 3900 n.m. and 4000
n.m. which is illustrated by the small black dots. The small black dots gives an indication of the boundary
of availability condition 2. The triangles are positions of vessels which enter a fixture loading in the Arabian
Gulf. The colors of the triangles indicate whether the self-reported destination region is the east coast of
India or the west coast of India.
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Figure 1.11: Far East proximity boundary for laden vessels
This figure shows vessel positions with a distance to Chiba (the big black dot) between 1900 n.m. and 2000
n.m. which is illustrated by the small black dots. The small black dots gives an indication of the boundary
of availability condition 3. The triangles are positions of vessels which enter a fixture loading in the Arabian
Gulf.
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Figure 1.12: Singapore proximity boundary for laden vessels
This figure shows vessel positions with a distance to Singapore (the big black dot) between 1600 n.m. and
1740 n.m. which is illustrated by the small black dots. The small black dots gives an indication of the
boundary of condition 4. The triangles are positions of vessels which enter a fixture loading in the Arabian
Gulf.
−25
0
25
50 75 100 125 150
longitude
la
tit
ud
e
Region
SPORE
45
46
Chapter 2
Crude Oil Contango Arbitrage and
the Floating Storage Decision
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Abstract
We investigate charterers’ ability and willingness to exploit floating storage arbitrage op-
portunities. Using time-series and fixtures data on time-charter rates, we find that arbitrage
opportunities were present during the Financial Crisis and the recent Oil Glut. An investiga-
tion of storage profits across storage horizons suggests that positive oil supply shocks favour
longer storage horizons than negative oil demand shocks. Evidence from spatial ship-tracking
data suggests charterers are reluctant to exploit the arbitrage opportunity when the implied
value of transportation from Forward Freight Agreements (FFAs) exceeds the storage profit.
Our findings are of interest to maritime economists and oil market participants.
Keywords— Contango, Crude Oil, Floating Storage, Forward Freight Agreements, Freight Rates, Time charter
rates.
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we evaluate the economics of the floating storage trade and the floating storage
decision of charterers. The floating storage trade is a simple cash and carry trade in the crude oil
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futures market. In addition to oil futures, the trade includes the leasing of an off-shore storage
facility, in our case a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC). A necessary condition for the floating
storage trade to be profitable is that the oil futures curve is upward-sloping i.e. the futures curve
is in contango.
To illustrate how the floating storage trade works, we consider a numerical example. A trader
buys 1 month Brent crude oil futures and sells 13 month Brent crude oil futures with principal of
two million barrels (2mbbl). After one month, the trader takes delivery and thereby gains physical
control of the crude oil for twelve months. When the trader takes delivery, she loads the oil into a
VLCC which has been chartered for twelve months to conduct the crude oil storage. The trader’s
profit is the price difference between the futures prices minus the costs associated with hiring and
operating the vessel, the transaction costs associated with trading the futures contracts, insurance
costs for the crude oil stored, and the financing costs of the trade. An example of income and
expense items is summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Numerical example
This table shows a numerical example of the floating storage trade for a VLCC with a capacity of 2 million
barrels (mbbl). The first column shows the items, the second column shows the expenses and the third
column shows the income.
Item Expenses Income
Oil purchase 2mbbl · $50.11/bbl = $100.22m
Trading costs $0.11m
Insurance costs $0.06m
Time-charter expenses $14.60m
Fuel costs $1.73m
Port charges $0.22m
Financing costs $0.60m
Oil sale 2mbbl · $61.24/bbl = $122.48m
Total $117.55m $122.48m
Profit $4.93m
The recent Oil Glut (2014-2016) and the Financial Crisis (2008-2009) both caused severe drops
in oil prices. The Financial Crisis led to an contraction the global economy and led to a steep
decline in demand for energy commodities including oil. This caused a significant decline in oil
prices. The Brent crude oil price dropped from 144.49 US dollars per barrel ($/bbl) on the 11th of
July, 2008 to $36.61/bbl on the 24th of December, 2008. The recent Oil Glut which was primarily
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caused by the North American shale oil revolution and OPEC’s decision1 to maintain production
levels also put a downward pressure on oil prices. Within the Oil Glut period, oil prices fell from
$103.19/bbl on the 29th of August, 2014 to $46.59/bbl on the 13th of January, 20152.
Despite their separate nature, the Oil Glut serving as a positive oil supply shock and the crisis
as a negative oil demand shock, both occasions led oil supply to exceed demand and moved the oil
futures curve into contango. The spread between the 13 month and 1 month Brent futures prices
reached $17.93/bbl on the 4th of December, 2008 and $12.02/bbl on the 13th of January, 2015. In
contango markets, commodity traders can earn an arbitrage profit if they are able to store oil at
an expense lower than the contango spread. On both occasions commodity traders actively leased
VLCCs to benefit from the contango market conditions:
”In order to capitalise on the contango structure we took on significant storage positions during
the course of the year and for a period of time a number of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs)
for use as floating storage.” Trafigura annual report 2015
The dual existence of arbitrageurs and arbitrage opportunities is associated with the inher-
ent paradox that if arbitrageurs are able to instantly correct mispricing then there should be no
arbitrage opportunities left in the data. However, if there are no arbitrage opportunities then
arbitrageurs have no incentive to monitor markets. Furthermore, even in the case where arbitrage
opportunities are observed empirically, they might be an artefact of frictions imposing limits to
arbitrage on the arbitrageurs, (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
The purpose of our paper is to investigate if floating storage arbitrage opportunities arise and
whether traders are both able and willing to exploit them. We evaluate the no-arbitrage relation
stating that agents cannot make an arbitrage profit by simultaneously trading in oil futures and
leasing a vessel on a time charter for storage purposes. The alternative usage of the vessel is
important as storage demand creates demand for tanker vessels in addition to the natural demand
for transportation. The floating storage trade has, however, received limited attention in the lit-
1The 166th Meeting of the OPEC, 27th of November, 2014.
2The Brent Oil price was $27.88/bbl at its lowest on the 20 January, 2016. However, the level of contango was
at its highest in January 2015.
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erature. Existing empirical studies fail to account for the shape of term-structure of time-charter
rates, rely solely on broker assessment of time-charter rates which are provided even when there are
no actual underlying trades, and do not investigate whether the hired tanker vessels are actually
used for floating storage.
Our research provides numerous contributions to the limited literature dealing with floating
storage. Firstly, our empirical evaluation of arbitrage opportunities is comprehensive and properly
accounts for both the time horizon of the oil futures trade and the shape of the term-structure of
tanker timecharter rates. Secondly, we point out how the value of the alternative use of the vessel
(i.e. for transportation rather than storage) should be accounted for and show how this can be
evaluated based on FFA prices. Thirdly, we also investigate the profitability of actual timecharter
transactions (fixtures) rather than basing the analysis only on standardized freight rate series.
The analysis of fixtures is important as the weekly time-charter rate time-series is an assessment
by brokers. This means that brokers provide a time-charter rate even when there are no actual
underlying fixtures in the relevant week, Adland et al. (2019). Finally, we evaluate the impact of
vessel specifications on the probability to be hired for storage by considering the ex-post usage of
chartered ships using geospatial (AIS) ship-tracking data.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related literature.
Section 2.3 presents the cash-and-carry trading strategy and the no-arbitrage condition. Section 2.4
presents the microeconomic evidence from time charter fixtures. Section 2.5 presents the evidence
on the actual usage of chartered ships using AIS ship-tracking data. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
The literature has mainly focused on the relationship between regional oil prices, geographical
arbitrage, and the relationship between refinery margins and the import of crude oil. Alizadeh
and Nomikos (2004) study the transatlantic arbitrage relationship. They consider an arbitrageur
who delivers Brent or Bonny crude oil under the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures contract.
In addition to the spot price of crude oil, the cost of carry includes financing costs, storage costs,
and transportation costs. A similar geographical cash and carry strategy is set forth in Ellefsen
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(2010) where the arbitrageur buys Dated Brent and sells futures on light Louisiana sweet crude oil.
The earlier paper of Mayr and Tamvakis (1999) looks at the cash and carry including the refinery
market. They show that crack spreads Granger causes US crude oil imports.
Acharya et al. (2013) model risk-averse oil producers with access to a storage technology and
capital constrained speculators. They study the relationship between managerial risk-aversion and
hedging activity for oil producers. Empirically, they find that proxies for hedging demand forecast
returns on oil futures. Kirilenko and Kruglova (2017) extend the Acharya et al. (2013) model by
adding carry traders who have access to an offshore storage technology. Empirically, they use bills
of lading3 to identify shipments from a trader to itself and use that as a proxy for speculative
storage. They show that their proxy of speculative floating storage is positively related to the
slope of the Brent futures curve and negatively related to storage costs.
Bucca and Cummins (2011) set forth a statistical arbitrage trading strategy based on mean-
reversion between floating storage costs and oil futures prices. They create a synthetic storage
price from freight rates and oil futures prices. In their synthetic storage price, they use the time
charter equivalent4 (TCE) of the spot rate for the TD3 route between Saudi Arabia and Japan.
Their usage of the TCE of voyage charter freight rates for storage horizons up to 12 months is an
implicit assumption that the term-structure of time charter rates is flat. As shown in Koekebakker
and Adland (2004), the true term-structure can have complex shapes and will typically not be flat.
Ghafouri and Davison (2017) value the rolling intrinsic storage value which can be added on
top of the static floating storage trade by rolling forward contracts. They model the evolution
in the land-locked WTI forward curve using the Schwartz and Smith (2000) two-factor model.
A limitation of using WTI forward contracts to evaluate the arbitrage is that a lack of available
pipeline capacity from Cushing to the US Gulf will impose limits to arbitrage. Ederington et al.
(2017) study the physical limits to storage arbitrage for WTI oil futures in Cushing. They find
3A Bill of Lading is a document that establishes the written evidence of a contract for the carriage and delivery
of goods sent by sea.
4When a charterer charters a vessel on voyage charter the freight rate covers voyage costs. However, when a
charterer charters a vessel on time charter voyage costs are not included. To make voyage charter freight rates
comparable with time charter rates, spot rates can be restated in terms of their time charter equivalent. The time
charter equivalent is quoted in $/day and is the freight income minus voyage costs divided with the number of voyage
days for the round trip.
51
that arbitrage opportunities persist when storage approaches onshore capacity limits. A limitation
of their approach is that they do not observe storage costs.
The previous papers evaluate the floating storage arbitrage by using either the landlocked WTI
futures contracts as in Ghafouri and Davison (2017), extrapolating the voyage charter TCEs to
obtain time-charter rates as in Bucca and Cummins (2011), or focus on the inherent short-term
storage associated with a voyage charter Alizadeh and Nomikos (2004), Mayr and Tamvakis (1999)
and Ellefsen (2010). We evaluate the floating storage economics using Brent crude oil which can
be loaded into VLCCs at the Sullom Voe terminal, thereby avoiding potential limits to arbitrage
due to limited pipeline capacity for the landlocked WTI.
To our knowledge we are the first to study how oil futures prices, time-charter rates and FFA
prices jointly relates to the floating storage decision i.e. the decision of whether to store oil or
transport oil. The previous literature on freight rate derivatives has primarily looked at their role
in price discovery and ability to forecast future physical freight rates (Kavussanos and Nomikos,
1999, 2003; Haigh, 2000; Kavussanos, Visvikis and Menachof, 2004; Batchelor et al., 2007; Goulas
and Skiadopoulos, 2012), hedging efficiency (Kavussanos and Nomikos, 2000b,0; Alizadeh, Huang
and van Dellen, 2015; Shi et al., 2017), and volatility spillover effects (Kavussanos and Visvikis,
2004; Kavussanos et al., 2010; Alizadeh, 2013; Li et al., 2014; Alexandridis et al., 2017).
The FFA literature suggests that freight derivatives incorporate market participants expecta-
tions of future realizations of spot rates. For short maturities FFAs have been shown to be unbiased
estimators, while monthly FFAs with longer maturities have been shown to be biased. The bias is
potentially partly caused by lower liquidity in the monthly FFAs with longer maturities (Alizadeh,
Kappou, Tsouknidis and Visvikis, 2015). In our paper, we use the FFA curve to represent the
implied earnings of operating a vessel in the voyage charter market as an alternative to floating
storage. The implied earnings from the FFA curve can also be viewed as a component in a FFA
hedged time charter trading strategy. The difference between FFA rates and time-charter rates
represents the profit which can be earned on a trading strategy in the absence basis risk and default
risk. Adland and Alizadeh (2018) investigate what drives the difference between time charter rates
and FFA rates in the dry bulk market. They find that time charter rates predominantly exceed
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the equivalent rate from FFAs. They argue that part of the positive difference can be explained
by a risk premium associated with default risk of the bilateral time-charter agreements. Another
factor is the convenience yield associated with having commercial control of the time-chartered
vessel which FFAs do not provide.
We calculate the excess storage profit over the FFA time charter basis which can be taken to
indicate whether the value of storage trade exceeds the alternative trading strategy in the absence
of basis risk. We find that this is a better predictor of whether a vessel on time charter will be
used for floating storage than the plain storage profit. We also find that vessel age is an important
determinant. Specifically, vessels older than 15 years, which panellists shall exclude in their Baltic
panel assessment, are more likely to be utilized as floating storage.
2.3 The floating storage trade and the no-arbitrage condition
We start by considering an agent who wants to store one barrel of crude oil between time t and
T with t < T . At time t, the agent finances and buys a barrel of crude oil in the spot market5.
Simultaneously, the agent sells an oil futures contract on a barrel with a futures price of Ft,T . Ft,T
is the price of the futures contract observed at time t with maturity at time T . The agent leases a
storage facility with storage costs of SCt,T paid at time t. The agent earns a profit on the storage
trade at time T of
pi = Ft,T (1− TRC)− ert,T (T−t) (St(1 + TRC) + INS)− ert,T (T−t)SCt,T (2.1)
where rt,T is the funding rate at which the agent can borrow between time t and T such that
ert,T (T−t) incorporates the financing costs associated with the purchase of the crude oil barrel.
INS is the insurance cost in $ per barrel, TRC represents trading costs from bid-ask spreads in
percentage of the futures prices and SCt,T is the cost of storage between time t and T .
We will now turn to the case where the agent uses a tanker vessel as floating storage. The
agent can hire a tanker by entering into a time-charter contract. The hire rate, also called the
time-charter rate, is quoted on a USD/day basis. The time-charter rate will constitute the storage
5Technically, there is no spot market and we use the future with the shortest time to delivery as the spot price.
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cost together with a port charge and an expense for fuel consumed by the auxiliary engine. We
denote the time-charter rate between time t and T by TCt,T , the port charge at the loading port
6
PC and the expense for marine gas oil MGOt,T . At time T the agent will have earned a profit on
the floating storage trade amounting to:
pi =
(
Ft,T (1− TRC)− ert,T (T−t) (St(1 + TRC) + INS)
)
w−ert,T (T−t) (TCt,T (T − t) +MGOt,T + PC) ,
(2.2)
where w is the storage capacity in barrels (bbl) of the leased tanker vessel. The no-arbitrage
condition for the storage trade is then:
(
Ft,T (1− TRC)− ert,T (T−t) (St(1 + TRC) + INS)
)
w−ert,T (T−t) (TCt,T (T − t) +MGOt,T + PC) ≤ 0.
(2.3)
If the time-charter rate and crude oil futures prices do not satisfy the above relation an agent
will be able to create an arbitrage. The agent can then finance and purchase w barrels in the
spot-market, hire a tanker vessel on a time-charter of duration T − t, and simultaneously sell oil
futures on w barrels.
We will now present storage profits calculated on the basis of time-series information on time-
charter rates. The trade is constructed by selling the 13 month Brent future and buying the 1
month Brent future. The main storage cost is the time-charter rates. We use the broker assess-
ment made by Clarksons for the one-year time-charter rate by a 310,000 dwt tanker. We assume
the amount of marine gas oil consumed by the auxiliary engine7 to be 10mt/day and use marine
gas oil prices for Rotterdam. We add a premium of 0.05% to the purchase price and discount
the selling price by 0.05% to reflect bid-ask spreads8. Insurance costs9 are $0.03/bbl. Port costs
6We do not incorporate anchorage charges for the storage period. We are also assuming that the tanker does not
sail far from the loading area. In reality, we expect that the arbitrageur will sell the cargo towards the end of the
storage period to a new agent such as a refinery. If the refinery is not located at the loading port it will have to pay
a freight rate for the voyage. The freight rate will then compensate the arbitrageur for the costs associated with the
voyage such as fuel expenses and port-charges. Hence the freight rate paid by the refinery will keep the arbitrage
profitable.
7Hamilton (2015) suggests a fuel consumption of 10mt/day which is similar to what is used in TCE calculations
for VLCCs at anchor.
8The premium and discount of 0.05% reflect the median transaction cost we observe in the period from the 1st
of January, 2008 to the 23rd August, 2017. See appendix 2.10
9See Alizadeh and Nomikos (2004). This a bit more conservative than the insurance cost of $0.02/bbl presented
in Hamilton (2015).
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are set to $223,81510. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics and time-series plots are in appendix 2.8.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics. Time-charter rates and bunker prices are weekly time-series. The
LIBOR rate is annualized. The sample period is from January 2006 to August 2017.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Brent 1 Month $/bbl 3,005 81.02 26.31 27.88 146.08
One-year contango $/bbl 3,004 1.49 5.50 −12.03 17.93
One-year time-charter rate VLCC $/day 604 39,784.56 17,169.19 18,000 90,000
Bunker Fuel Price $/mt 626 690.73 221.25 227.50 1,317.50
One-month LIBOR 3,032 1.35 1.86 0.15 5.82
Figure 2.1: Twelve month storage profits
This figure shows the profit for the VLCC floating storage trade. Profits are given by equation (2.2). The
storage horizon is fixed at one year and the storage capacity at 2Mbbl. The trade consists of a short 13 month
Brent futures position and a long 1 month Brent futures positions. The time-charter rate is Clarksons’ 1
time-charter rate year for a modern 310,000 dwt tanker. We account for insurance costs of $0.03/bbl. We
use a fixed premium and discount of 0.05% for the futures prices. We use the LIBOR term-structure as
funding rate.
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Figure 2.1 shows the profit for the one-year VLCC floating storage trade. In Figure 2.1, the
agent is able to fund the storage trade at LIBOR. Commodity traders will in practice do secured
10Port charges are for Sullom Voe and are from Corry Brothers. Sullom Voe is one of the loading points for the
Brent crude oil grade.
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borrowing, pledging the commodity as collateral, (Tang and Zhu, 2016). As we cannot observe the
secured borrowing rates for the commodity traders involved in the trade, we use LIBOR which is
a measure of the unsecured inter-bank funding rate for a panel of large banks. We acknowledge
that the use of LIBOR will underestimate the unsecured capital costs for most of the potential
arbitrageurs, though we also expect arbitrageurs to borrow secured pledging the crude oil as
collateral. Secured borrowing will result in lower borrowing rates relative to unsecured borrowing.
Hence, our assumed borrowing rates suffer from one positive and one negative bias. We construct
our yield curve using the LIBOR curve which we extend with swap rates for maturities above one
year. There are four periods where the arbitrage condition is violated. The first period is from
November 2008 to January 2009. This is the period with the largest violation peaking with a
storage profit of $11.36M. The second window where the arbitrage opens is at the end of April
2009 peaking in the beginning of May 2009 with a profit of $3.06M. There is another violation in
December 2009 with an arbitrage profit of $0.71M. Finally the arbitrage is open in January 2015,
where the trade profits peaked at a value of $4.93M.
2.3.1 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we look at how sensitive the no-arbitrage violations are with respect to the arbi-
trageur’s funding rate and transaction costs.
Financing costs
We investigate the sensitivity of the arbitrage opportunities to the arbitrageur’s funding rate by
backing out the funding rate where the arbitrage profit is equal zero (the implied no-arbitrage
funding rates). Agents who cannot fund themselves at a rate lower than the implied no-arbitrage
funding rate are unable to exploit the arbitrage opportunity. Table 2.3 shows the implied no-
arbitrage funding rates in the violation periods. The largest violation is on the 5th of December,
2008. Here the implied no-arbitrage funding rate premium is 10.55 percentage points above LIBOR.
During the Oil Glut, the implied no-arbitrage funding rate premium peaks at 4.63% on the 9th
of January, 2015. The fourth column shows a premium constructed from an index of yields on
seasoned Baa corporate bonds, i.e. bonds with a maturity above 20 years. The premium is the
yield on the bonds minus the average of the 20 year and 30 year swap rates. The premium serves
as reference point under the assumption that the term-structure of the premium is flat across
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maturities. The Baa reference is an estimate of the unsecured funding rate premium and will be
conservative relative to the unobserved secured borrowing rates. An agent who is able to fund
herself at a funding rate equal to LIBOR plus the Baa premium would only have been able set up
the arbitrage in four weeks of our sample.
Table 2.3: Implied no-arbitrage funding rate premiums
This table shows implied no-arbitrage funding rates. The first column shows the dates in the weekly time-
series where the no-arbitrage condition is violated. The second column shows the profit in million US
dollars. The third column shows the implied no-arbitrage premium. The implied no-arbitrage premium is
the spread in percentage points above LIBOR where the arbitrage profit is exactly zero. The fourth column
shows a premium derived from Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield from the Federal Reserve Bank
of ST. Louis. The seasoned bonds have a maturity above 20 years. The premium is constructed as the Baa
yield minus the average of the 20 year and 30 year swap rates. The premium serves as reference point under
the assumption that the term-structure of the premium is flat across maturities.
Date Profit ($m) No-arbitrage premium (%) Baa premium (%) Violation
2008-11-28 6.01 4.49 5.98
2008-12-05 11.37 10.55 5.88 yes
2008-12-12 5.60 4.70 5.92
2008-12-19 3.98 3.52 5.58
2009-01-02 8.18 6.77 5.24 yes
2009-01-09 8.90 7.66 5.28 yes
2009-01-16 1.00 0.84 5.17
2009-04-03 0.41 0.33 5.20
2009-04-17 1.44 1.15 4.95
2009-04-24 1.80 1.48 4.78
2009-05-01 3.06 2.45 4.54
2009-11-27 0.01 0.01 2.22
2009-12-04 0.62 0.36 2.18
2009-12-11 0.71 0.44 2.12
2015-01-02 1.97 1.51 2.03
2015-01-09 4.93 4.11 2.10 yes
Transaction costs
In this section, we look at the sensitivity of the storage profits with respect to transaction costs. In
Figure 2.2, we illustrate the difference between profits in our base case to a scenario with extreme
transaction costs. In our base case, we use a transaction cost of 0.05%, close to the median
(see, appendix 2.10). This means that a premium of 0.05% is added on futures purchased by the
arbitrageur. Similarly futures contracts sold by the arbitrageur are discounted by 0.05%. In our
extreme scenario, we use transaction costs of 2% which exceeds the observed 95 percentile by a
large margin, see appendix 2.10. The storage trade remains profitable both in the aftermath of the
Financial Crisis and during the Oil Glut. With transaction costs of 2% the profit peaks at $7.56m
compared to $11.36m in the base case. Similarly, the storage profit during the Oil Glut peaks at
$0.52m compared with a storage profit of $4.93m in the base case.
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Figure 2.2: Sensitivity of storage profits to transaction costs
This figure shows the sensitivity of the storage profit with respect to transaction costs.
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2.3.2 Storage profits across horizons
Before we evaluate the storage profits for the individual time-charter fixtures directly, we will
apply the term-structure smoothing approach11 of Koekebakker and Adland (2004) to evaluate
storage profits across the term-structure of oil prices and time-charter rates. Here we face the
issue of calibrating the short-end of the term-structure as there is no time-charter index with a
horizon below one year. In order to estimate storage profits with horizons below one year, we
incorporate time-charter equivalent earnings from voyage charter rates as a proxy for very short
period time-charters. As an example, Figure 2.3 shows the smoothed time-charter and forward
time-charter curves on January, 2nd 2015. The forward rates are bootstrapped from Clarksons’
time-charter rates with horizons of one, three and five years respectively. We use the spot TCE
rate as our two-month time-charter rate. The spot TCE is for a modern 2010-built VLCC tanker
for the route from Ras Tanura to Chiba. We note that this might underestimate storage prof-
its associated with hiring older and cheaper vessels. In panel (b) of Figure 2.3, we compare the
11See appendix 2.9 for brief outline of the approach.
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Koekebakker and Adland (2004) with the Nelson and Siegel (1987) smoothing method. The two
methods show only small differences in smoothed values. We have a slight preference for the Koeke-
bakker and Adland (2004) smoothing method as it always matches the observed time-charter rates.
Interestingly, figure 2.4 shows that short-term storage profits for two and six months were
higher than the one-year storage profit during the Financial Crisis. During the Oil Glut, we see
the opposite picture such that storage profits of 18 months exceeds the profit associated with shorter
storage horizons of two months, six months, or twelve months. The different shapes (spreads) over
time can be attributed to the different nature of oil supply and demand shocks. The Financial
Crisis served as a negative oil demand shock which depressed both the short-run demand for crude
oil (large contango) and tanker services (flat and low term structure of TC rates). Conversely, the
Oil Glut served as a positive oil supply shock. A positive oil supply shock (increased production)
pushes down the short end of the oil futures curve (large contango) but also stimulates short-run
tanker rates (downward sloping term structure of TC rates). Higher production generally leads to
an increase in demand for tanker services, (Shi et al., 2013), though this will also depend on the
degree of oversupply of tankers. This leads to the observation that long-term storage was more
profitable than short-term storage during the Oil Glut. Figure 2.4 shows frequent small violations
of two month storage arbitrage. This suggest that a voyage itself acts as a type of floating storage
which connects oil and freight markets. To address the potential concern that our smoothed time-
charter rates do not reflect actual rates traded, we will now evaluate storage profits directly from
actual time-charter fixtures.
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Figure 2.3: Smooth time-charter rate curve
This figure shows the smoothest continuous forward rate function on the 2nd of January 2015. The forward
rate function is given by equation (10) in Koekebakker and Adland (2004). The grey line shows the smoothed
time-charter rates in panel (a) and (b). Observed time-charter rates are from Clarksons’ and cover horizons
of one, three, and five years. We use the spot TCE to proxy the short end of the curve. The spot TCE is
for a modern 2010 tanker and is the VLCC earnings for the route Ras Tanura to Chiba. The spot earnings
are assumed to proxy a time-charter with a horizon of 60 days. Panel (b) compares the Koekebakker and
Adland (2004) smoothing method with the method of Nelson and Siegel (1987).
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Figure 2.4: Storage profit across lengths of the storage period
This figure shows the storage profit for storage periods of 1 year, 6 months and 2 months in the first panel.
The second panel shows storage profits for storage periods of 1 year, 18 months and 2 years.
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2.4 Microeconomic evidence from fixtures
We will now turn to the microeconomic evidence from fixtures. Between 2008 and 2017, we observe
316 unique time-charter fixtures in the VLCC segment. We have collected the individual time-
charter fixtures from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence (2011-2017) as well as IHS via Bloomberg
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(2008-2017). Information on the TC rates are public for 291 out of the 316 fixtures. Table 2.4
shows summary statistics for the time-charter fixtures. We use the fixtures to see whether agents
are able and willing to time-charter vessels during periods of arbitrage violations. An agent can
enter a time-charter fixture either for transportation or storage purposes. For each individual
time-charter fixture i with i = 1, 2, ..., N , we compute the floating storage profit as:
pii =
(
Fti,Ti(1− TRC)− erti,Ti (Ti−ti) (Sti(1 + TRC) + INS)
)
wi
− erti,Ti (Ti−ti) (TCi,ti,Ti(Ti − ti) +MGOti,Ti + PC) . (2.4)
It is important to note that we do not observe whether the charterers also enter crude oil fu-
tures positions. Instead we use the futures prices which match the maturity of the time-charter
agreement Ti and the 1 month Brent future. We note that a portion (72) of the time-charters
have embedded extension options. This provides the time-charterer with the option to extend
the period at a pre-specified rate. For time-charter fixtures which have extension options, storage
profits are calculated for the base period only (i.e. excluding the extension period). This will
underestimate the value of the trade as it ignores the option value associated with the charterers
option to dynamically roll the storage into the extension period.
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Figure 2.5: Storage profits for the individual fixtures
This figure shows the storage profits calculated as in equation 2.4 for the individual time-charter fixtures.
The histogram panel above the storage profit panel shows the number of fixtures at a weekly frequency.
2010 2012 2014 2016
−
40
−
30
−
20
−
10
0
10
20
Date
M
illi
on
 $
Storage Profit
0
5
10
Tr
a
de
s
In figure 2.5, we show the storage profits for the fixtures. The figure shows that agents are
able to time-charter vessels during periods with violations of the no-arbitrage condition. The
histogram in the top panel shows the number of fixtures at a weekly frequency. In the period
prior to 2011, we do not have fixtures from Clarksons. Hence it is hard to compare the number of
fixtures in the period prior to 2011 with the period from 2011 onwards. We see a relatively high
number of fixtures around the violation period during the Oil Glut. Table 2.5 shows storage profits
for profitable fixtures for the individual charterers. The charterers with profitable storage trades
can be characterized as shipping companies, commodity traders, oil companies and a commercial
bank. We think that the commodity traders, oil companies and the commercial bank observed
in table 2.5 are firms which are able to set up the arbitrage strategy outlined in equation (2.4),
because they have access crude cargoes and also have the funding relationships needed to carry
out the trade. Table 2.6 shows the implied funding rates as a spread above LIBOR for which the
storage profit will be zero. For instance, a value of 5 in Table 2.6 implies that the agent will only
be able to profit from the arbitrage if her funding rate is below the prevailing LIBOR rate plus
five percentage points. We note that some of the implied no-arbitrage rates have a considerable
spread above LIBOR of more than 3 percentage points. The implied no-arbitrage rates gives
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additional information regarding the size of the storage profit relative to the length of the storage
period. We note that most of the charterers are also chartering vessels when the storage trade
is unprofitable. We do not find this controversial as commodity traders and oil companies also
demand transportation services or store crude oil temporarily for logistical reasons.
Table 2.4: Time-charter fixtures summary statistics
This table shows summary statistics from time-charter fixtures collected from Clarksons Shipping Intelli-
gence Network (2011-2017) and Bloomberg (2008-2017). The earliest reported fixture is from the 9th of
June 2008 and last is from the 2nd of May 2017. The extension option indicates whether a time-charter
contract contains an extension option.
Characteristic Unit N Average St. Dev. Min Max Yes No
Vessel DWT 317 307,900 19,347 265,500 442,000
TC period Months 317 17.16 14.35 1 96
TC rate $/day 291 34,705 12,945 10,750 98,000
Vessel age Years 317 8.707 5.358 0 21
Extension option yes/no 317 72 245
Table 2.5: Floating storage profits
This table shows summary statistics for profitable floating storage trades for a LIBOR funded agent. We
label a trade as a profitable floating storage trade when the profit in equation (2.4) is positive. The table
shows the profits in million USD. Numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of time-charter fixtures
made by the specific charterer within our sample period.
Charterer Number of profitable trades Average floating storage profit Minimum Maximum
SK Energy 1(2) 6.687 6.687 6.687
Koch 6(30) 5.643 0.514 12.203
Trafigura 5(11) 4.870 2.218 7.494
BP 1(21) 3.441 3.441 3.441
Clearlake 5(10) 3.122 0.134 7.472
Unipec 3(15) 2.758 0.805 4.781
Shell 9(29) 2.499 0.404 5.888
Euronav 1(4) 2.146 2.146 2.146
Morgan Stanley 2(3) 1.810 0.913 2.708
Core Petroleum 2 (6) 1.120 0.851 1.548
Blue light 1(2) 0.788 0.788 0.788
ST Shipping 3(10) 0.710 0.277 1.124
Reliance 1(10) 0.570 0.570 0.570
Litasco 1(6) 0.341 0.341 0.341
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Table 2.6: Implied no-arbitrage funding rates
This table shows summary statistics for profitable floating storage trades for a LIBOR funded agent. We
label a trade as a profitable floating storage trade when the profit in equation (2.4) is positive. The table
shows how many percentage points above LIBOR the funding rate needs to be in order for the profit of the
storage trade to equal zero.
Charterer No arbitrage LIBOR spread Average Minimum Maximum
Shell 8.146 0.241 33.936
SK Energy 5.877 5.877 5.877
Koch 7.586 0.990 16.371
Clearlake 4.475 0.507 8.832
Morgan Stanley 4.426 0.573 8.278
Trafigura 4.193 1.671 6.610
Unipec 3.800 1.323 7.776
BP 2.580 2.580 2.580
Euronav 1.332 1.332 1.332
Reliance 1.287 1.287 1.287
Core Petroleum 1.259 1.149 1.369
ST Shipping 1.223 0.529 2.394
Blue light 1.000 1.000 1.000
Litasco 0.597 0.597 0.597
2.5 The floating storage decision
2.5.1 The FFA hedged time-charter trading strategy
We will now look further into the floating storage decision of charterers. We compare the storage
profits with the alternative strategy of using the vessel for transportation and hedging the market
exposure using FFAs. We set forth the alternative trading strategy as a possible explanation for
why vessels on time-charter are sailing when they would have had positive storage profits during
the Oil Glut. The alternative trading strategy consists of three steps. First, the charterer time-
charters a vessel and pays the time-charter rate. Second, the charterer employs the vessel in
the voyage charter market earning voyage charter freight rates. Third, the charterer hedges the
voyage charter freight rate exposure from the second step by entering into the paper-based freight
derivatives Forward Freight Agreements. The charterer receives a cash-flow from this trading
strategy which has a present value of:
piFFA−TCt = e
−rt,T (T−t)(T − t)Et [FFAt,T − FR.Baltict,T − (TCt,T − FRt,T )] , (2.5)
where FFAt,T is the time-charter equivalent FFA rates, FR.Baltict,T is the average of the time-
charter equivalent settlement rates for the FFAs published by the Baltic Exchange, and FRt,T is
the average freight earnings over the period from time t to time T . In the case, where there is no
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basis risk between the Baltic spot assessments and the freight income of the vessel the charterer
earns the FFA TC basis: FFAt,T − TCt,T .
Time-charter agreements and FFAs are two possible ways agents can hedge their freight rate
exposure. A time-charter gives the charterer possession of a vessel whereas FFAs are cash-settled
contracts. This implies that FFAs are purely linked to the future realizations of spot freight rates.
FFAs do therefore not reflect the value of real options such as the floating storage trade. If FFAs
and time-charter agreements were perfect substitutes an agent would be able to make an arbitrage
profit by time-chartering a vessel, hedging the freight rate exposure with FFAs, and employing a
vessel in the spot market. FFA hedging is, however, associated with considerable basis risk and
the arbitrage strategy outlined above is not a risk-free arbitrage strategy (Adland and Jia, 2017;
Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2009). The basis risk can be attributed to a number of factors. To mention
a few, vessels fix at discrete time-points roughly two months apart whereas the FFA settles against
the average of daily spot assessment throughout the period. Another source stems from differences
between vessel characteristics of the reference vessel of the FFA and the vessel on time-charter.
Similarly, basis risk can arise if the time-chartered vessel is employed on routes different from
reference route of the FFA. The time-charter is also associated with unemployment risk which is
not captured by the FFA12. The above mentioned features are all reasons why the FFA hedged
time-chartering strategy need not represent an arbitrage opportunity in the true risk-less sense.
Nevertheless, if deviations between time-charter rates and FFA rates become sufficiently large the
trading strategy might still be attractive to charterers.
12FFAs settle against the broker assessed settlement rates published by Baltic Exchange. The settlement rate
should reflect the prevailing spot rate for vessels trading. Unlike a time-charter, the FFA contract therefore does not
hedge an operator against vessel unemployment risk.
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Figure 2.6: Time-charter FFA basis
This figure shows the spread between the time charter equivalent from FFAs and the time-charter rate with
a horizon of one year. The spread can be denominated either in $/day or in million $ over the one year
period.
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In a recent paper, Adland and Alizadeh (2018) look at what determines the difference between
time-charter rates and FFAs in dry bulk. They find that on average the time-charter rates exceed
the equivalent rate from FFA contracts. They argue that part of the positive difference can be
explained by a risk premium associated with default risk inherent in the bilateral time-charter
agreements. Another factor is the convenience yield associated with the commercial control of the
vessel. From Adland and Alizadeh (2018), we know that time-charter rates on average exceed FFA
rates in the dry bulk market. Interestingly, Figure 2.6 shows that the period where the floating
storage arbitrage is open coincides with the period where time-charter rates are lower than the
equivalent rate from FFAs13. The deviation of $11,620/day which corresponds to $4.24m over the
one year storage period is substantial. Time-charter rates are therefore not only low compared to
the oil futures contango spread but also compared to the corresponding FFA prices. This suggests
that time-charter rates are generally too low when they are related both to the storage trade and
the FFA hedged time-charter trading strategy.
13We use FFA prices for the TD3 route between Saudi Arabia and Japan
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2.5.2 The excess storage profit
A rational charterer should pursue the most profitable trading strategy. A charterer should there-
fore only pursue the floating storage trade if the profit exceeds the profit of the alternative trading
strategy. Ignoring the FFA hedging basis risk, a vessel will be used for floating storage when:
piExcesst =
(
Ft,T − ert,T (T−t) (St + INS + TRCt)
)
w− ert,T (T−t) (TCt,T (T − t) +MGOt,T + PC)
−max
{
ert,T (T−t)(T − t) (FFAt,T − TCt,T ) , 0
}
≥ 0 (2.6)
We will now use information from vessels’ AIS to test the hypothesis that vessels will be used
for floating storage when the excess profit from equation (2.6) is positive. We use information
from vessels’ AIS to look at the behaviour of vessels on time-charter. We utilize AIS information
provided by MarineTraffic on vessel positions, speeds, and self-reported draughts for a period from
October 2014 to August 2016.
We then look at which vessels that were actually used for floating storage. We categorize vessels
on time-charter into vessels used as floating storage, vessels used for transportation, and vessels
used for a combination of storage and voyages. In order for a vessel to be put in the combination of
storage and voyages category, it has to be laden and stationary (i.e. have a draught above 15 meters
and a speed below 6 knots) for at least 20 consecutive days within the time-charter period. We do
not observe all vessels through their entire time-charter period. Also, some vessels’ time-charter
period exceed our AIS sample period. However, for most vessels we are able to get a reasonable
view of how the chartered vessel is utilized. We make two samples. The first sample consists
of time-charter contracts where we are able to reasonably classify the behaviour of the vessels
on time-charter. The second sample consists only of time-charter contracts where the entire time-
charter period is contained in our AIS sample period. Figure 2.7 consists of two panels showing the
storage profit and excess storage profit for the first sample. Panel (a) shows excess storage profits
above the FFA TC basis given by equation (2.6) for each of the individual fixtures. For positive
values, the floating storage profit exceeds the value of the alternative trading strategy. Panel (b)
shows the storage profit measured by equation (2.3). The shape of the points indicate whether
vessels are used for floating storage, transportation or a combination of the two. The figure shows
that only a few trades relate to floating storage for the entire period of the time-charter.
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Figure 2.7: Storage profit excess of the FFA TC basis and storage profit
In Panel (a), this figure shows the storage profit excess of the time-charter FFA basis which is set forth in
equation (2.6). Panel (b) shows the storage profit set forth in equation (2.2).
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2.5.3 The storage decision logistic regression results
We estimate a logistic-regression where the dependent variable equals one if the vessel is involved
in any form of floating storage within the time-charter period and zero if it is purely used for
transportation. A limitation of our work is that we cannot properly evaluate the storage decision
for long-term time-charter contracts within our sample window of 1 year and 10 months. Another
limitation is that our approach compares two static choices made when the time-charter is fixed.
Hence our method does not factor in charterers’ dynamic responses to realizations of uncertainty
during the time-charter period. We use two specifications. In the first specification, we include a
vessel age dummy for vessels with an age above 15 years. In the manual for panellists, panellists
are instructed to make their freight rate assessment for vessels with a maximum age of 15 years.
Hence we expect a higher level of basis risk for vessels older than 15 years due to a higher risk
of unemployment in the spot market. We also include the TC period in months, vessel size in
dwt and a dummy equal to one if the storage profit is positive and exceeds the FFA-TC basis
from equation (2.6). In our second specification, we replace the excess storage profit dummy from
equation (2.6) with a dummy equal to one if the storage profit from equation (2.4) is positive.
The regression results are shown in table 2.7. The first column shows the specification using
the storage profit in excess of the FFA TC basis as a covariate. We notice that it as a positive and
significant coefficient, indicating that the probability that the vessel is used for floating storage
increases with the excess profit. Column two and three shows the second specification with the
pure storage profit as a covariate. The third specification only uses observations for which we were
able to calculate the FFA TC basis. Hence, column three and column one are estimated on the
same data. The size of the storage profit has a positive and significant impact for both the sample
with 128 and 81 observations. In all specifications, the vessel age dummy has a significant effect
suggesting that old vessels on time-charter are more likely to be used for floating storage. This
is intuitive as older vessels should have higher basis risk and unemployment risk than younger
vessels, and thus a lower value of the alternative use in the spot freight market. A key result of our
paper is the significant coefficient of the storage profit excess of the FFA TC basis. We interpret
this as charterers being reluctant to use the vessel for storage purposes when the storage profit is
smaller than the alternative chartering strategy. Table 2.8 shows similar results when we restrict
our sample to time-charter contracts where we are able to track the vessels through the entire
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storage period, though we acknowledge that our result is dependent on our classification of our
outcome variable.
As a further check, we therefore estimate another logistic regression where we adapt a more
restrictive classification of vessels used floating storage. If we do not label observations where time-
chartered vessels are used for a combination of storage and voyages as storage outcomes, we can
not explain the storage decision of charterers. The logistic regression results, when we adapt the
restrictive definition of storage outcomes, show that neither excess storage profits, storage profits or
vessel age are able to explain charterers’ storage decision. In the sample with 128 observation, we
find a negative effect with respect to the time-charter period using the restrictive characterisation of
storage outcomes. The estimated logistic regression results for the restrictive definition of storage
outcomes are shown in appendix 2.11. We believe that it is sensible to label vessels that are used
for a combination of storage and voyages as storage outcomes. We are nevertheless aware that our
results are sensitive to our classification of storage outcomes.
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Table 2.7: Floating storage logistic-regression
This table shows results from logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a floating storage dummy. The
dummy takes a value of one if the vessel is used for floating storage during the time-charter period.
Dependent variable:
Outcome
(1) (2) (3)
1{Excess Storage Profit>0} 3.930∗∗
(1.427)
1{Storage Profit>0} −1.068 1.306∗ 1.454∗
(1.153) (0.567) (0.633)
1{Vessel age>15} 3.203∗∗∗ 2.594∗∗∗ 2.899∗∗∗
(0.806) (0.634) (0.723)
Extension Option Dummy −1.686 −1.157 −1.318
(0.906) (0.767) (0.848)
Dwt −0.029 −0.009 0.003
(0.038) (0.028) (0.036)
TC period −0.167 −0.073 −0.107
(0.085) (0.040) (0.078)
Constant 8.455 1.703 −1.956
(11.716) (8.553) (11.071)
Observations 81 128 81
Log Likelihood −31.071 −48.256 −34.598
Akaike Inf. Crit. 76.142 108.512 81.195
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 2.8: Floating storage logistic-regression using only non-censored observations
This table shows results from logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a floating storage dummy. The
dummy takes a value of one if the vessel is used for floating storage during the time-charter period. The
data sample is restricted to vessels on time-charter where the entire time-charter period is contained in our
AIS sample period.
Dependent variable:
Outcome
(1) (2)
1{Excess Storage Profit>0} 4.841∗
(1.886)
1{Storage Profit>0} −2.271 0.858
(1.612) (0.702)
1{Vessel age>15} 4.612∗∗ 3.407∗∗
(1.706) (1.196)
Extension Option Dummy −1.406 −0.820
(1.402) (1.206)
Dwt −0.062 −0.020
(0.047) (0.040)
TC Period −0.047 −0.007
(0.120) (0.103)
Constant 17.473 4.391
(14.204) (12.097)
Observations 56 56
Log Likelihood −20.636 −26.317
Akaike Inf. Crit. 55.272 64.633
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
2.5.4 Economic explanations for the oil market arbitrage
The violations of the no-arbitrage condition occur during the recent Oil Glut and the Financial
Crisis. During the Financial Crisis, arbitrage opportunities have been documented for multiple
markets e.g. deviations from the covered interest rate parity in foreign exchange markets and
the CDS-corporate bond arbitrage, (Mancini-Griffoli and Ranaldo, 2011; Mitchell and Pulvino,
2012; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011). The idea of slow moving capital, as described in Mitchell
et al. (2007) and Duffie (2010), states that arbitrageurs are dependent on available capital in order
to fund their arbitrage activities. When arbitrageurs are capital constrained they are unable to
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correct the mispricing and violations persist. We see that during the Oil Glut the violation is
short-lived compared to the violations during the Financial Crisis.
During the Oil Glut, we have no reason to expect that arbitrageurs (commodity traders, oil
companies, and commercial banks) were capital constrained. This raises the question why we ob-
serve violations during the Oil Glut? We start by noting that the majority of shipowners cannot do
the floating storage trade themselves as they are not able finance the trade and do not have access
to oil cargoes. Firms such as commodity trading houses and oil companies are better positioned,
and the heterogeneity in the ability to finance the trade and access cargoes creates an incentive
to trade. The amount funding needed to finance the trade is substantial. With a crude oil price
of 46.59$ per barrel14 and a cargo size of 2 million barrels, the principal on the floating storage
trade is $93.18m for the crude oil alone. In comparison, the price of a 5 year secondhand 310,000
dwt VLCC was $80m in the same period15. Furthermore, the magnitude of voyage charter costs
are typically between $0.5m and $2m for a voyage between Saudi Arabia and Japan. For instance
the total voyage costs from the Baltic Exchange TCE amounted to $970,770, in October 2016 for
a voyage from Saudi Arabia to Japan. The financing costs associated with the trade substantially
exceeds shipowners working capital.
Second, we argue that the time-charter rates accepted were low in the violation period in Jan-
uary, 2015. In section 2.5, we compare time-charter rates with the time-charter equivalent rate
from FFAs. The comparison suggests that time-charter rates were not only low compared to the
level of contango, but they were also low compared to the prevailing FFA prices. The deviation
from both the level of contango and FFA prices suggests that shipowners were accepting too low
time-charter rates. We are not able to establish the exact cause which made shipowners accept the
relatively low time-charter rates. Possible rational explanations are; (a) shipowners were liquid-
ity constrained and therefore willing to accept lower time-charter rates, (b) shipowners were risk
averse and therefore willing charter out their vessels at a discount or (c) a combination of (a) and
(b). Alternatively, there is the behavioural explanation16 that the shipowners’ perception of the
14This is the observed Brent Crude oil future price on the 13th of January 2015.
15Source: Clarksons Shipping Intelligence
16Greenwood and Hanson (2014) argues that shipowners’ investment decisions are subject to behavioural biases.
They argue that shipowners over-extrapolate past returns and neglect competitors’ investment decisions. If shipown-
ers investment decisions are subject to behavioural biases then their chartering decisions are possibly also subject
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attractiveness of the time-charter rate is reference dependent, a general concept from behavioural
economics, (see for instance, Kahneman (2003)). In January 2015, the one-year time-charter rate
reached its highest level since 200917 which potentially made them attractive compared to the
shipowners’ reference point of rates from the previous five years.
During the violation period in the Oil Glut, we have argued that time-charter rates were not
just low compared to the degree of contango but also relative to the equivalent FFA rates. The
literature on FFAs contains some evidence that the FFA curve reflects market participants’ ex-
pectation of the future voyage charter rate and thereby the excess storage profit will reflect the
expected value of the floating storage relative to the value of operating the vessel in the voyage
charter market. The positive spread between the FFA rates and the time-charter rate can fur-
thermore serve as a trading signal for a risky time-chartering strategy without the FFA hedge.
This is an even simpler albeit even riskier trading strategy which is open to a wider set of market
participants e.g. shipowners.
This implies that the firms which are able to exploit the floating storage arbitrage might be
beaten to the punch by firms who employ risky trading strategies which can be carried out right
away. Given that the time-charter rates generally seem too low, the number of shipowners who are
willing to hire out their vessels at discount should be limited to liquidity constrained, risk averse
or behavioural biased shipowners. Furthermore, it can be argued that the floating storage is not
completely risk-free as the arbitrageur might receive margin calls during the storage period. The
arbitrage is open when oil prices are low and the degree of contango is high. When oil prices are
low there is potentially an increased likelihood that the oil price will mean-revert towards a higher
level in the future. Hence the arbitrageur might have an increased likelihood of receiving margin
calls on the short futures position during the storage period. If oil prices increase sufficiently the
arbitrageur needs sufficiently deep pockets to cover the potential margin calls.
to behavioural biases.
17See the time-series plot of the one-year time-charter rate in appendix 2.8
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2.6 Concluding remarks
We investigate the floating storage trade. The floating storage trade causes additional demand for
tanker vessels in excess of the demand for transportation services. We evaluate a cash-and-carry
trading strategy and the corresponding no-arbitrage relation. We find violations of the no-arbitrage
condition both using time-series of time-charter rates and time-charter rates from fixtures.
We investigate storage profits across storage horizons. We find that in the aftermath of the
Financial Crisis profits for short storage horizons exceeded profits for longer horizons. During
the Oil Glut, we see the opposite picture such that storage profits for storage horizons above one
year exceed short-term storage profits. We attribute the difference to the distinction between
oil supply and demand shocks. The Financial Crisis served as a negative oil demand shock and
pushed down both the short end of the oil futures curve and spot freight rates. In contrast, the
Oil Glut served as a positive demand shock to oil which pushed down the short end of the oil fu-
tures curve but stimulated spot freight rates through increased demand for transportation services.
Our findings are of interest to maritime economists and oil market participants alike. As float-
ing storage activity can be an important driver of tanker demand at the margin, an improved
understanding of the behaviour market participants in this regard can assist in better forecasts of
the market. Our findings also illustrate empirically how the tanker freight and oil futures market
are integrated through the floating storage arbitrage, with the oil futures spread effectively putting
a floor on tanker time-charter rates. However, we show that this constraint has been effective only
rarely, notably in the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and subsequently in the Oil Glut of 2014-2015.
Finally, we evaluate the ex-post usage of chartered ships using geospatial ship-tracking data.
We find that charterers are reluctant to use vessels for floating storage even in cases when they
would have had positive profits. We derive the excess storage profits above the FFA time-charter
spread and find that it is a significant predictor of charterers’ storage decision. A possible expla-
nation for this finding is that the charterer simply chooses the most profitable trading strategy.
However, the FFA hedged time-chartering strategy is subject to basis-risk. We also find that ves-
sels with an age above 15 years are more likely to be used for floating storage. An alternative
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explanation is that market participants who are not able to exploit the storage arbitrage still find
time-chartering a vessel and operating it unhedged in the voyage charter market attractive. This
would also lead to an significant effect of the excess profit covariate.
A natural continuation of this research would be to look at volatility spillover effects and the
lead-lag relationship between crude oil tanker time-charter rates, the FFA curve and contango
spreads.
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2.8 Appendix: Time-series plots
Figure 2.8.1: Time-series plots
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2.9 Appendix: Method of Koekebakker and Adland (2004)
We create a smooth time-charter rate curve using the method of Koekebakker and Adland (2004).
The the time-charter rate between time t (today) and a future time-point time T is modelled such
that the smooth forward rate f(s, s) satisfy the value matching condition:
EQt
[
1
T − t
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(TCt,T − f(s, s))ds
]
= 0. (2.7)
Rearranging equation (2.7) and accepting the approximation ers/(
∫ T
t e
rsds) ≈ 1/(T − t) gives us
an expression for time-charter rates:
TCt,T =
1
T − t
∫ T
t
f(t, s)ds, (2.8)
The forward time-charter rate is then defined as the rate at which a charterer at time t can charter
a vessel between two future time-points T1 and T2. The forward time-charter rate is then
FTCt,T1,T2 =
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
f(t, s)ds, (2.9)
This enables us to bootstrap forward rates from the observed time-charter indices as
FTCt,T1,T2 =
TCt,T2(T2 − t)− TCt,T1(T1 − t)
T2 − T1 . (2.10)
We choose the functional form of f(t, s) as the cubic spline that matches the observed forward
charter rates from equation (2.10) and simultaneously satisfies the maximum smoothness criteria
of Adams and Van Deventer (1994).
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2.10 Appendix: Brent Bid-Ask spread (% Price)
We obtain an estimate of transaction costs from bid and ask prices for the Brent futures contract.
The time-series of bid and ask prices are from Bloomberg. It is often the case that either the bid
or ask price is missing. Table 2.10.1 shows the distribution of the bid-ask spread divided by two
measured in percent of the last price. In our base case, we discount arbitrageurs’ crude oil sales
with 0.05% and put a premium of 0.05% on arbitrageurs’ crude oil purchases.
Table 2.10.1: (Bid-Ask spread)/2 (% Price)
This table shows half of the bid-ask spread relative to the last price. We use the last price as the mid price
such that the bid price is the mid price minus one half of the bid-ask spread. In the table a value of 0.043
corresponds to a Bid-Ask spread of 0.086% of the last price. The bid-ask spread in the period between
September 2008 and January 2009 consists of only one value observed on the 14th of September 2008. In
our calculation of the storage profits we put a premium and discount of the futures prices of 0.05%.
5% 15% 25% 50% 75% 85% 95%
Period 1995-Dec-12 to 2017-Aug-23 0.015 0.022 0.028 0.043 0.085 0.134 0.275
Period 2008-Jan-01 to 2009-Jan-01 0.014 0.020 0.029 0.052 0.107 0.193 0.462
Period 2008-Sep-01 to 2009-Jan-01 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608
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2.11 Appendix: Logistic regression results with the restrictive
specification of the storage dummy
Table 2.11.1: Floating Storage Logistic-Regression
This table shows results from logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a floating storage dummy. The
dummy takes a value of one if the vessel is used for floating storage during the entire time-charter period.
Dependent variable:
Outcome
(1) (2) (3)
1{Excess Storage Profit>0} −17.812
(3,434.203)
1{Storage Profit>0} 0.081 −0.372 −0.372
(1.774) (1.588) (1.588)
1{Vessel age>15} 4.624 4.856 4.855
(2.920) (2.886) (2.886)
Extension Option Dummy −2.830 −3.156 −3.155
(2.387) (2.322) (2.323)
Dwt −0.160 −0.154 −0.154
(0.104) (0.097) (0.097)
TC Period −0.737 −0.822∗ −0.822∗
(0.377) (0.399) (0.400)
Constant 48.888 47.272 47.262
(31.964) (29.814) (29.809)
Observations 81 128 81
Log Likelihood −8.776 −9.500 −9.500
Akaike Inf. Crit. 31.553 31.000 30.999
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 2.11.2: Floating Storage Logistic-Regression using only non-censored observations
This table shows results from logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a floating storage dummy. The
dummy takes a value of one if the vessel is used for floating storage during the entire time-charter period.
The data sample is restricted to vessels on time-charter where the entire time-charter period is contained
in our AIS sample period.
Dependent variable:
Outcome
(1) (2)
1{Excess Storage Profit>0} −18.278
(3,329.399)
1{Storage Profit>0} −1.210 −1.589
(1.984) (1.822)
1{Vessel age>15} 5.585 5.756
(3.053) (3.082)
Extension Option −2.873 −3.205
(2.432) (2.412)
Dwt −0.152 −0.144
(0.111) (0.103)
TC Period −0.615 −0.743
(0.403) (0.423)
Constant 45.991 44.169
(34.006) (31.566)
Observations 56 56
Log Likelihood −6.810 −7.700
Akaike Inf. Crit. 27.619 27.401
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Chapter 3
Bargaining Power in Crude Oil
Tanker Markets
Frederik Regli
Abstract
I study the bargaining power of shipowners and charterers in the crude oil tanker market for
very large crude oil carriers (VLCCs). I find that the Nash bargaining parameter of shipowners
is 24% on average and that the distribution of bargaining parameters is right skewed. This
means that, when a shipowner enters into voyage charter agreement, the shipowner extracts
approximately one-fourth of the shipowner’s and the charterer’s joint value of the trade.
Keywords— AIS, Bargaining, Crude Oil, Matching, VLCC
3.1 Introduction
I study the relative bargaining power of geographical traders and shipowners in the crude oil tanker
market. Recent studies by Brancaccio et al. (2017), Brancaccio et al. (2018), Parker (2014) and
Tvedt (2011) have looked at the equilibrium search and matching between geographical commod-
ity traders(hereafter traders) and shipowners in bulk shipping markets. An important aspect of
the search and matching models is the subsequent bargaining process and the relative bargaining
power of the involved parties. When exporters and shipowners meet, they start bargaining over the
contractual terms of the transportation contract, also known as the charter party. An important
feature of the charter party is the price paid for the transportation service, better known to market
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participants as the freight rate. The contractually agreed upon freight rate reflects the relative
bargaining power of the geographical trader and the shipowner. However, the shipowner and the
trader will only reach an agreement if the value of entering the trade exceeds the value of their
alternatives. The value of the alternatives serves as threat points establishing the agents’ partici-
pation constraints. Both agents will exercise some bargaining power if they are able to extract an
excess value above the value of their outside alternative. The joint value of the trade is the sum
of the shipowner’s and trader’s value in excess of the value of their respective threat-points. The
freight rate outcome determines the share of the value which the shipowner and trader are able to
extract. The relative bargaining power depends on the agents’ valuations of the trade and the value
of their alternatives to the trade. The outside option of the shipowner is to remain unemployed
and continue searching for employment. The unemployed shipowner dynamically makes a choice
of where to sail in ballast to search for orders.
The traders buy crude oil in an oil-producing country such as Saudi Arabia, hire a tanker vessel
to transport the oil to the refinery. The refinery will be located in an oil-consuming country such
as South Korea. When the crude oil reaches the refinery, it is refined into oil products such as
gasoline, diesel and fuel oil. Introducing refineries into my model, allows me to use the profit of
refineries, better known as the refining margin, to determine the profit obtained by a trader1. In
general the charterer need not be a refinery as it could also be an oil major reallocating oil reserves.
The idea of jointly modelling oil tanker markets and refining markets is not new. Kennedy (1974)
sets forth a static long-run model of crude oil production, transportation, refining, and consump-
tion of oil products. Mayr and Tamvakis (1999) show that US crack spreads lead crude oil import
volumes in the United States of America. My specification of geographical traders’ valuations is an
important distinction from the papers by Brancaccio et al. (2017) and Parker (2014). This allows
me to get an estimate of the relative bargaining power of the shipowners and charterers through
their profit sharing.
The freight market is often characterized as a perfectly competitive market in which the freight
rate reflects the transportation cost of the marginal vessel. However, freight rates often exceed the
marginal cost of transportation, (Adland and Strandenes, 2007), which suggests that shipowners
1In a more general model, the profit will be shared between a shipowner, a trader and a refinery. My main interest
is on shipowners’ bargaining power and I therefore treat the the trader and refinery as one agent.
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are in possession of bargaining power. The bargaining power enables shipowners to extract some
of the value which would otherwise have accrued to the trader.
Brancaccio et al. (2017) estimate a fixed bargaining coefficient of drybulk shipowners equal
to 0.3. Their estimated bargaining coefficient depends on the exporters’ valuation of the freight.
They estimate exporters’ valuations as a weighted average of the prices of iron ore, coal, grain,
steel, and urea. The average is weighted by the relative frequency of the commodities in their
sample of shipping contracts. However, geographical traders profit from the geographical spread
in commodity prices rather than the price level of the commodities. In their model, exporters
are oil producers with unobserved production costs. In the model by Parker (2014), the traders’
valuation of a freight is the revenue arising from the geographical spread in oil prices. In the
estimation of the model, it is assumed that the geographical traders’ expectation of the future oil
price is independent of the destination region. Furthermore, the traders’ expectation of the crude
oil price evolution is based on a binomial model. In the model, there is an 80% chance that the
crude oil price will increase by 10%, and a 20% chance that the oil price will decrease by 5%.
In this paper, I set up a simple matching model where shipowners make dynamic ballasting
choices. The matching model set forth in Brancaccio et al. (2017) and Brancaccio et al. (2018)
is, to my knowledge, the only existing empirical matching model in bulk-shipping markets. Their
model does not account for unobserved matches which arise through unreported fixtures. I esti-
mate the spatial matching function using an expectation maximization (EM) algorithm to account
for matches which are not reported in the fixtures data, (Dempster et al., 1977). Another contrast
is that I allow shipowners to dynamically update their ballasting choices during their ballast legs.
I estimate a stylized regime shifting process for the freight rate earnings. The regime shifts are
governed by a Markov chain. This allows me to estimate a shipowner’s steady state continuation
value associated with accepting the terms in the voyage charter party, but also the continuation
value of the shipowner’s alternative to remaining unemployed. The shipowner’s continuation value
associated with remaining unemployed serves as the shipowner’s disagreement point. I find that
the shipowners’ bargaining parameter is 24% on average, e.g., if a trade has an excess value (above
the values of the threat points) of $100,000 the shipowner $24,000 and the trader would get $76,000
on average.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the model, section 3.3 de-
scribes the data, section 3.4 presents the empirical estimation approach, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Environment
My model is inspired by the spatial matching frameworks of Brancaccio et al. (2017) and Buchholz
(2015). Rather than estimating my model using a structural dynamic discrete choice model, I
specify a stochastic freight rate process and estimate my matching function parametrically. Fur-
thermore, I allow the shipowners to match with geographical traders prior to their arrival to the
loading region. This is reasonable as the number of days between the contract signing and the
loading date is roughly 21 days in the VLCC segment, according to Prochazka (2018, chapter 1).
The model is a discrete-time infinite horizon and finite location model with L locations such that
l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} and t ∈ T = {0, 1, ...}. Time periods should be thought of as weekly periods and
locations as both geographical regions and ocean regions. Geographical regions are, for instance,
the Arabian Gulf, Europe, the Far East, the Caribbean, the United States of America, West Africa,
India, and Southern Asia. The distance between location l and k is δl,k miles, and the average
transportation time is τl,k =
δl,k
7 · 24 · vl,k weeks, where vl,k is the average speed between location l
and location k in knots. The model contains two types of agents: traders and shipowners. Both
agent types are risk-neutral and have time-additive utility. The discount factor is given by β.
Traders profit from refining crude oil into oil products. Traders buy crude oil in oil-producing
regions (e.g., the Arabian Gulf, West Africa and the Caribbean) and transport it to oil-importing
regions (e.g., the Far East, the United States of America and Europe). In the oil-importing coun-
try, refineries refine crude oil into oil products such as gasoline, diesel oil and fuel oil, which are
sold to consumers.
3.2.2 Ship owners’ freight revenue and voyage costs
In my model, shipowners earn freight rate income when they supply tanker services to the traders.
There are Ns vessels in the merchant tanker fleet. Vessels are sailing either loaded or in ballast.
Sailing between location l and location k is associated with a cost of sailing equal to csl,k,t(Ballast)
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when the vessel sails in ballast and csl,k,t(Loaded) when the vessel is loaded.
When a shipowner forms a match and enters into an agreement with a trader, she earns freight
revenue and pays voyage costs. I let time t denote the time when the shipowner and trader enter
into the agreement. At time t, the vessel is located at position i, which has a distance to region
l of δ(i, l). The shipowner is responsible for paying voyage costs, such as port charges and fuel
expenses. The shipowner’s profit from entering into a voyage charter with a load in location l and
discharging in location k is the freight revenue net of canal dues, fuel- and port costs2 given by:
pii,l,k,t = rl,k,t · q︸ ︷︷ ︸
Freight Revenue
− bpt ·
(
csi,l,t(Ballast) · τi,l + csl,k,t(Loaded) · τl,k
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fuel expenses
− cport(l, k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Port charges
. (3.1)
The shipowner’s freight revenue is rl,k,t ·q where q is the cargo size (measured in tonnes or barrels),
and rl,k,t is the freight rate (measured in dollar per ton or dollar per barrel) which the shipowner
receives for transportation of the crude oil from location l to location k. First, the shipowner needs
to sail the vessel to loading region l from the vessel’s current location i. The cost of sailing in
ballast to the loading region depends on the bunker price and the bunker consumption. cport is
the exogenous port charges in dollars. The freight rate is assumed to be governed by a discrete
Markov chain. For each loading region l, the freight rate can be in one of three discrete states:
low, medium or high. The freight rate transitions are governed by a Markov chain probability
transition matrix Π.
3.2.3 Searching and matching
Shipowners and traders search for each other in the shipping market. Searching vessels can either
be vessels sailing in ballast towards a loading region or employed vessels searching for their next
voyage charter. When a shipowner and trader match, they start bargaining over the terms of the
charter party agreement. In practice, brokers will intermediate trades and form matches between
buyers and sellers of transportation services (Strandenes, 2000). In the model, the matching process
between traders and shipowners is modelled by the matching function:
ml,t = ml(sl,t, fl,t) (3.2)
2I ignore the foreign exchange element in port charges which are often denominated in local currency.
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where fl,t is the number of cargoes, and sl,t is the number of unmatched ships searching for freights
in location l. In the model of Brancaccio et al. (2017), ships can only match with traders when they
are within the same region. However, the number of days between the contract signing and the
loading date is 21 in the VLCC segment compared to an average of six days in the sample of dry-
bulk contracts of Brancaccio et al. (2017). This implies that, in most cases, tanker vessels search
and match with traders before reaching the loading region. The probability that an unemployed
vessel matches with a trader is pl,t = ml,t/sl,t.
3.2.4 Traders
The trader buys crude oil at location l and hires a tanker vessel to carry out the transportation
between location l and location k. The refinery transforms crude oil into oil products. I focus on
N = 4 oil product types: gasoline, diesel, fuel oil and liquefied pressured gas (LPG). When the
refinery refines one barrel of crude oil, it obtains wn barrels of oil product n. The table shows the
oil product yields obtained from refining one barrel of Brent and WTI crude oil respectively.
Table 3.2.1: This table shows product yields from refining a barrel of Brent and WTI crude oil,
source: Bloomberg.
Brent WTI
LPG 6 5
Gasoline 54 58
Diesel 37 34
Fuel Oil 12 11
The profit of the refinery is the refining margin. The refining margin is the revenue on the oil
products sold to consumers after expenses associated with purchasing the crude oil, transportation
costs, and operational costs. The refinery considers the prices of crude oil, oil products, and
operational costs as exogenous. The freight rate is determined through Nash bargaining between
the shipowner and refinery. The crude oil price at location l at time t is given by Pl,t. The exogenous
oil product prices at location k ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} are denoted by the price vector [Pk,1,t, Pk,2,t, ..., Pk,N,t],
and the marginal operational costs of the refinery is crt . The profit
3 of the refinery on a cargo size
3Parker (2014) specifies the trader’s profit from matching with ship i as the discounted expected value of selling
the crude oil at location k at time t + tl,k less transportation costs and the cost associated with purchasing of the
crude oil at location l at time t:
Et[pi
G
t ] =
(
βtl,kEt[Pk,t+tl,k ] − Pl,t
)
q − rl,k,t · q
It is seen that using a oil futures price has similar appeal as using refinery margins as a measure of a trader’s profits.
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of q is:
pirl,k,t = q
(
N∑
n=1
wnPn,k,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from oil products
−crt − rl,k,t − Pl,t
)
. (3.3)
If the trader does not match with a tanker vessel, the trader does not buy the crude oil and receives
his outside value equal to zero.
3.2.5 Shipowners’ states, values and decisions
In this section, I will describe the behaviour of a shipowner. The state variables of the shipowner are
the vessel’s location and employment status. The shipowner’s dynamic decision problem is where
to ballast her vessel when it is unemployed. When a vessel enters employment, it will ballast to
the loading region and carry out the voyage specified by the voyage charter contract. However, the
employment status of vessels is not perfectly observed by the econometrician since not all contracts
are reported4. This implies that for parts of the data, the true underlying employment state of
the vessels is unobserved. When fixtures are unreported the employment state of the vessels is
coarse5. However, I observe a change in the vessels’ loading conditions. For vessels that load oil
without a contract being observed, I can create an interval in which the vessel entered the contract.
The exact event time is unknown but falls within a certain time interval. It should be noted that
some vessels may never enter into a voyage charter for natural reasons, for instance, if the vessel
is owned or time-chartered by an oil company. In other words, the exact time of employment is
interval censored. Within each location, the vessel can be
1. unemployed when it is sailing in ballast and the shipowner has not entered a new agreement
with a trader.
2. employed when it is sailing in ballast, but the shipowner has signed a new contract with a
trader. The vessel will also be employed when it is sailing loaded.
The vessel’s employment status can transition accordingly: an unemployed vessel will transition
to the employed state when it enters into an agreement with a trader. It can also remain in unem-
ployed state if it does not enter an agreement with a trader. Whenever a vessel in the data makes a
4Not all voyage charter agreements are reported. Some charterers omit to report their fixtures, see Parker (2014)
chapter 5. Furthermore, in some of the fixtures, the vessel is not specified. This implies that only a fraction of the
realized matches is observed in the fixtures data in practice.
5Coarse data is when: ”data are neither entirely missing nor perfectly present. Instead, we observe only a subset
of the complete-data sample space in which the true, unobservable data lie”, Heitjan and Rubin (1991)
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direct transition from unemployed to employed without an fixture being observed, I interval censor
the entire ballast leg.
3.2.6 Timing
Within each period, the timing is as follows:
1. Unemployed vessels make ballasting choices dt based on their current position it and the
current freight rate state xt.
2. Traders and shipowners match.
3. Matched vessels will bargain over the freight rate and become employed. In the next period,
they will start to ballast towards the loading region.
4. Unmatched vessels will start the next period unemployed at their new location it+1 and with
a new freight rate state xt+1, which is governed by the probability transition matrix Π.
Ballasting ships’ valuations
Unemployed vessels will make ballasting choices based on their assigned continuation values. The
shipowner’s optimal ballasting choice is given by:
d∗t (xt, it) = arg max
dt
{
Et
[
−c(i, dt)+
Expected value of a voyage charter︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
l
pl(it)
∑
k
Mlk
(
q · rl,k,t(xt)− c(it+1, l, k) + βτV (xt+τ , k, d∗t+τ )
)
+
(
1−
∑
l
pl(it)
)
· β · V (xt+1, it+1, d∗t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected value of remaining unemployed
]}
. (3.4)
The value associated with being at location it, when the freight rate state is xt and the ballasting
choice made by the shipowner is dt is:
V (xt, it, dt) = Et
[
− c(it, dt) +
Expected value of a voyage charter︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
l
pl(it)
∑
k
Mlk
(
q · rl,k,t(xt)− c(it+1, l, k) + βτV (xt+τ , k, d∗t+τ )
)
+
(
1−
∑
l
pl(it)
)
· β · V (xt+1, it+1, d∗t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected value of remaining unemployed
]
. (3.5)
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The expected value of a vessel depends on the vessel’s current location it and the current freight
rate state. The expected value consists of the following components: −c(it, dt) is the cost associated
with the vessel’s ballast choice, dt. pl(it) is the probability of entering into a voyage charter with a
trader, which will load in region l. For simplicity, I assume that pl(it) is independent of the freight
rate state xt. In reality, I expect a positive dependence, i.e., a positive covariance between the
fraction of available ships that matches and the freight rate level6. Conditional on a match with a
load in location l, the probability of getting a voyage to location k is Ml,k. When the vessel matches
with a trader, it earns the freight rate rl,k,t and pays voyage costs of c(it+1, l, k). The voyage costs
c(it+1, l, k) consist of bunker costs and port charges. Bunker costs are the costs associated with
sailing in ballast from the vessel’s position at time t + 1, it+1, to the loading region l plus the
cost for the voyage between location l and location k. The vessel will be travelling for τ periods
after time t before it reaches location k, i.e. τ = τit+1,l + τl,k. For notational convenience, I have
suppressed the dependence of τ on it+1, l and k. The continuation value associated with being in
region k is given by V (xt+τ , k, d
∗
t+τ ) which is discounted by β
τ . With probability (1−∑l pl(it)),
the vessel does not match with a trader. The vessel will then continue in the next period from
its prevailing location. The new location at time t+ 1 is it+1 which is determined by the vessel’s
previous location it and its ballast choice dt. The continuation value from the vessel’s new position
is given by V (xt+1, it+1, d
∗
t+1), which is discounted one period by β.
3.2.7 The freight rate bargaining power
When a trader and a shipowner match they bargain over the freight rate and split the surplus
via Nash bargaining. The shipowner’s bargaining power is determined by the Nash bargaining
parameter γ. The freight rate outcome of the bargaining process rl,k,t maximizes the Nash (1950)
product:
rl,k,t = arg max (VShip match − VShip no match)γ (VTrader match − VTrader no match)(1−γ) , (3.6)
where VShip match = q · rl,k,t − c(it, l, k) + βτEt
[
V (xt+τ , it+1, d
∗
t+τ )
]
is the shipowner’s value asso-
ciated with the match for the freight rate rl,k,t. The shipowner only enters the voyage charter
if the value of the match exceeds the value of remaining unemployed. The value of remaining
6When there are few(many) available vessels the freight rate level is expected to be high(low) and the fraction of
available vessels that matches is also expected to be high(low) for a fixed level of transportation demand.
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unemployed is the threat point of the shipowner. The threat point is given by VShip no match =
β · Et
[
V (xt+1, it+1, d
∗
t+1)
]
. The trader’s value of a match is given by the refining margin, i.e.,
VTrader match = pi
r
l,k,t. If the trader does not match with a shipowner, the trader receives a value of
zero. The shipowner’s bargaining power parameter γ = γshipowner is determined from:
(1− γshipowner)
(
q · rl,k,t − c(it, l, k) + βτEt
[
V (xt+τ , it+1, d
∗
t+τ )
]− β · Et [V (xt+1, it+1, d∗t+1)]) =
γshipowner
q
(
N∑
n=1
wnPn,k,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from oil products
−crt − rl,k,t − Pl,t
) (3.7)
Equivalently, the shipowner’s bargaining power is given by proportion of the total value which the
shipowner is able to extract:
γshipowner =
VShip match − VShip no match
(VShip match − VShip no match) + (VTrader match − VTrader no match) (3.8)
Before I get to the estimation of the matching function and describe how I calculate continuation
values, I will describe the data.
3.3 Data description
3.3.1 Data sources
I combine datasets from different sources. First, I have information from ships’ AIS tracking
systems for VLCCs from MarineTraffic from November 2014 to August 2016. The AIS data con-
tains information on vessels’ speed, self-reported draughts and positions in the form of longitude
and latitude coordinates. Second, I employ time-series information on route-specific, time-charter
equivalent (TCE) earnings and bunker prices. I use the TCE and bunker price series to esti-
mate the choice-specific continuation values. I merge the AIS dataset with the fixtures dataset by
the vessel-specific IMO numbers. Furthermore, I have information on bilateral fixtures between
charterers and shipowners from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network. In the fixtures data, I
observe the name of the shipowner and charterer, the agreed upon freight rate, the date the fixture
entered, the cargo size, and the IMO number of the vessels. The freight rates are predominately
denominated in World Scale. I am in possession of the flat rate (i.e., the conversion rate from
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World Scale to dollars per metric ton) for the route between the Arabian Gulf and the Far East.
I am only able to evaluate the bargaining power on the route from the Arabian Gulf to the Far East.
I have information on refinery margins from Bloomberg. The refining margin data consists of
time-series of the revenue from sold oil products, variable refinery costs, and crude oil spot prices.
Table 3.3.1 shows the summary statistics for the oil product revenue in South Korea for a barrel
of the Dubai Fateh grade, the crude oil spot price for the Dubai Fateh grade, and the variable
refinery costs which are all from Bloomberg.
Table 3.3.1: Refinery-related time-series
This table shows summary statistics for the three refinery-related time-series which are all measured
in $/bbl. The first time-series is the oil product revenue in South Korea. The second time-series
is the crude oil spot price for the Dubai Fateh grade, where one mt corresponds to 7.232 barrels.
The third time-series is the variable refinery costs.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Oil product revenue in South Korea for Dubai Fateh 718 73.56 26.97 34.37 118.18
Crude oil spot price Dubai Fateh 718 64.40 27.00 22.49 111.28
Variable refinery costs 711 3.89 1.73 1.68 7.68
3.3.2 Voyages and employment status
In order to determine the vessels’ employment status, I have compiled voyages for each vessel using
the AIS data. I compile voyages by filtering through the AIS data in order to determine loading
and discharge dates. The loading and discharge dates are determined based on the vessels’ speeds,
draughts and locations. As an example, the vessels’ reported draughts are not always up to date,
e.g., vessels change their draughts while sailing after they have departed from a port in a loading
region. Table 3.3.2 shows the distribution of interregional voyages. The primary loading region
is the Arabian Gulf where 66.57% of the voyages are initiated. The Arabian Gulf is followed by
West Africa (16.30%) and the Caribbean (9.24%).
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Table 3.3.2: Compiled voyages
This table shows the distribution of the hand compiled voyages from the AIS sample. The sample period is
from November 2014 to August 2016.
Load Discharge No. Percentage
Brazil and Uruguay Far East 28 0.98
Brazil and Uruguay India 5 0.18
Brazil and Uruguay SPORE 41 1.44
Brazil and Uruguay US Gulf 1 0.04
Caribbean Far East 19 0.67
Caribbean India 103 3.62
Caribbean SPORE 141 4.95
Mediterranean Far East 6 0.21
Mediterranean India 1 0.04
Mediterranean SPORE 4 0.14
Other Far East 7 0.25
Other India 22 0.77
Other Red Sea 1 0.04
Other SPORE 10 0.35
Other US Gulf 1 0.04
Panama and Ecuador Far East 14 0.49
Panama and Ecuador SPORE 5 0.18
Arabian Gulf Brazil 9 0.32
Arabian Gulf Canada 24 0.84
Arabian Gulf Far East 998 35.04
Arabian Gulf India 222 7.79
Arabian Gulf Other 2 0.07
Arabian Gulf Red Sea 42 1.47
Arabian Gulf South Africa 9 0.32
Arabian Gulf SPORE 363 12.75
Arabian Gulf UK and Continent 65 2.28
Arabian Gulf US Gulf 127 4.46
Arabian Gulf US West Coast 35 1.23
Red Sea Far East 9 0.32
Red Sea India 3 0.11
Red Sea SPORE 3 0.11
Red Sea UK and Continent 2 0.07
UK and Continent Far East 33 1.16
UK and Continent SPORE 26 0.91
UK and Continent UK and Continent 1 0.04
West Africa Canada 1 0.04
West Africa Far East 261 9.16
West Africa India 145 5.09
West Africa Other 1 0.04
West Africa South Africa 3 0.11
West Africa SPORE 44 1.54
West Africa UK and Continent 8 0.28
West Africa US Gulf 1 0.04
Yemen Far East 1 0.04
Yemen SPORE 1 0.04
On aggregate, 92.11% of the voyages load in either the Arabian Gulf, West Africa or the
Caribbean. The majority of voyages (88.33%) discharge in either the Far East (48.32%), the
Southern Pacific Oceania Region (SPORE) (22.41%) or India (17.60%).
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Vessels’ employment states
I will now label the employment status for each of the vessels. First, I label vessels which are
carrying out a voyage as employed. Second, I look through the periods when vessels’ are reported
loaded by their draughts but are not carrying out a voyage. These observations consist of vessels
which are sitting laden and are either used for floating storage or hindered from discharging due
to port congestion7. I label the employment status of these observations as vessels involved in
floating storage or subject to port congestion. Third, the remaining observations consist of vessels
which are sailing in ballast.
I categorize vessels sailing in ballast vessels into three categories unemployed, employed, or
either employed or unemployed. On ballast legs where I observe a fixture, I know when the vessel
is employed and unemployed. On the part of the ballast leg prior to the fixture is reported, I label
the vessel as unemployed. On the part of the ballast leg after the vessel has entered the fixture,
I label the vessel as employed. On ballast legs where I do not observe a reported fixture vessels
are either employed or unemployed. This is the case when a vessel sails in ballast to a loading
region and picks up a cargo without a fixture being observed in the fixtures dataset. In this case,
I cannot identify the exact time where the fixture is entered and the match is interval-censored.
3.4 Empirical approach
I will now present the empirical approach. I start by estimating the matching function as a
generalized linear binomial model. I assume that unobserved matches are missing at random and
employ an EM algorithm to account for the interval censored matches8. In my estimation of the
matching function, I consider only matches in the Arabian Gulf, West Africa, and the Caribbean.
The three loading regions contain 92.11% of all voyages identified in my sample. When I leave out
7.89% of the observed matches I will underestimate the continuation values.
7Admittedly, the vessels subject to port congestion should have been classified as still employed on a voyage.
This is a consequence of my compilation of voyages, where I have sometimes marked the date of arrival at a port as
the discharge date instead of the actual discharge date.
8Parker (2014, chapter 5) notes that oil majors Shell and Vitol have a low representation of fixtures in the
Clarkson fixtures compared with reports from shipbrokers on their respective market share. This implies that the
missing fixtures are potentially charter specific.
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3.4.1 Estimation of the matching probability
In this section, I estimate the matching function as a generalized linear model with a complemen-
tary log-log link function. My voyage charter data sample does only contain some of the voyages
actually conducted. When a vessel loads at a loading region without a voyage charter agreement
being present in the data, I treat it as an interval-censored observation. I assume that the vessel
entered the voyage charter at some point within its ballasting leg9. In this case, I only know that
the vessel has entered into a voyage charter agreement prior to its loading date. Thus, I have a
missing data problem since, I lack the exact week in which the agreement was made. I deal with the
missing data problem by estimating the parameters with an EM algorithm, (Dempster et al., 1977).
First, I initialize the parameters by estimating the model using only data where I observe the
matches. I then do an expectation step. In the expectation step, I calculate the expectation of
when the vessel matches with a trader. I calculate the expected values using the initial parameters
from the estimation where I only use data on ballast legs where fixtures are reported. I then
estimate new parameters using both the complete data and the interval-censored data.
Let Yi,l,t be a stochastic variable equal to one if the vessel matches with a trader in location l
in week t:
Yi,l,t =

1 If a ’location l match’ is observed for vessel i, in week t
0 If no ’location l match’ is observed for vessel i in week t,
(3.9)
Let Ti,l be the waiting time until a vessel matches with a trader, i.e., the time until Yi,l,t = 1. The
discrete hazard10 is the conditional probability of getting a match in period t, conditional on the
shipowner not having matched earlier on the ballast leg. The hazard is given by:
λl(t) = P (Ti,l = t|Ti,l ≥ t) = P (Ti,l = t)P (Ti,l ≥ t) (3.10)
9In the data, I observe that shipowners enter into new employment while they are still employed on a voyage
charter. I ignore this possibility in my EM-algorithm estimation and assume that all unobserved matches are made
when the vessel is ballasting.
10Here the hazard is a conditional probability rather than a rate.
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I work with the discrete hazard function of the form:
λl(t) = 1− exp
[− exp [αl + β′Xi,t]] (3.11)
The complementary log-log link function yields a linear predictor
log [− log (1− λl(t))] = αl + β′Xi,t (3.12)
The probability of observing a match in week t for a voyage charter which will load in region l is:
P (Ti,l = t) = λl(t)
∏
k∈L
t−1∏
j=1
(1− λk(j)), (3.13)
where the probability that the vessel still has not matched in period t− 1 is:
P (Ti,l > t− 1) =
∏
k∈L
t−1∏
j=1
(1− λk(j)) (3.14)
The joint likelihood function for all vessels is then:
Likelihood =
∏
t
∏
i
∏
l
[P (Ti,l = t)]yi,l,t [P (Ti,l > t)]1−yi,l,t
=
∏
t
∏
i
∏
l
[
λl(t)
1− λl(t)
]yi,l,t t∏
j=1
(1− λl(j))
(3.15)
where yi,l,t is a dummy equal to one if the vessel enters into a voyage charter with a loading port
in region l for the complete observations. The log likelihood becomes:
LogLikelihood =
∑
t
∑
i
∑
l
yi,l,t log λl(t)− yi,l,t log(1− log λl(t)) +
t∑
j
log(1− log λl(j)) (3.16)
In the EM algorithm’s expectation step number n, I take the expectation of the log likelihood
conditional on the current parameter estimates θ(n) = [α(n) β(n)]. As the log-likelihood function
is linear in yi,l,t, this corresponds to finding the expected value of yi,l,t conditional on the current
parameter values θ(n) and the observed data.
For the interval-censored observations, I do not know the exact event time yi,l′,t, but I do know
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that the vessel will eventually load in region l′ and that the week when the vessel matches lies
between two time points t0 and t0 + κ. In the expectation step, the observations are replaced by
their expected values y˜i,l′,t′ . The expected value y˜i,l′,t for t ∈ {t0, t0 + 1, ..., t0 + κ} is equal to
probability that the event occurs at time t′ conditional on the event occurring in one week between
time t0 and time t0 + κ, i.e., y˜i,l′,t′ = P
(
Yi,l′,t′ = 1
∣∣∣∑t0+κu=t0 Yi,l′,u = 1), where t0 is the week the
vessel journeys out on its ballasting leg and t0 + κ is the week where the vessel loads a cargo. The
probability that the vessel enters a match in a week between t0 and t0 + κ is:
P
(
t0+κ∑
u=t0
Yi,l′,u = 1
)
= P (Yi,l′,t0 = 1)+ t0+κ∑
t=t0+1
P (Yi,l′,t = 1)
(
t−t0∏
v=1
P (Yi,l′,t−v = 0)
)
,
Furthermore, the joint probability of a match occurring during the ballast leg and the match
occurring exactly in week t′ is given by:
P
(
Yi,l′,t′ = 1 ∩
t0+κ∑
u=t0
Yi,l′,u = 1
)
=

P (Yi,l′,t′ = 1) when t′ = t0
P (Yi,l′,t′ = 1) (∏t′−t0v=1 P (Yi,l′,t′−v = 0)) when t′ > t0
0 when t′ > t0 + κ
and the expected value y˜i,l′,t′ is then given by:
P
(
Yi,l′,t′ = 1
∣∣∣∣∣
t0+κ∑
u=t0
Yi,l′,u = 1
)
=
P (Yi,l′,t′ = 1 ∩∑t0+κu=t0 Yi,l′,u = 1)
P (∑t0+κu=t0 Yi,l′,u = 1) (3.17)
I estimate parameters for four covariates. The covariates consist of three loading region indicator
variables, one for each loading region. The fourth covariate is the distance to the loading region.
This specification gives the distance covariate and equal influence for all loading regions. The
parameters for the complete data are shown in Table 3.4.1, and the converged EM algorithm
parameters are shown in Table 3.4.2. The matching probabilities for the converged EM algorithm
are also illustrated for the Arabian Gulf in Figure 3.4.1, West Africa in Figure 3.4.2, and the
Caribbean in Figure 3.4.3. The figures show how the probability of getting a match increases as
the vessel approaches the loading region. The matching probabilities are evaluated in the observed
vessel position closest to the data’s centroid of each locational tile.
98
Table 3.4.1: Initial matching function estimates from the complete data
This table shows the regression results for the generalized linear model for the sample without the interval-
censored observations. The dependent variable is a match dummy which is equal to one when the ship
matches within a given loading region. The matches are assumed to follow a binomial distribution with a
complementary log-log link function.
Dependent variable:
1{Match}
1{Arabian Gulf} −0.363∗∗∗
(0.046)
1{West Africa} −1.188∗∗∗
(0.098)
1{Caribbean} −2.401∗∗∗
(0.156)
Distance −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00001)
Observations 13,083
Log Likelihood −3,892.175
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,792.349
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.4.2: Matching function EM algorithm estimates
This table shows the results for EM algorithm for the generalized linear model. The dependent
variable is a match dummy which is equal to one when the ship matches within a given loading
region. The matches are assumed to follow a binomial distribution with a complementary log-log
link function.
Dependent variable:
1{Match}
1{Arabian Gulf} 0.759
1{West Africa} −0.452
1{Caribbean} −0.923
Distance −0.0003
Observations 48,717
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Figure 3.4.1: Matching probabilities for voyages loading in the Arabian Gulf
This figure shows the probability that an unemployed vessel matches with a trader at each locational tile
for a voyage loading in the Arabian Gulf.
52%
86% 34%
67%
81%
50%
67%
81% 65%
39%
57%
26%
62%
32%
28%
54%
20%
27%
−60
−30
0
30
60
0 50 100 150
lon
la
t
100
Figure 3.4.2: Matching probabilities for voyages loading in West Africa
This figure shows the matching probabilities for an order out of West Africa for different locational tiles.
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Figure 3.4.3: Matching probabilities for voyages loading in the Caribbean
This figure shows the matching probabilities for an order out of the Caribbean for different locational tiles.
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3.4.2 Freight rate process
In this section, I specify the freight rate earnings process which I use to estimate the continuation
values associated with the shipowners’ ballasting choices. I model the freight rate process as
a regime-shifting process, the transitions are governed by a Markov chain. This is admittedly
somewhat simplistic and stylized. The regime-shifting approach is a convenient process to work
with, however. Before I specify the model, I will present the earnings time series.
TCE earnings
I will now present the TCE earnings series which I use to estimate the freight rate process. The
earnings series is denominated in thousand dollars per day for the round trip. The TCE calculation
is given by:
TCE =
r · q · (1− brokers fee)− port costs− bunker costs
voyage time
. (3.18)
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I am interested in the earnings before the bunker costs for the ballasting leg are subtracted. I get
the earnings by multiplying the TCE series with the number of voyage days. I then add back the
bunker costs for the ballasting leg. I calculate the bunker costs for the ballasting leg using the
prevailing bunker price and the assumed bunker consumption in ballast of 55 mt/day, see table
3.4.3. I use the bunker price index closest to the loading port of the voyage. Specifically, I use
the Fujairah 380cst bunker price for voyages which load in the Arabian Gulf, the Gibraltar 380cst
bunker price for voyages loading in West Africa, and the Panama 380cst bunker price for voyages
out of the Caribbean11. An earnings series is given as:
Earnings = TCE · voyage time + ballast leg bunker costs (3.19)
I will now set up the simplistic Markov chain model. I group the earnings series by loading region.
I then compute average earnings within each of the three loading regions. I subdivide the loading
region average series into tertiles, i.e., I find the 33.33% and the 66.67% quantiles such that the
earnings in each loading region can be in either a low, medium or high state. I take the average
value within each tertile as the discrete value of the earnings in that state. This leads to 33 = 27
potential states for the freight earnings process. I only observe 13 out of the 27 possible combina-
tions of states in the data. When the freight rate level is high for voyages out of the Arabian Gulf,
freight rate levels are also predominately high for voyages out of West Africa and the Caribbean.
This is not surprising as freight rates are cointegrated across regions (Berg-Andereassen, 1996;
Berg-Andreassen, 1997; Veenstra and Franses, 1997; Kavussanos, 2003). The freight rate regimes
can be seen in Table 3.4.4.
I face the issue of having fewer freight rate route indices than there are routes in the observed
matches. I replace unobserved route indices with the observed index, which constitutes the closest
geographical substitute. For the matches with a loading port in the Arabian Gulf, the earnings
index from Ras Tanura to LOOP (Louisiana offshore oil port) is used for voyages which discharge
in the US Gulf, Canada and Brazil. The earnings index from the Arabian Gulf to Chiba in Japan
is used for voyages from the Arabian Gulf to the Far East. Likewise, I match the earnings indices
to the observed voyages in parentheses accordingly: voyages from Ras Tanura (the Arabian Gulf)
11The bunker price series could be changed such that the bunker price series for Singapore is used for voyages out
of West Africa, and the bunker price for Houston is used for voyages out of the Caribbean.
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to Rotterdam (UK and Continent), Ain Sukna (Red Sea), Singapore (SPORE), and Jamnager
(India). I match the indices from West Africa to the observed voyages in parentheses accordingly:
Bonny Offshore (West Africa) to LOOP (Canada and US Gulf), to Ningbo (Far East), to Kaohsi-
ung (SPORE), to LOOP (US Gulf), to Jamnager (India). For the Caribbean, I only have a single
earnings index series from Bonaire to Singapore which then also serves as an earnings proxy for
voyages to India and the Far East.
The distribution of voyage destinations conditional on a match, Mlk, is shown in Table 3.4.5 for
each of the three loading regions. For voyages out of the Arabian Gulf, I discard voyages in Table
3.3.2 to South Africa and the US West Coast. For these voyages, I do not have an appropriate
index to use. For voyages out of West Africa, I discard voyages to South Africa and the UK and
Continent region.
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Table 3.4.3: Freight Rate TCE series
This table shows the assumptions of the TCE earnings series. The index vessel is built around 2010. The columns show the assumptions regarding the
voyages’ loading port, discharge port, voyage distances, voyage speeds and bunker fuel consumption. Source Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network.
ID Load Discharge Distance Distance Sea Sea Port Total Speed Speed Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons.
Port Port Laden Ballast Time Margin Time Time Laden Ballast Laden Ballast
T120 Ras Tanura Rotterdam 11, 170 4, 475 50 2.50 4 56.50 13.50 12 80 55
T121 Ras Tanura Chiba 6, 654 6, 654 43.60 2.20 4 49.80 13.50 12 80 55
T122 Ras Tanura Ain Sukna 3, 121 3, 121 20.50 1 4 25.50 13.50 12 80 55
T125 Ras Tanura LOOP 12, 225 6, 011 58.60 2.90 4 65.50 13.50 12 80 55
T126 Ras Tanura Singapore 3, 702 3, 702 24.30 1.20 4 29.50 13.50 12 80 55
T127 Bonny Offshore LOOP 5, 912 5, 912 38.80 1.90 4 44.70 13.50 12 80 55
T128 Bonny Offshore Kaohsiung 9, 440 9, 440 61.90 3.10 4 69 13.50 12 80 55
T129 Bonny Offshore Jamnagar 7, 075 7, 075 46.40 2.30 4 52.70 13.50 12 80 55
T131 Bonaire Singapore 10, 767 3, 730 46.20 2.30 4 52.50 13.50 12 80 55
T133 Bonny Offshore Ningbo 10, 196 10, 196 66.90 3.30 4 74.20 13.50 12 80 55
T134 Ras Tanura Jamnagar 1, 184 1, 184 7.80 0.40 4 12.20 13.50 12 80 55
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Table 3.4.4: Freight earnings regimes
This table shows the freight rate regimes for voyages out of the Arabian Gulf, West Africa and the Caribbean.
Freight rate regimes are measured in thousand dollars.
Rotterdam Chiba Ain Sukna LOOP Singapore Jamnagar
Arabian Gulf low 962 1, 141 527 1, 166 858 230
Arabian Gulf medium 1, 729 1, 960 956 2, 259 1, 420 469
Arabian Gulf high 3, 584 3, 846 1, 824 4, 800 2, 089 938
LOOP Kaohsiung Jamnagar Ningbo
West Africa low 1, 390 1, 807 216 1, 680
West Africa medium 2, 187 2, 940 479 2, 876
West Africa high 3, 730 5, 191 939 5, 037
Singapore
Caribbean low 1, 390
Caribbean medium 2, 581
Caribbean high 5, 533
Table 3.4.5: Distribution of voyage destinations conditional on a match
This table shows the relative frequency of voyage destinations in percent for the three loading
regions for the voyages compiled from the AIS data: the Arabian Gulf, West Africa and the
Caribbean. The relative frequencies are used as estimates of Mlk, e.g., the probability of getting a
voyage to the Far East conditional on having matched with a loading port in the Arabian Gulf is
53.9%.
The Far East India Red Sea SPORE UK and Continent US Gulf
Arabian Gulf 53.9 12 2.3 19.6 3.5 8.6
West Africa 57.7 32.1 0 9.7 0 0.4
Caribbean 7.2 39.2 0 53.6 0 0
3.4.3 Continuation values
I will now calculate the continuation values. I fix the discount factor at 0.99. I set the bunker
price12 used to calculate the ballasting sailing costs equal to 280$/mt. The price of 280$/mt is
close to the average bunker price for 380cst Fujairah of 281.285$/mt in the period from October
2014 to October 2016. I solve for the continuation values using the following approach: First, I
initialize the continuation value matrix EV. The EV matrix contains an element for each pair of
the location and freight rate states. In my setup, the EV matrix has 32 rows and 13 columns,
12The model could be extended with a bunker price process.
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Table 3.4.6: Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics for the earnings series measured in thousand dollars. The
sample period is from January 2010 to October 2016.
Index Load Discharge N Average St. Dev. Min Max
T120 Ras Tanura Rotterdam 347 2,105 1,324 −272 7,351
T121 Ras Tanura Chiba 345 2,335 1,298 664 6,888
T122 Ras Tanura Ain Sukna 342 1,116 625 275 3,320
T125 Ras Tanura LOOP 343 2,789 1,752 452 8,937
T126 Ras Tanura Singapore 351 1,465 720 189 4,073
T127 Bonny Offshore LOOP 354 2,423 1,116 944 6,016
T128 Bonny Offshore Kaohsiung 346 3,329 1,604 1,059 8,354
T129 Bonny Offshore Jamnagar 330 523 324 26 1,269
T131 Bonaire Singapore 351 3,168 1,917 514 7,940
T133 Bonny Offshore Ningbo 334 3,188 1,532 869 7,421
T134 Ras Tanura Jamnagar 330 523 324 26 1,269
where 32 is the number of distinct locations, and 13 is the number of distinct freight rate states.
I solve for continuation values accordingly:
1. I make an initial guess at the values in the continuation value matrix EV.
2. For each freight rate location state, I evaluate the value of each possible discrete ballasting
choice. Let x be a freight rate state, it be the vessels current location, and d be a discrete
ballasting choice which leads to the new location it+1 in period t+ 1. Then the value of the
ballasting choice d is:
V (x, it, d) =
∑
l
pl(it)
∑
k
Mlk
(
q · rl,k,t(x)− c(it+1, l, k) + βτ(it+1,l,k)+1 · exΠτ(it+1,l,k)+1 EV[k, ]′
)
+
(
1−
∑
l
pl(it)
)
· β · exΠ EV[it+1, ]′ − c(it, dt), (3.20)
where τ(it+1, l, k) is sailing time from position it+1 to loading region l plus the sailing time
from loading region l to discharge region k. The freight evolution is governed by the (13×13)
probability transition matrix Π. If the vessel matches for a voyage from l to k the distribution
of the freight rate states at time τ(it+1, l, k)+1 is exΠ
τ(it+1,l,k)+1, where Π3 is Π to the matrix
power 3 and ex is a unit column vector with element x equal to one. EV[k, ]
′ is a (13 × 1)
vector of the continuation values associated with each of the 13 freight rate states at discharge
location k.
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3. Once the values for each of the possible ballasting choices have been calculated in state (it,
x), I find the value of the ballasting choice which yields the highest value. I store this value
in a temporary continuation value matrix EVtmp[it, x].
4. After I have found the value associated with optimal ballasting choices for all states, I update
the continuation value matrix setting EV = EVtmp.
5. Steps 2 to 5 are repeated until the sum of squared differences between the continuation value
matrix and the temporary continuation value matrix is smaller than 10−6.
3.4.4 Bargaining power parameters
I will now determine the bargaining power parameters for the bilateral fixtures. I have to restrict
my sample to voyages from the Arabian Gulf to the Far East. This is the only route where I know
the flat rate and where I am able to convert freight rates from World Scale into dollars per metric
ton. Furthermore, I have port charges from a TCE calculation from the Baltic Exchange. I do
have the freight rate lump sum payment in dollars for certain voyages, e.g. the majority of voyages
which load in the Caribbean. However, I do not know the port charges for these voyages. Hence,
I restrict my sample to the route from the Arabian Gulf to the Far East as this is the only route
that allows me to make a reasonable estimate of the voyage costs and earnings. I obtain bargaining
parameters as:
γshipowner =
VShip match − VShip no match
VShip match − VShip no match + VTrader match − VTrader no match .
The distribution of bargaining power parameters is shown in Figure 3.4.4. The average value is
23.96% which is somewhat close to the 30% used in Brancaccio et al. (2017). This is supportive
of the view that charterers are in possession of more bargaining power than shipowners. The
distribution of bargaining parameters are right-skewed. The bargaining parameters indicate the
freight markets are competitive but that shipowners are able to exert market power and extract
part of the traders’ value from the trades.
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Table 3.4.7: Summary statistics for bargaining parameters
This table shows the summary statistics for the estimated bargaining parameters for voyages from
the Arabian Gulf to the Far East.
Statistic N Average St. Dev. Min Max
NashBargainingParameterShipowner 465 23.960 10.157 3.809 67.076
Figure 3.4.4: Histogram of bargaining power parameters
Histogram of ship owners' bargaining parameters
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I evaluate the relative bargaining power of shipowners and traders. I set forth a sim-
ple model of the matching between shipowners and geographical traders. In the model, shipowners
make dynamic ballasting choices to maximize their continuation value. The model differs from the
model by Brancaccio et al. (2017) in two important aspects. First, shipowners are able to re-
evaluate which loading region to ballast towards along their ballast leg. Second, the matching
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function is estimated parametrically using an EM algorithm to account for unreported fixtures.
Furthermore, I utilize information on refining margins earned by geographical traders to find the
relative bargaining power. I find that, on average, geographical traders are in possession of more
bargaining power than shipowners. I find that shipowners’ average bargaining power coefficient,
i.e. the proportion of the total value that the shipowner is able to extract, is approximately 24%.
I acknowledge that my model suffers from (at least) the following limitations: First, the model
does not account for dynamic speed choices made by shipowners. Second, the matching function
implemented depends only on a loading region dummy, and it is assumed linear in distance. The
distance effect is therefore homogeneous across loading regions. This implies that my matching
function is neither time varying nor freight rate state dependent. In contrast, Prochazka (2018,
chapter 1) shows that the freight rate and distance from the loading region are positively related.
Third, the estimation of my matching function, which applies the EM algorithm relies on (a) the
missing matches being missing at random, and (b) being able to specify the correct functional form
of the matching function. Whether either of the two is satisfied in practice is doubtful. Fourth, I
do not have TCE indices for all types of voyages observed in the AIS sample. My replacement of
certain routes with the closest substitute will potentially lead to a bias in the estimated contin-
uation values. Furthermore, I make no effort to correct the TCE indices for deviations from the
voyage speeds assumed in the calculation of earnings. Fifth, the refining market information I use
from Bloomberg is a benchmark series for refineries in South Korea. This implies that I use this as
a proxy for all refineries in China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Hence I am not able to capture
the heterogeneity in refinery margins. Sixth, the unavailability of flat rates and information on
voyage costs limits my examination of the bargaining power to voyages from the Arabian Gulf to
the Far East. Seventh, my bargaining power estimate will be biased if my assumption that the
trader’s alternative value equals zero is invalid.
3.6 Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the helpful comments I have received from Birthe Larsen, Benjamin Christoffersen,
Roar Adland, Patrick Kofod Mogensen, Kristian Miltersen, Peter Løchte Jørgensen, and Ken L.
110
Bechmann. Furthermore, I gratefully acknowledge MarineTraffic for provision of the AIS data
sample.
111
112
Chapter 4
References
Acharya, V. V., Lochstoer, L. A. and Ramadorai, T. (2013), ‘Limits to arbitrage and hedging:
Evidence from commodity markets’, Journal of Financial Economics 109(2), 441–465.
Adams, K. J. and Van Deventer, D. R. (1994), ‘Fitting yield curves and forward rate curves with
maximum smoothness’, The Journal of Fixed Income 4(1), 52–62.
Adland, R. and Alizadeh, A. H. (2018), ‘Explaining price differences between physical and deriva-
tive freight contracts’, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
118, 20–33.
Adland, R., Cariou, P. and Wolff, F. (2016), ‘The influence of charterers and owners on bulk
shipping freight rates’, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
86, 69–82.
Adland, R., Cariou, P. and Wolff, F. (2017), ‘What makes a freight market index? an empirical
analysis of vessel fixtures in the offshore market’, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and
Transportation Review 104, 150–164.
Adland, R., Cariou, P. and Wolff, F.-C. (2019), ‘Comparing transaction-based and expert-
generated price indices in the market for offshore support vessels’, Journal of Transport Eco-
nomics and Policy 53(1), 121.
Adland, R. and Jia, H. (2016), ‘Dynamic speed choice in bulk shipping’, Maritime Economics &
Logistics pp. 1–14.
113
Adland, R. and Jia, H. (2017), ‘Simulating physical basis risks in the capesize freight market’,
Maritime Economics & Logistics 19(2), 196–210.
Adland, R., Jia, H. and Strandenes, S. P. (2017), ‘Are ais-based trade volume estimates reliable?
the case of crude oil exports’, Maritime Policy & Management pp. 1–9.
Adland, R. and Strandenes, S. P. (2007), ‘A discrete-time stochastic partial equilibrium model of
the spot freight market’, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (JTEP) 41(2), 189–218.
Alexandridis, G., Sahoo, S. and Visvikis, I. (2017), ‘Economic information transmissions and liquid-
ity between shipping markets: New evidence from freight derivatives’, Transportation Research
Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 98, 82–104.
Alizadeh, A. H. (2013), ‘Trading volume and volatility in the shipping forward freight market’,
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 49(1), 250–265.
Alizadeh, A. H., Huang, C.-Y. and van Dellen, S. (2015), ‘A regime switching approach for hedging
tanker shipping freight rates’, Energy Economics 49, 44–59.
Alizadeh, A. H., Kappou, K., Tsouknidis, D. and Visvikis, I. (2015), ‘Liquidity effects and ffa
returns in the international shipping derivatives market’, Transportation Research Part E: Lo-
gistics and Transportation Review 76, 58–75.
Alizadeh, A. H. and Talley, W. K. (2011), ‘Vessel and voyage determinants of tanker freight rates
and contract times’, Transport Policy 18(5), 665–675.
Alizadeh, A. and Nomikos, N. (2004), ‘Cost of carry, causality and arbitrage between oil futures and
tanker freight markets’, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
40(4), 297–316.
Alizadeh, A. and Nomikos, N. (2009), Shipping Derivatives and Risk Management, Palgrave McMil-
lan.
Aßmann, L. M., Andersson, J. and Eskeland, G. S. (2015), ‘Missing in action? speed optimization
and slow steaming in maritime shipping’, Speed Optimization and Slow Steaming in Maritime
Shipping (March 12, 2015). NHH Dept. of Business and Management Science Discussion Paper
(2015/13).
114
Batchelor, R., Alizadeh, A. and Visvikis, I. (2007), ‘Forecasting spot and forward prices in the
international freight market’, International Journal of Forecasting 23(1), 101–114.
Beenstock, M. and Vergottis, A. (1989), ‘An econometric model of the world tanker market’,
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy pp. 263–280.
Berg-Andereassen, J. A. (1996), ‘Some properties of international maritime statistics’, Maritime
Policy and Management 23(4), 381–395.
Berg-Andreassen, J. (1997), ‘Efficiency and interconnectivity in international shipping markets’,
International Journal of Transport Economics/Rivista internazionale di economia dei trasporti
pp. 241–257.
Brancaccio, G., Kalouptsidi, M. and Papageorgiou, T. (2017), Geography, search frictions and
endogenous trade costs, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Brancaccio, G., Kalouptsidi, M. and Papageorgiou, T. (2018), ‘The impact of oil prices on world
trade’.
Bucca, A. and Cummins, M. (2011), ‘Synthetic floating crude oil storage and optimal statistical
arbitrage: A model specification analysis’, Working paper .
Buchholz, N. (2015), Spatial equilibrium, search frictions and efficient regulation in the taxi in-
dustry, Technical report, Technical report, University of Texas at Austin.
Charemza, W. and Gronicki, M. (1981), ‘An econometric model of world shipping and shipbuild-
ing’, Maritime Policy & Management 8(1), 21–30.
Dempster, A. P., Laird, N. M. and Rubin, D. B. (1977), ‘Maximum likelihood from incomplete
data via the em algorithm’, Journal of the royal statistical society. Series B (methodological)
pp. 1–38.
Devanney, J. (2011), ‘The impact of charter party speeds on co2 emissions’, Center for Tankship
Excellence. Retrieved from www.c4tx.org .
Dickey, D. A. and Fuller, W. A. (1981), ‘Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive time series
with a unit root’, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 1057–1072.
115
Duffie, D. (2010), ‘Presidential address: Asset price dynamics with slow-moving capital’, The
Journal of finance 65(4), 1237–1267.
Ederington, L. H., Fernando, C. S., Holland, K. V. and Linn, S. C. (2017), ‘Arbitrage and its
physical limits’, Working paper .
Ellefsen, P. E. (2010), Commodity market modeling and physical trading strategies, PhD thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. (1987), ‘Co-integration and error correction: representation,
estimation, and testing’, Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society pp. 251–276.
Garleanu, N. and Pedersen, L. H. (2011), ‘Margin-based asset pricing and deviations from the law
of one price’, The Review of Financial Studies 24(6), 1980–2022.
Ghafouri, B. and Davison, M. (2017), ‘A forward dynamic optimization strategy under contango
storage arbitrage with frictions’, Working paper .
Goulas, L. and Skiadopoulos, G. (2012), ‘Are freight futures markets efficient? evidence from
imarex’, International journal of forecasting 28(3), 644–659.
Granger, C. W. (1981), ‘Some properties of time series data and their use in econometric model
specification’, Journal of econometrics 16(1), 121–130.
Greenwood, R. and Hanson, S. (2015), ‘Waves in ship prices and investment’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 55, 109.
Greenwood, R. and Hanson, S. G. (2014), ‘Waves in ship prices and investment’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 130(1), 55–109.
Haigh, M. S. (2000), ‘Cointegration, unbiased expectations, and forecasting in the biffex freight
futures market’, Journal of Futures Markets 20(6), 545–571.
Hamilton, T. W. (2015), ‘Crude storage economics’.
URL: https://www.lbcg.com/media/downloads/events/447/tamela-hamilton-lukoil-pan-
americas.7707.pdf
Hawdon, D. (1978), ‘Tanker freight rates in the short and long run’, Applied Economics 10(3), 203–
218.
116
Heitjan, D. F. and Rubin, D. B. (1991), ‘Ignorability and coarse data’, The annals of statistics
pp. 2244–2253.
Jarque, C. M. and Bera, A. K. (1980), ‘Efficient tests for normality, homoscedasticity and serial
independence of regression residuals’, Economics letters 6(3), 255–259.
Jia, H., Adland, R., Prakash, V. and Smith, T. (2017), ‘Energy efficiency with the application of
virtual arrival policy’, Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 54, 50–60.
Johansen, S. (1988), ‘Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors’, Journal of economic dynamics
and control 12(2-3), 231–254.
Johansen, S. (1991), ‘Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in gaussian vector
autoregressive models’, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 1551–1580.
Johansen, S. (1995), Likelihood-based inference in cointegrated vector autoregressive models, Oxford
University Press on Demand.
Kahneman, D. (2003), ‘Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics’, Amer-
ican economic review 93(5), 1449–1475.
Kalouptsidi, M. (2014), ‘Time to build and fluctuations in bulk shipping’, The American Economic
Review 104(2), 564–608.
Karakitsos, E. and Varnavides, L. (2016), Maritime Economics: A macroeconomic approach,
Springer.
Kavussanos, M. G. (2003), ‘Time varying risks among segments of the tanker freight markets’,
Maritime Economics & Logistics 5(3), 227–250.
Kavussanos, M. G. and Nomikos, N. K. (1999), ‘The forward pricing function of the shipping
freight futures market’, Journal of futures markets 19(3), 353–376.
Kavussanos, M. G. and Nomikos, N. K. (2000a), ‘Constant vs. time-varying hedge ratios and hedg-
ing efficiency in the biffex market’, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation
Review 36(4), 229–248.
Kavussanos, M. G. and Nomikos, N. K. (2000b), ‘Hedging in the freight futures market’, Journal
of Derivatives 8(1), 41–58.
117
Kavussanos, M. G. and Nomikos, N. K. (2003), ‘Price discovery, causality and forecasting in the
freight futures market’, Review of Derivatives Research 6(3), 203–230.
Kavussanos, M. G. and Visvikis, I. D. (2004), ‘Market interactions in returns and volatilities
between spot and forward shipping freight markets’, Journal of Banking & Finance 28(8), 2015–
2049.
Kavussanos, M. G., Visvikis, I. D. and Batchelor, R. A. (2004), ‘Over-the-counter forward con-
tracts and spot price volatility in shipping’, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and
Transportation Review 40(4), 273–296.
Kavussanos, M. G., Visvikis, I. D. and Dimitrakopoulos, D. N. (2014), ‘Economic spillovers be-
tween related derivatives markets: The case of commodity and freight markets’, Transportation
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 68, 79–102.
Kavussanos, M. G., Visvikis, I. D. and Menachof, D. (2004), ‘The unbiasedness hypothesis in
the freight forward market: Evidence from cointegration tests’, Review of Derivatives Research
7(3), 241–266.
Kavussanos, M., Visvikis, I. and Dimitrakopoulos, D. (2010), ‘Information linkages between pana-
max freight derivatives and commodity derivatives markets’, Maritime Economics & Logistics
12(1), 91–110.
Kennedy, M. (1974), ‘An economic model of the world oil market’, The Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science pp. 540–577.
Kirilenko, A. and Kruglova, A. (2017), ‘Speculative floating oil’, Working paper .
Koekebakker, S. and Adland, R. (2004), ‘Modelling forward freight rate dynamicsempirical evi-
dence from time charter rates’, Maritime Policy & Management 31(4), 319–335.
Koekebakker, S., Adland, R. and Sødal, S. (2006), ‘Are spot freight rates stationary?’, Journal of
Transport Economics and Policy (JTEP) 40(3), 449–472.
Koopmans, T. C. (1939), Tanker Freight Rates and Tankship Building: An Analysis of Cyclical
Fluctuations, by Dr. T. Koopmans, number 27, De erven F. Bohn nv.
118
Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P. C., Schmidt, P. and Shin, Y. (1992), ‘Testing the null hypothesis of
stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure are we that economic time series
have a unit root?’, Journal of econometrics 54(1-3), 159–178.
Li, K. X., Qi, G., Shi, W., Yang, Z., Bang, H.-S., Woo, S.-H. and Yip, T. L. (2014), ‘Spillover
effects and dynamic correlations between spot and forward tanker freight markets’, Maritime
Policy & Management 41(7), 683–696.
Mancini-Griffoli, T. and Ranaldo, A. (2011), ‘Limits to arbitrage during the crisis: funding liquidity
constraints and covered interest parity’, Working paper .
Mayr, T. P. and Tamvakis, M. N. (1999), ‘The dynamic relationships between paper petroleum
refining and physical trade of crude oil into the united states’, Maritime Policy & Management
26(2), 127–136.
Mitchell, M., Pedersen, L. H. and Pulvino, T. (2007), ‘Slow moving capital’, American Economic
Review 97(2), 215–220.
Mitchell, M. and Pulvino, T. (2012), ‘Arbitrage crashes and the speed of capital’, Journal of
Financial Economics 104(3), 469–490.
Nash, J. F. (1950), ‘The bargaining problem’, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society
pp. 155–162.
Nelson, C. R. and Siegel, A. F. (1987), ‘Parsimonious modeling of yield curves’, Journal of business
pp. 473–489.
Norman, V. D. and Wergeland, T. (1981), ‘Nortanka simulation model of the freight markets
for large tankers, report 4/81’, Center for Applied Research, Norwegian School of Business
Administration .
of World Energy, B. S. R. (2017), ‘Bp statistical review of world energy june 2017’, Statistical
review .
Papapostolou, N. C., Nomikos, N. K., Pouliasis, P. K. and Kyriakou, I. (2014), ‘Investor sentiment
for real assets: the case of dry bulk shipping market’, Review of Finance 18(4), 1507–1539.
119
Parker, S. (2014), Matching in the oil tanker industry: implications for energy efficiency, PhD
thesis, UCL (University College London).
Phillips, P.C.B .and Perron, P. (1988), ‘Testing for a unit root in time series regression’, Biometrika
75(2), 335–346.
Prochazka, V. (2018), Uncertainty modeling and spatial positioning in tramp shipping, PhD thesis,
NHH (Norwegian School of Economics).
Ronen, D. (1982), ‘The effect of oil price on the optimal speed of ships’, Journal of the Operational
Research Society 33(11), 1035–1040.
Schwartz, E. and Smith, J. E. (2000), ‘Short-term variations and long-term dynamics in commodity
prices’, Management Science 46(7), 893–911.
Schwarz, G. (1978), ‘Estimating the dimension of a model’, The annals of statistics 6(2), 461–464.
Shi, W., Li, K. X., Yang, Z. and Wang, G. (2017), ‘Time-varying copula models in the shipping
derivatives market’, Empirical Economics 53(3), 1039–1058.
Shi, W., Yang, Z. and Li, K. X. (2013), ‘The impact of crude oil price on the tanker market’,
Maritime Policy & Management 40(4), 309–322.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997), ‘The limits of arbitrage’, The Journal of Finance 52(1), 35–
55.
Stopford, M. (2009), Maritime Economics 3e, Routledge.
Strandenes, S. P. (1984), ‘Price determination in the time charter and second hand markets’,
Center for Applied Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,
working paper MU 6.
Strandenes, S. P. (2000), ‘The shipbroking function and market efficiency’, International journal
of maritime economics 2(1), 17–26.
Tang, K. and Zhu, H. (2016), ‘Commodities as collateral’, The Review of Financial Studies
29(8), 2110–2160.
Tinbergen, J. (1931), ‘Ein schiffbauzyklus?’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv pp. 152–164.
120
Tinbergen, J. (1934), ‘Scheepsruimte en vrachten’, De Nederlandsche Conjunctuur 1, 23–35.
Tvedt, J. (2003), ‘Shipping market models and the specification of freight rate processes’, Maritime
Economics & Logistics 5(4), 327–346.
Tvedt, J. (2011), ‘Short-run freight rate formation in the vlcc market: A theoretical framework’,
Maritime Economics & Logistics 13(4), 442–455.
Veenstra, A. W. and Franses, P. H. (1997), ‘A co-integration approach to forecasting freight rates
in the dry bulk shipping sector’, Transportation Research Part A: policy and practice 31(6), 447–
458.
Xu, J. J., Yip, T. L. and Marlow, P. B. (2011), ‘The dynamics between freight volatility and
fleet size growth in dry bulk shipping markets’, Transportation research part E: logistics and
transportation review 47(6), 983–991.
Zannetos, Z. S. (1966), The theory of oil tankship rates: an economic analysis of tankship opera-
tions, number 4, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press [1966].
121
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2004
1. Martin Grieger
Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
LIKENESS
A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
Beslutningens vaklen
En systemteoretisk analyse of mo-
derniseringen af et amtskommunalt
sundhedsvæsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
Organizing Consumer Innovation
A product development strategy that
is based on online communities and
allows some ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a
distributed process of innovation by
consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION
AND TRANSLATION MEMORY
SYSTEMS
An empirical investigation of cognitive
segmentation and effects of integra-
ting a TM system into the translation
process
6. Jeanet Hardis
Sociale partnerskaber
Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie
af partnerskabsaktørers virkeligheds-
opfattelse mellem identitet og
legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
Strategisk Økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
Knowledge Management as Internal
Corporate Venturing
– a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
De profesjonelle i endring
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
Environmental Practices and Greening
Strategies in Small Manufacturing
Enterprises in South Africa
– A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
Industriel forskningsledelse
– på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde
i danske forskningsintensive virksom-
heder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
The Governance of GN Great Nordic
– in an age of strategic and structural
transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV
Advertising
A study of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years with
special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
The Social and Economic Dynamics
of Networks
– a Weberian Analysis of Three
Formalised Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
Engaging Personas and Narrative
Scenarios – a study on how a user-
 centered approach inﬂuenced the 
perception of the design process in 
the e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
Organisationsidentitet
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk
in Energy Markets
20. Sabine Madsen
Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
The Impact of Foreign Direct Inve-
stment on Efﬁciency, Productivity
Growth and Trade: An Empirical Inve-
stigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
Making Events Work Or,
How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
Brand Ethos
Om troværdige brand- og
virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og
diskursteoretisk perspektiv
24. Sidsel Fabech
Von welchem Österreich ist hier die
Rede?
Diskursive forhandlinger og magt-
kampe mellem rivaliserende nationale
identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske
pressediskurser
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
ﬂersprogede forbundsstater
Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og
Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
Human Resource Practices and
Knowledge Transfer in Multinational
Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
Markedets politiske fornuft
Et studie af velfærdens organisering i
perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
A.s erfaring
Om mellemværendets praktik i en
transformation af mennesket og 
 subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
The Constitution of Meaning
– A Meaningful Constitution?
Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion
in the debate on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
Managing product innovation through
rules – The role of formal and structu-
red methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
Mellem konﬂikt og konsensus
– Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
Customer Value Driven Product Inno-
vation – A Study of Market Learning in
New Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
Making space
An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
Differences that Matter
An analysis of practices of gender and
organizing in contemporary work-
places
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
Benchmarking as a Means to
Managing Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
From an idea to a standard
The UN and the global governance of
accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d.
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
An Experimental Field Study on the
Effectiveness of Grocer Media 
 Advertising 
Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, 
Purchase Intentions and Short-Term 
Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
Essays on the Pricing of Corporate
Bonds and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
Figure che fanno conoscere
Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo
e espressivo della metafora e di altri
tropi da Aristotele e da Vico ﬁno al
cognitivismo contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
Strategic Planning and Corporate
Performance
An integrative research review and a
meta-analysis of the strategic planning
and corporate performance literature
from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
The TDF – PMI Case
Making Sense of the Dynamics of
Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
Corporate Social Responsibility in
Global Supply Chains
Understanding the uniqueness of ﬁrm
behaviour
16. Eva Boxenbaum
Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
Capacity Development, Environmental
Justice NGOs, and Governance: The
Case of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening
Comprehension in English as a Foreign
Language
An empirical study employing data 
elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
Essays on Business Reporting
Production and consumption of
strategic information in the market for
information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
Egos and Ethics of Management
Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
Performance management i Proces-
 innovation 
– belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
Om organisering af den kreative gøren
i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
Revenue Management
Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige &
organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
The Danish Case of Accounting and
Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’
Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes
fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
Remerger
– skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og
opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot,
pædagog eller politiker?
Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstil-
skrivninger i forbindelse med vellykket
gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede
forandringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynami-
ske
læringsnettverk i toppidretten
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
Linking Healthcare
An inquiry into the changing perfor-
 mances of web-based technology for 
 asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie
i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering
kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle lærings-
miljøer
34. Anika Liversage
Finding a Path
Labour Market Life Stories of
Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
Studier i samspillet mellem stat og
 erhvervsliv i Danmark under
1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
A DIFFERENT STORY
Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
Strategic Management of the Radical
Innovation Process
Leveraging Social Capital for Market
Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
Essays in Computational Finance
3. Tina Brandt Husman
Organisational Capabilities,
Competitive Advantage & Project-
Based Organisations
The Case of Advertising and Creative
Good Production
4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
Practice at the top
– how top managers mobilise and use
non-ﬁnancial performance measures
5. Eva Parum
Corporate governance som strategisk
kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj
6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
Culture’s Inﬂuence on Performance
Management: The Case of a Danish
Company in China
7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
The Discursive Constitution of Organi-
zational Governance – Between unity
and differentiation
The Case of the governance of
environmental risks by World Bank
environmental staff
8. Cynthia Selin
Volatile Visions: Transactons in
Anticipatory Knowledge
9. Jesper Banghøj
Financial Accounting Information and
 Compensation in Danish Companies
10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-
Tech Markets: What’s the Difference
and does it Matter?
11. Tine Aage
External Information Acquisition of
Industrial Districts and the Impact of
Different Knowledge Creation Dimen-
sions
A case study of the Fashion and  
Design Branch of the Industrial District 
of Montebelluna, NE Italy
12. Mikkel Flyverbom
Making the Global Information Society
Governable
On the Governmentality of Multi-
Stakeholder Networks
13. Anette Grønning
Personen bag
Tilstedevær i e-mail som inter-
aktionsform mellem kunde og med-
arbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst
14. Jørn Helder
One Company – One Language?
The NN-case
15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
Differing perceptions of customer
value
Development and application of a tool
for mapping perceptions of customer
value at both ends of customer-suppli-
er dyads in industrial markets
16. Lise Granerud
Exploring Learning
Technological learning within small
manufacturers in South Africa
17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
Between Hopes and Realities:
Reﬂections on the Promises and
Practices of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR)
18. Ramona Samson
The Cultural Integration Model and
European Transformation.
The Case of Romania
2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
Discipline in The Global Economy
Panopticism and the Post-Washington
Consensus
2. Heidi Lund Hansen
Spaces for learning and working
A qualitative study of change of work,
management, vehicles of power and
social practices in open ofﬁces
3. Sudhanshu Rai
Exploring the internal dynamics of
software development teams during
user analysis
A tension enabled Institutionalization
Model; ”Where process becomes the
objective”
4. Norsk ph.d.
Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur
5. Serden Ozcan
EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND
OUTCOMES
A Behavioural Perspective
6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
Inter-organizational Performance
Measurement and Management in
Action
– An Ethnography on the Construction
of Management, Identity and
Relationships
7. Tobias Lindeberg
Evaluative Technologies
Quality and the Multiplicity of
Performance
8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
Den globale soldat
Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse
i multinationale militære organisatio-
ner
9. Lars Frederiksen
Open Innovation Business Models
Innovation in ﬁrm-hosted online user
communities and inter-ﬁrm project
ventures in the music industry
– A collection of essays
10. Jonas Gabrielsen
Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’
til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld
evaluering.
Anvendelsen af studentertilfredsheds-
 målinger på de korte og mellemlange  
 videregående uddannelser set fra et 
 psykodynamisk systemperspektiv
12. Ping Gao
Extending the application of
actor-network theory
Cases of innovation in the tele-
 communications industry
13. Peter Mejlby
Frihed og fængsel, en del af den
samme drøm?
Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af
frigørelsens og kontrollens sam-
eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse!
14. Kristina Birch
Statistical Modelling in Marketing
15. Signe Poulsen
Sense and sensibility:
The language of emotional appeals in
insurance marketing
16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
Essays on derivatives pricing and dyna-
mic asset allocation
17. Peter Feldhütter
Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit
Markets
18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
Default and Recovery Risk Modeling
and Estimation
19. Maria Theresa Larsen
Academic Enterprise: A New Mission
for Universities or a Contradiction in
Terms?
Four papers on the long-term impli-
cations of increasing industry involve-
ment and commercialization in acade-
mia
20. Morten Wellendorf
Postimplementering af teknologi i den
 offentlige forvaltning
Analyser af en organisations konti-
nuerlige arbejde med informations-
teknologi
21. Ekaterina Mhaanna
Concept Relations for Terminological
Process Analysis
22. Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
Forsvaret i forandring
Et studie i ofﬁcerers kapabiliteter un-
der påvirkning af omverdenens foran-
dringspres mod øget styring og læring
23. Christa Breum Amhøj
Det selvskabte medlemskab om ma-
nagementstaten, dens styringstekno-
logier og indbyggere
24. Karoline Bromose
Between Technological Turbulence and
Operational Stability
– An empirical case study of corporate
venturing in TDC
25. Susanne Justesen
Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity
in Innovation Practice
– A Longitudinal study of six very
different innovation processes – in
practice
26. Luise Noring Henler
Conceptualising successful supply
chain partnerships
– Viewing supply chain partnerships
from an organisational culture per-
spective
27. Mark Mau
Kampen om telefonen
Det danske telefonvæsen under den
tyske besættelse 1940-45
28. Jakob Halskov
The semiautomatic expansion of
existing terminological ontologies
using knowledge patterns discovered
on the WWW – an implementation 
and evaluation
29. Gergana Koleva
European Policy Instruments Beyond
Networks and Structure: The Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative
30. Christian Geisler Asmussen
Global Strategy and International
Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?
31. Christina Holm-Petersen
Stolthed og fordom
Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved ska-
belsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem
fusion
32. Hans Peter Olsen
Hybrid Governance of Standardized
States
Causes and Contours of the Global
Regulation of Government Auditing
33. Lars Bøge Sørensen
Risk Management in the Supply Chain
34. Peter Aagaard
Det unikkes dynamikker
De institutionelle mulighedsbetingel-
ser bag den individuelle udforskning i
professionelt og frivilligt arbejde
35. Yun Mi Antorini
Brand Community Innovation
An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult
Fans of LEGO Community
36. Joachim Lynggaard Boll
Labor Related Corporate Social Perfor-
mance in Denmark
Organizational and Institutional Per-
spectives
2008
1. Frederik Christian Vinten
Essays on Private Equity
2. Jesper Clement
Visual Inﬂuence of Packaging Design
on In-Store Buying Decisions
3. Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
Tid til kvalitetsmåling?
– Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i
forbindelse med introduktionen af
kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i speciallæ-
gepraksissektoren
4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
Management Consulting in Action
Value creation and ambiguity in
client-consultant relations
5. Anders Rom
Management accounting and inte-
grated information systems
How to exploit the potential for ma-
nagement accounting of information
technology
6. Marina Candi
Aesthetic Design as an Element of
Service Innovation in New Technology-
based Firms
7. Morten Schnack
Teknologi og tværfaglighed
– en analyse af diskussionen omkring
indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafde-
ling
8. Helene Balslev Clausen
Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio
sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en
un pueblo mexicano
9. Lise Justesen
Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter.
En beretning om forvaltningsrevisio-
nens beretninger
10. Michael E. Hansen
The politics of corporate responsibility:
CSR and the governance of child labor
and core labor rights in the 1990s
11. Anne Roepstorff
Holdning for handling – en etnologisk
undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale
Ansvar/CSR
12. Claus Bajlum
Essays on Credit Risk and
Credit Derivatives
13. Anders Bojesen
The Performative Power of Competen-
ce  – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and
Social Technologies at Work
14. Satu Reijonen
Green and Fragile
A Study on Markets and the Natural
Environment
15. Ilduara Busta
Corporate Governance in Banking
A European Study
16. Kristian Anders Hvass
A Boolean Analysis Predicting Industry
Change: Innovation, Imitation & Busi-
ness Models
The Winning Hybrid: A case study of
isomorphism in the airline industry
17. Trine Paludan
De uvidende og de udviklingsparate
Identitet som mulighed og restriktion
blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftaylo-
riserede fabriksgulv
18. Kristian Jakobsen
Foreign market entry in transition eco-
nomies: Entry timing and mode choice
19. Jakob Elming
Syntactic reordering in statistical ma-
chine translation
20. Lars Brømsøe Termansen
Regional Computable General Equili-
brium Models for Denmark
Three papers laying the foundation for
regional CGE models with agglomera-
tion characteristics
21. Mia Reinholt
The Motivational Foundations of
Knowledge Sharing
22. Frederikke Krogh-Meibom
The Co-Evolution of Institutions and
Technology
– A Neo-Institutional Understanding of
Change Processes within the Business
Press – the Case Study of Financial
Times
23. Peter D. Ørberg Jensen
OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND
HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES:
ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS
AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS
24. Pham Thi Song Hanh
Functional Upgrading, Relational
Capability and Export Performance of
Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers
25. Mads Vangkilde
Why wait?
An Exploration of ﬁrst-mover advanta-
ges among Danish e-grocers through a
resource perspective
26. Hubert Buch-Hansen
Rethinking the History of European
Level Merger Control
A Critical Political Economy Perspective
2009
1. Vivian Lindhardsen
From Independent Ratings to Commu-
nal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’
Decision-Making Behaviours
2. Guðrið Weihe
Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning
and Practice
3. Chris Nøkkentved
Enabling Supply Networks with Colla-
borative Information Infrastructures
An Empirical Investigation of Business
Model Innovation in Supplier Relation-
ship Management
4. Sara Louise Muhr
Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulner-
ability of Diversity Management
5. Christine Sestoft
Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livs-
formsteoretisk perspektiv
6. Michael Pedersen
Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On
the production of the stress-ﬁt self-
managing employee
7. Salla Lutz
Position and Reposition in Networks
– Exempliﬁed by the Transformation of
the Danish Pine Furniture Manu-
 facturers
8. Jens Forssbæck
Essays on market discipline in
commercial and central banking
9. Tine Murphy
Sense from Silence – A Basis for Orga-
nised Action
How do Sensemaking Processes with
Minimal Sharing Relate to the Repro-
duction of Organised Action?
10. Sara Malou Strandvad
Inspirations for a new sociology of art:
A sociomaterial study of development
processes in the Danish ﬁlm industry
11. Nicolaas Mouton
On the evolution of social scientiﬁc
metaphors:
A cognitive-historical enquiry into the
divergent trajectories of the idea that
collective entities – states and societies,
cities and corporations – are biological
organisms.
12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
Mobile Data Services:
Shaping of user engagements
13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korﬁatis
Information Exchange and Behavior
A Multi-method Inquiry on Online
Communities
14. Jens Albæk
Forestillinger om kvalitet og tværfaglig-
hed på sygehuse
– skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og
plejegrupperne angående relevans af
nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gen-
nem tolkningsprocesser
15. Maja Lotz
The Business of Co-Creation – and the
Co-Creation of Business
16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
Narrative Construction of Leader Iden-
tity in a Leader Development Program
Context
17. Dorte Hermansen
”Living the brand” som en brandorien-
teret dialogisk praxis:
Om udvikling af medarbejdernes
brandorienterede dømmekraft
18. Aseem Kinra
Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental
Complexity
19. Michael Nørager
How to manage SMEs through the
transformation from non innovative to
innovative?
20. Kristin Wallevik
Corporate Governance in Family Firms
The Norwegian Maritime Sector
21. Bo Hansen Hansen
Beyond the Process
Enriching Software Process Improve-
ment with Knowledge Management
22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
Franske adjektivisk aﬂedte adverbier,
der tager præpositionssyntagmer ind-
ledt med præpositionen à som argu-
menter
En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse
23. Line Gry Knudsen
Collaborative R&D Capabilities
In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer
Employers meet employees
Essays on sorting and globalization
25. Rasmus Johnsen
The Great Health of Melancholy
A Study of the Pathologies of Perfor-
mativity
26. Ha Thi Van Pham
Internationalization, Competitiveness
Enhancement and Export Performance
of Emerging Market Firms:
Evidence from Vietnam
27. Henriette Balieu
Kontrolbegrebets betydning for kausa-
tivalternationen i spansk
En kognitiv-typologisk analyse
2010
1. Yen Tran
Organizing Innovationin Turbulent
Fashion Market
Four papers on how fashion ﬁrms crea-
te and appropriate innovation value
2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen
Metaphysical Labour
Flexibility, Performance and Commit-
ment in Work-Life Management
3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir
Dependently independent
Co-existence of institutional logics in
the recorded music industry
4. Ásta Dis Óladóttir
Internationalization from a small do-
mestic base:
An empirical analysis of Economics and
Management
5. Christine Secher
E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og
forvaltningens medkonstruktion og
konsekvenserne heraf
6. Marianne Stang Våland
What we talk about when we talk
about space:
End User Participation between Proces-
ses of Organizational and Architectural 
Design
7. Rex Degnegaard
Strategic Change Management
Change Management Challenges in
the Danish Police Reform
8. Ulrik Schultz Brix
Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslut-
ning
En pragmatisk analyse af perception
og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutte-
rings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet
9. Jan Ole Similä
Kontraktsledelse
Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse
og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via ﬁre
norske virksomheter
10. Susanne Boch Waldorff
Emerging Organizations: In between
local translation, institutional logics
and discourse
11. Brian Kane
Performance Talk
Next Generation Management of
Organizational Performance
12. Lars Ohnemus
Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and
Shareholder Value
An Empirical Reconciliation of two
Critical Concepts
13. Jesper Schlamovitz
Håndtering af usikkerhed i ﬁlm- og
byggeprojekter
14. Tommy Moesby-Jensen
Det faktiske livs forbindtlighed
Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk
τηθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger
15. Christian Fich
Two Nations Divided by Common
Values
French National Habitus and the
Rejection of American Power
16. Peter Beyer
Processer, sammenhængskraft
og ﬂeksibilitet
Et empirisk casestudie af omstillings-
forløb i ﬁre virksomheder
17. Adam Buchhorn
Markets of Good Intentions
Constructing and Organizing
Biogas Markets Amid Fragility
and Controversy
18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen
Social læring og fælles praksis
Et mixed method studie, der belyser
læringskonsekvenser af et lederkursus
for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige
mellemledere
19. Heidi Boye
Fødevarer og sundhed i sen- 
modernismen
– En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og
de relaterede fødevarepraksisser
20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen
Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige
mobiliseringer
Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde
Festival
21. Oliver Jacob Weber
Causes of Intercompany Harmony in
Business Markets – An Empirical Inve-
stigation from a Dyad Perspective
22. Susanne Ekman
Authority and Autonomy
Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge
Work
23. Anette Frey Larsen
Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler
– Ledelsernes indﬂydelse på introduk-
tion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstra-
tegier i det danske sundhedsvæsen
24. Toyoko Sato
Performativity and Discourse: Japanese
Advertisements on the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Desire
25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen
Identifying the Last Planner System
Lean management in the construction
industry
26. Javier Busquets
Orchestrating Network Behavior
for Innovation
27. Luke Patey
The Power of Resistance: India’s Na-
tional Oil Company and International
Activism in Sudan
28. Mette Vedel
Value Creation in Triadic Business Rela-
tionships. Interaction, Interconnection
and Position
29. Kristian Tørning
Knowledge Management Systems in
Practice – A Work Place Study
30. Qingxin Shi
An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud
Usability Testing from a Cultural
Perspective
31. Tanja Juul Christiansen
Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes
kommunikative handlekraft
32. Malgorzata Ciesielska
Hybrid Organisations.
A study of the Open Source – business
setting
33. Jens Dick-Nielsen
Three Essays on Corporate Bond
Market Liquidity
34. Sabrina Speiermann
Modstandens Politik
Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten.
En diskussion af traﬁkkampagners sty-
ringspotentiale
35. Julie Uldam
Fickle Commitment. Fostering political
engagement in 'the ﬂighty world of
online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen
Traveling technologies and
transformations in health care
37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte
Organising Development
Power and Organisational Reform in
the United Nations Development
Programme
38. Louise Rygaard Jonas
Branding på butiksgulvet
Et case-studie af kultur- og identitets-
arbejdet i Kvickly
2011
1. Stefan Fraenkel
Key Success Factors for Sales Force
Readiness during New Product Launch
A Study of Product Launches in the
Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry
2. Christian Plesner Rossing
International Transfer Pricing in Theory
and Practice
3. Tobias Dam Hede
Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin
– en analyse af coachingsdiskursens
genealogi og governmentality
4. Kim Pettersson
Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choi-
ce, and Equity Valuation
5. Henrik Merkelsen
The expert-lay controversy in risk
research and management. Effects of
institutional distances. Studies of risk
deﬁnitions, perceptions, management
and communication
6. Simon S. Torp
Employee Stock Ownership:
Effect on Strategic Management and
Performance
7. Mie Harder
Internal Antecedents of Management
Innovation
8. Ole Helby Petersen
Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and
Regulation – With Comparative and
Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark
and Ireland
9. Morten Krogh Petersen
’Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multipli-
city in Government Communication
10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund
Allocation of cognitive resources in
translation - an eye-tracking and key-
logging study
11. Moshe Yonatany
The Internationalization Process of
Digital Service Providers
12. Anne Vestergaard
Distance and Suffering
Humanitarian Discourse in the age of
Mediatization
13. Thorsten Mikkelsen
Personligsheds indﬂydelse på forret-
ningsrelationer
14. Jane Thostrup Jagd
Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbølgen ud-
over ”the tipping point”?
– en empirisk analyse af information
og kognitioner om fusioner
15. Gregory Gimpel
Value-driven Adoption and Consump-
tion of Technology: Understanding
Technology Decision Making
16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov
Den nye mulighed
Social innovation i en forretningsmæs-
sig kontekst
17. Jeppe Christoffersen
Donor supported strategic alliances in
developing countries
18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard
Dominant Ideological Modes of
Rationality: Cross functional
integration in the process of product
 innovation
19. Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
Governance Failure and Icelands’s
Financial Collapse
20. Allan Sall Tang Andersen
Essays on the modeling of risks in
interest-rate and inﬂ ation markets
21. Heidi Tscherning
Mobile Devices in Social Contexts
22. Birgitte Gorm Hansen
Adapting in the Knowledge Economy
 Lateral Strategies for Scientists and
Those Who Study Them
23. Kristina Vaarst Andersen
Optimal Levels of Embeddedness
 The Contingent Value of Networked
Collaboration
24. Justine Grønbæk Pors
Noisy Management
 A History of Danish School Governing
from 1970-2010
25. Stefan Linder
 Micro-foundations of Strategic
Entrepreneurship
 Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action
26. Xin Li
 Toward an Integrative Framework of
National Competitiveness
An application to China
27. Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
Værdifuld arkitektur
 Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers
rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse
28. Monica Viken
 Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i
varemerke- og markedsføringsrett
29. Christian Wymann
 Tattooing
 The Economic and Artistic Constitution
of a Social Phenomenon
30. Sanne Frandsen
Productive Incoherence
 A Case Study of Branding and
Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige
Organization
31. Mads Stenbo Nielsen
Essays on Correlation Modelling
32. Ivan Häuser
Følelse og sprog
 Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori,
eksempliﬁ ceret på russisk
33. Sebastian Schwenen
Security of Supply in Electricity Markets
2012
1. Peter Holm Andreasen
 The Dynamics of Procurement
Management
- A Complexity Approach
2. Martin Haulrich
 Data-Driven Bitext Dependency
Parsing and Alignment
3. Line Kirkegaard
 Konsulenten i den anden nat
 En undersøgelse af det intense
arbejdsliv
4. Tonny Stenheim
 Decision usefulness of goodwill
under IFRS
5. Morten Lind Larsen
 Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd
 Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens
Danmark 1945 - 1958
6. Petter Berg
 Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries
7. Lynn Kahle
Experiential Discourse in Marketing
 A methodical inquiry into practice
and theory
8. Anne Roelsgaard Obling
 Management of Emotions
in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9. Thomas Frandsen
 Managing Modularity of
Service Processes Architecture
10. Carina Christine Skovmøller
 CSR som noget særligt
 Et casestudie om styring og menings-
skabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en
intern optik
11. Michael Tell
 Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers
ﬁ nansieringsudgifter
 En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11,
11B og 11C
12. Morten Holm
 Customer Proﬁ tability Measurement
Models
 Their Merits and Sophistication
across Contexts
13. Katja Joo Dyppel
 Beskatning af derivater
En analyse af dansk skatteret
14. Esben Anton Schultz
 Essays in Labor Economics
Evidence from Danish Micro Data
15. Carina Risvig Hansen
 ”Contracts not covered, or not fully
covered, by the Public Sector Directive”
16. Anja Svejgaard Pors
Iværksættelse af kommunikation
 - patientﬁ gurer i hospitalets strategiske
kommunikation
17. Frans Bévort
 Making sense of management with
logics
 An ethnographic study of accountants
who become managers
18. René Kallestrup
 The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign
Credit Risk
19. Brett Crawford
 Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests
in Organizational Institutionalism
 The Case of U.S. Chambers of
Commerce
20. Mario Daniele Amore
 Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance
21. Arne Stjernholm Madsen
 The evolution of innovation strategy
 Studied in the context of medical
device activities at the pharmaceutical
company Novo Nordisk A/S in the
period 1980-2008
22. Jacob Holm Hansen
 Is Social Integration Necessary for
Corporate Branding?
 A study of corporate branding
strategies at Novo Nordisk
23. Stuart Webber
 Corporate Proﬁ t Shifting and the
Multinational Enterprise
24. Helene Ratner
 Promises of Reﬂ exivity
 Managing and Researching
Inclusive Schools
25. Therese Strand
 The Owners and the Power: Insights
from Annual General Meetings
26. Robert Gavin Strand
 In Praise of Corporate Social
Responsibility Bureaucracy
27. Nina Sormunen
Auditor’s going-concern reporting
 Reporting decision and content of the
report
28. John Bang Mathiasen
 Learning within a product development
working practice:
 - an understanding anchored
in pragmatism
29. Philip Holst Riis
 Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise
Systems: From Vendors to Customers
30. Marie Lisa Dacanay
Social Enterprises and the Poor
 Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and
Stakeholder Theory
31. Fumiko Kano Glückstad
 Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual
concept mapping based on the
information receiver’s prior-knowledge
32. Henrik Barslund Fosse
 Empirical Essays in International Trade
33. Peter Alexander Albrecht
 Foundational hybridity and its
reproduction
Security sector reform in Sierra Leone
34. Maja Rosenstock
CSR  - hvor svært kan det være?
 Kulturanalytisk casestudie om
udfordringer og dilemmaer med at
forankre Coops CSR-strategi
35. Jeanette Rasmussen
Tweens, medier og forbrug
 Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns
brug af internettet, opfattelse og for-
ståelse af markedsføring og forbrug
36. Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen
 ‘This page is not intended for a
US Audience’
 A ﬁ ve-act spectacle on online
communication, collaboration
& organization.
37. Kasper Aalling Teilmann
 Interactive Approaches to
Rural Development
38. Mette Mogensen
 The Organization(s) of Well-being
and Productivity
 (Re)assembling work in the Danish Post
39. Søren Friis Møller
 From Disinterestedness to Engagement
 Towards Relational Leadership In the
Cultural Sector
40. Nico Peter Berhausen
 Management Control, Innovation and
Strategic Objectives – Interactions and
Convergence in Product Development
Networks
41. Balder Onarheim
Creativity under Constraints
 Creativity as Balancing
‘Constrainedness’
42. Haoyong Zhou
Essays on Family Firms
43. Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen
Making sense of organisational conﬂ ict
 An empirical study of enacted sense-
making in everyday conﬂ ict at work
2013
1. Jacob Lyngsie
 Entrepreneurship in an Organizational
Context
2. Signe Groth-Brodersen
Fra ledelse til selvet
 En socialpsykologisk analyse af
forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse
og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv
3. Nis Høyrup Christensen
 Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional
Analysis of the Emerging
Organizational Field of Renewable
Energy in China
4. Christian Edelvold Berg
As a matter of size
 THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL
MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS
5. Christine D. Isakson
 Coworker Inﬂ uence and Labor Mobility
Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship
and Location Choice in the Danish
Maritime Industry
6. Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon
 Accounting Qualities in Practice
Rhizomatic stories of representational
faithfulness, decision making and
control
7. Shannon O’Donnell
Making Ensemble Possible
 How special groups organize for
collaborative creativity in conditions
of spatial variability and distance
8. Robert W. D. Veitch
 Access Decisions in a
Partly-Digital World
Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal
Modes for Film and Music
9. Marie Mathiesen
Making Strategy Work
An Organizational Ethnography
10. Arisa Shollo
The role of business intelligence in
organizational decision-making
11. Mia Kaspersen
 The construction of social and
environmental reporting
12. Marcus Møller Larsen
The organizational design of offshoring
13. Mette Ohm Rørdam
EU Law on Food Naming
The prohibition against misleading
names in an internal market context
14. Hans Peter Rasmussen
GIV EN GED!
Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte
til velgørenhed og understøtte
relationsopbygning?
15. Ruben Schachtenhaufen
Fonetisk reduktion i dansk
16. Peter Koerver Schmidt
Dansk CFC-beskatning
 I et internationalt og komparativt
perspektiv
17. Morten Froholdt
Strategi i den offentlige sektor
En kortlægning af styringsmæssig
kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt
anvendte redskaber og teknologier for
udvalgte danske statslige styrelser
18. Annette Camilla Sjørup
Cognitive effort in metaphor translation
An eye-tracking and key-logging study
19. Tamara Stucchi
 The Internationalization
of Emerging Market Firms:
A Context-Speciﬁ c Study
20. Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth
“Let’s Go Outside”:
The Value of Co-Creation
21. Ana Alačovska
Genre and Autonomy in Cultural
Production
The case of travel guidebook
production
22. Marius Gudmand-Høyer
 Stemningssindssygdommenes historie
i det 19. århundrede
 Omtydningen af melankolien og
manien som bipolære stemningslidelser
i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til
dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs
relative autonomi.
 En problematiserings- og erfarings-
analytisk undersøgelse
23. Lichen Alex Yu
Fabricating an S&OP Process
 Circulating References and Matters
of Concern
24. Esben Alfort
The Expression of a Need
Understanding search
25. Trine Pallesen
Assembling Markets for Wind Power
An Inquiry into the Making of
Market Devices
26. Anders Koed Madsen
Web-Visions
Repurposing digital traces to organize
social attention
27. Lærke Højgaard Christiansen
BREWING ORGANIZATIONAL
RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
28. Tommy Kjær Lassen
EGENTLIG SELVLEDELSE
 En ledelsesﬁ losoﬁ sk afhandling om
selvledelsens paradoksale dynamik og
eksistentielle engagement
29. Morten Rossing
Local Adaption and Meaning Creation
in Performance Appraisal
30. Søren Obed Madsen
Lederen som oversætter
Et oversættelsesteoretisk perspektiv
på strategisk arbejde
31. Thomas Høgenhaven
Open Government Communities
Does Design Affect Participation?
32. Kirstine Zinck Pedersen
Failsafe Organizing?
A Pragmatic Stance on Patient Safety
33. Anne Petersen
Hverdagslogikker i psykiatrisk arbejde
En institutionsetnograﬁ sk undersøgelse
af hverdagen i psykiatriske
organisationer
34. Didde Maria Humle
Fortællinger om arbejde
35. Mark Holst-Mikkelsen
Strategieksekvering i praksis
– barrierer og muligheder!
36. Malek Maalouf
Sustaining lean
Strategies for dealing with
organizational paradoxes
37. Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche
Systemic Innovation In The Making
The Social Productivity of
Cartographic Crisis and Transitions
in the Case of SEEIT
38. Morten Gylling
The Structure of Discourse
A Corpus-Based Cross-Linguistic Study
39. Binzhang YANG
Urban Green Spaces for Quality Life
 - Case Study: the landscape
architecture for people in Copenhagen
40. Michael Friis Pedersen
Finance and Organization:
The Implications for Whole Farm
Risk Management
41. Even Fallan
Issues on supply and demand for
environmental accounting information
42. Ather Nawaz
Website user experience
A cross-cultural study of the relation
between users´ cognitive style, context
of use, and information architecture
of local websites
43. Karin Beukel
The Determinants for Creating
Valuable Inventions
44. Arjan Markus
External Knowledge Sourcing
and Firm Innovation
Essays on the Micro-Foundations
of Firms’ Search for Innovation
2014
1. Solon Moreira
 Four Essays on Technology Licensing
and Firm Innovation
2. Karin Strzeletz Ivertsen
Partnership Drift in Innovation
Processes
A study of the Think City electric
car development
3. Kathrine Hoffmann Pii
Responsibility Flows in Patient-centred
Prevention
4. Jane Bjørn Vedel
Managing Strategic Research
An empirical analysis of
science-industry collaboration in a
pharmaceutical company
5. Martin Gylling
Processuel strategi i organisationer
Monograﬁ  om dobbeltheden i
tænkning af strategi, dels som
vidensfelt i organisationsteori, dels
som kunstnerisk tilgang til at skabe
i erhvervsmæssig innovation
6. Linne Marie Lauesen
Corporate Social Responsibility
in the Water Sector:
How Material Practices and their
Symbolic and Physical Meanings Form
a Colonising Logic
7. Maggie Qiuzhu Mei
LEARNING TO INNOVATE:
The role of ambidexterity, standard,
and decision process
8. Inger Høedt-Rasmussen
Developing Identity for Lawyers
Towards Sustainable Lawyering
9. Sebastian Fux
Essays on Return Predictability and
Term Structure Modelling
10. Thorbjørn N. M. Lund-Poulsen
Essays on Value Based Management
11. Oana Brindusa Albu
Transparency in Organizing:
A Performative Approach
12. Lena Olaison
Entrepreneurship at the limits
13. Hanne Sørum
DRESSED FOR WEB SUCCESS?
 An Empirical Study of Website Quality
in the Public Sector
14. Lasse Folke Henriksen
Knowing networks
How experts shape transnational
governance
15. Maria Halbinger
Entrepreneurial Individuals
Empirical Investigations into
Entrepreneurial Activities of
Hackers and Makers
16. Robert Spliid
Kapitalfondenes metoder
og kompetencer
17. Christiane Stelling
Public-private partnerships & the need,
development and management
of trusting
A processual and embedded
exploration
18. Marta Gasparin
Management of design as a translation
process
19. Kåre Moberg
Assessing the Impact of
Entrepreneurship Education
From ABC to PhD
20. Alexander Cole
Distant neighbors
Collective learning beyond the cluster
21. Martin Møller Boje Rasmussen
Is Competitiveness a Question of
Being Alike?
How the United Kingdom, Germany
and Denmark Came to Compete
through their Knowledge Regimes
from 1993 to 2007
22. Anders Ravn Sørensen
Studies in central bank legitimacy,
currency and national identity
Four cases from Danish monetary
history
23. Nina Bellak
 Can Language be Managed in
International Business?
Insights into Language Choice from a
Case Study of Danish and Austrian
Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
24. Rikke Kristine Nielsen
Global Mindset as Managerial
Meta-competence and Organizational
Capability: Boundary-crossing
Leadership Cooperation in the MNC
The Case of ‘Group Mindset’ in
Solar A/S.
25. Rasmus Koss Hartmann
User Innovation inside government
Towards a critically performative
foundation for inquiry
26. Kristian Gylling Olesen
 Flertydig og emergerende ledelse i
folkeskolen
 Et aktør-netværksteoretisk ledelses-
studie af politiske evalueringsreformers
betydning for ledelse i den danske
folkeskole
27. Troels Riis Larsen
 Kampen om Danmarks omdømme
1945-2010
Omdømmearbejde og omdømmepolitik
28. Klaus Majgaard
 Jagten på autenticitet i offentlig styring
29. Ming Hua Li
Institutional Transition and
Organizational Diversity:
Differentiated internationalization
strategies of emerging market
state-owned enterprises
30. Soﬁ e Blinkenberg Federspiel
IT, organisation og digitalisering:
Institutionelt arbejde i den kommunale
digitaliseringsproces
31. Elvi Weinreich
Hvilke offentlige ledere er der brug for
når velfærdstænkningen ﬂ ytter sig
– er Diplomuddannelsens lederproﬁ l
svaret?
32. Ellen Mølgaard Korsager
Self-conception and image of context
in the growth of the ﬁ rm
– A Penrosian History of Fiberline
Composites
33. Else Skjold
 The Daily Selection
34. Marie Louise Conradsen
 The Cancer Centre That Never Was
The Organisation of Danish Cancer
Research 1949-1992
35. Virgilio Failla
 Three Essays on the Dynamics of
Entrepreneurs in the Labor Market
36. Nicky Nedergaard
Brand-Based Innovation
 Relational Perspectives on Brand Logics
and Design Innovation Strategies and
Implementation
37. Mads Gjedsted Nielsen
Essays in Real Estate Finance
38. Kristin Martina Brandl
 Process Perspectives on
Service Offshoring
39. Mia Rosa Koss Hartmann
In the gray zone
With police in making space
for creativity
40. Karen Ingerslev
 Healthcare Innovation under
The Microscope
 Framing Boundaries of Wicked
Problems
41. Tim Neerup Themsen
 Risk Management in large Danish
public capital investment programmes
2015
1. Jakob Ion Wille
Film som design
 Design af levende billeder i
ﬁ lm og tv-serier
2. Christiane Mossin
Interzones of Law and Metaphysics
 Hierarchies, Logics and Foundations
of Social Order seen through the Prism
of EU Social Rights
3. Thomas Tøth
 TRUSTWORTHINESS: ENABLING
GLOBAL COLLABORATION
 An Ethnographic Study of Trust,
Distance, Control, Culture and
Boundary Spanning within Offshore
Outsourcing of IT Services
4. Steven Højlund
Evaluation Use in Evaluation Systems –
The Case of the European Commission
5. Julia Kirch Kirkegaard
AMBIGUOUS WINDS OF CHANGE – OR
FIGHTING AGAINST WINDMILLS IN
CHINESE WIND POWER
A CONSTRUCTIVIST INQUIRY INTO
CHINA’S PRAGMATICS OF GREEN
MARKETISATION MAPPING
CONTROVERSIES OVER A POTENTIAL
TURN TO QUALITY IN CHINESE WIND
POWER
6. Michelle Carol Antero
 A Multi-case Analysis of the
Development of Enterprise Resource
Planning Systems (ERP) Business
Practices
Morten Friis-Olivarius
The Associative Nature of Creativity
7. Mathew Abraham
New Cooperativism:
 A study of emerging producer
organisations in India
8. Stine Hedegaard
Sustainability-Focused Identity: Identity
work performed to manage, negotiate
and resolve barriers and tensions that
arise in the process of constructing or
ganizational identity in a sustainability
context
9. Cecilie Glerup
Organizing Science in Society – the
conduct and justiﬁ cation of resposible
research
10. Allan Salling Pedersen
Implementering af ITIL®  IT-governance
- når best practice konﬂ ikter med
kulturen Løsning af implementerings- 
 problemer gennem anvendelse af  
kendte CSF i et aktionsforskningsforløb.
11. Nihat Misir
A Real Options Approach to
Determining Power Prices
12. Mamdouh Medhat
MEASURING AND PRICING THE RISK
OF CORPORATE FAILURES
13. Rina Hansen
Toward a Digital Strategy for
Omnichannel Retailing
14. Eva Pallesen
In the rhythm of welfare creation
 A relational processual investigation
moving beyond the conceptual horizon
of welfare management
15. Gouya Harirchi
In Search of Opportunities: Three
Essays on Global Linkages for Innovation
16. Lotte Holck
Embedded Diversity: A critical
ethnographic study of the structural
tensions of organizing diversity
17. Jose Daniel Balarezo
Learning through Scenario Planning
18. Louise Pram Nielsen
 Knowledge dissemination based on
terminological ontologies. Using eye
tracking to further user interface
design.
19. Soﬁ e Dam
 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR
INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY
TRANSFORMATION
 An embedded, comparative case study
of municipal waste management in
England and Denmark
20. Ulrik Hartmyer Christiansen
 Follwoing the Content of Reported Risk
Across the Organization
21. Guro Refsum Sanden
 Language strategies in multinational
corporations. A cross-sector study
of ﬁ nancial service companies and
manufacturing companies.
22. Linn Gevoll
 Designing performance management
for operational level
 - A closer look on the role of design
choices in framing coordination and
motivation
23. Frederik Larsen
 Objects and Social Actions
– on Second-hand Valuation Practices
24. Thorhildur Hansdottir Jetzek
 The Sustainable Value of Open
Government Data
 Uncovering the Generative Mechanisms
of Open Data through a Mixed
Methods Approach
25. Gustav Toppenberg
 Innovation-based M&A
 – Technological-Integration
Challenges – The Case of
Digital-Technology Companies
26. Mie Plotnikof
 Challenges of Collaborative
Governance
 An Organizational Discourse Study
of Public Managers’ Struggles
with Collaboration across the
Daycare Area
27. Christian Garmann Johnsen
 Who Are the Post-Bureaucrats?
 A Philosophical Examination of the
Creative Manager, the Authentic Leader
and the Entrepreneur
28. Jacob Brogaard-Kay
 Constituting Performance Management
 A ﬁ eld study of a pharmaceutical
company
29. Rasmus Ploug Jenle
 Engineering Markets for Control:
Integrating Wind Power into the Danish
Electricity System
30. Morten Lindholst
 Complex Business Negotiation:
Understanding Preparation and
Planning
31. Morten Grynings
TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY FROM AN
ALIGNMENT PERSPECTIVE
32. Peter Andreas Norn
 Byregimer og styringsevne: Politisk
lederskab af store byudviklingsprojekter
33. Milan Miric
 Essays on Competition, Innovation and
Firm Strategy in Digital Markets
34. Sanne K. Hjordrup
The Value of Talent Management
 Rethinking practice, problems and
possibilities
35. Johanna Sax
Strategic Risk Management
 – Analyzing Antecedents and
Contingencies for Value Creation
36. Pernille Rydén
Strategic Cognition of Social Media
37. Mimmi Sjöklint
The Measurable Me
- The Inﬂ uence of Self-tracking on the
User Experience
38. Juan Ignacio Staricco
Towards a Fair Global Economic
Regime? A critical assessment of Fair
Trade through the examination of the
Argentinean wine industry
39. Marie Henriette Madsen
Emerging and temporary connections
in Quality work
40. Yangfeng CAO
Toward a Process Framework of
Business Model Innovation in the
Global Context
Entrepreneurship-Enabled Dynamic
Capability of Medium-Sized
Multinational Enterprises
41. Carsten Scheibye
 Enactment of the Organizational Cost
Structure in Value Chain Conﬁ guration
A Contribution to Strategic Cost
Management
2016
1. Signe Soﬁ e Dyrby
Enterprise Social Media at Work
2. Dorte Boesby Dahl
 The making of the public parking
attendant
 Dirt, aesthetics and inclusion in public
service work
3. Verena Girschik
 Realizing Corporate Responsibility
Positioning and Framing in Nascent
Institutional Change
4. Anders Ørding Olsen
 IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
 Inertia, Knowledge Sources and Diver-
sity in Collaborative Problem-solving
5. Pernille Steen Pedersen
 Udkast til et nyt copingbegreb
 En kvaliﬁ kation af ledelsesmuligheder
for at forebygge sygefravær ved
psykiske problemer.
6. Kerli Kant Hvass
 Weaving a Path from Waste to Value:
Exploring fashion industry business
models and the circular economy
7. Kasper Lindskow
 Exploring Digital News Publishing
Business Models – a production
network approach
8. Mikkel Mouritz Marfelt
 The chameleon workforce:
Assembling and negotiating the
content of a workforce
9. Marianne Bertelsen
Aesthetic encounters
 Rethinking autonomy, space & time
in today’s world of art
10. Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen
EU PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
11. Abid Hussain
 On the Design, Development and
Use of the Social Data Analytics Tool
(SODATO):  Design Propositions,
Patterns, and Principles for Big
Social Data Analytics
12. Mark Bruun
 Essays on Earnings Predictability
13. Tor Bøe-Lillegraven
BUSINESS PARADOXES, BLACK BOXES,
AND BIG DATA: BEYOND
ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY
14. Hadis Khonsary-Atighi
 ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF
DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN AN OIL-
BASED ECONOMY: THE CASE OF IRAN
(1965-2010)
15. Maj Lervad Grasten
 Rule of Law or Rule by Lawyers?
On the Politics of Translation in Global
Governance
16. Lene Granzau Juel-Jacobsen
SUPERMARKEDETS MODUS OPERANDI
– en hverdagssociologisk undersøgelse
af forholdet mellem rum og handlen
og understøtte relationsopbygning?
17. Christine Thalsgård Henriques
In search of entrepreneurial learning
– Towards a relational perspective on
incubating practices?
18. Patrick Bennett
Essays in Education, Crime, and Job
Displacement
19. Søren Korsgaard
Payments and Central Bank Policy
20. Marie Kruse Skibsted
 Empirical Essays in Economics of
Education and Labor
21. Elizabeth Benedict Christensen
 The Constantly Contingent Sense of
Belonging of the 1.5 Generation
Undocumented Youth
An Everyday Perspective
22. Lasse J. Jessen
 Essays on Discounting Behavior and
Gambling Behavior
23. Kalle Johannes Rose
Når stifterviljen dør…
Et retsøkonomisk bidrag til 200 års
juridisk konﬂ ikt om ejendomsretten
24. Andreas Søeborg Kirkedal
Danish Stød and Automatic Speech
Recognition
25. Ida Lunde Jørgensen
Institutions and Legitimations in
Finance for the Arts
26. Olga Rykov Ibsen
An empirical cross-linguistic study of
directives: A semiotic approach to the
sentence forms chosen by British,
Danish and Russian speakers in native
and ELF contexts
27. Desi Volker
Understanding Interest Rate Volatility
28. Angeli Elizabeth Weller
Practice at the Boundaries of Business
Ethics & Corporate Social Responsibility
29. Ida Danneskiold-Samsøe
Levende læring i kunstneriske
organisationer
En undersøgelse af læringsprocesser
mellem projekt og organisation på
Aarhus Teater
30. Leif Christensen
 Quality of information – The role of
internal controls and materiality
31. Olga Zarzecka
 Tie Content in Professional Networks
32. Henrik Mahncke
De store gaver
 - Filantropiens gensidighedsrelationer i
teori og praksis
33. Carsten Lund Pedersen
 Using the Collective Wisdom of
Frontline Employees in Strategic Issue
Management
34. Yun Liu
 Essays on Market Design
35. Denitsa Hazarbassanova Blagoeva
 The Internationalisation of Service Firms
36. Manya Jaura Lind
 Capability development in an off-
shoring context: How, why and by
whom
37. Luis R. Boscán F.
 Essays on the Design of Contracts and
Markets for Power System Flexibility
38. Andreas Philipp Distel
Capabilities for Strategic Adaptation:
 Micro-Foundations, Organizational
Conditions, and Performance
Implications
39. Lavinia Bleoca
 The Usefulness of Innovation and
Intellectual Capital in Business
Performance:  The Financial Effects of
Knowledge Management vs. Disclosure
40. Henrik Jensen
 Economic Organization and Imperfect
Managerial Knowledge: A Study of the
Role of Managerial Meta-Knowledge
in the Management of Distributed
Knowledge
41. Stine Mosekjær
The Understanding of English Emotion
Words by Chinese and Japanese
Speakers of English as a Lingua Franca
An Empirical Study
42. Hallur Tor Sigurdarson
The Ministry of Desire - Anxiety and
entrepreneurship in a bureaucracy
43. Kätlin Pulk
Making Time While Being in Time
A study of the temporality of
organizational processes
44. Valeria Giacomin
Contextualizing the cluster Palm oil in
Southeast Asia in global perspective
(1880s–1970s)
45. Jeanette Willert
 Managers’ use of multiple
Management Control Systems:
 The role and interplay of management
control systems and company
performance
46. Mads Vestergaard Jensen
 Financial Frictions: Implications for Early
Option Exercise and Realized Volatility
47. Mikael Reimer Jensen
Interbank Markets and Frictions
48. Benjamin Faigen
Essays on Employee Ownership
49. Adela Michea
Enacting Business Models
 An Ethnographic Study of an Emerging
Business Model Innovation within the
Frame of a Manufacturing Company.
50. Iben Sandal Stjerne
 Transcending organization in
temporary systems
 Aesthetics’ organizing work and
employment in Creative Industries
51. Simon Krogh
Anticipating Organizational Change
52. Sarah Netter
Exploring the Sharing Economy
53. Lene Tolstrup Christensen
 State-owned enterprises as institutional
market actors in the marketization of
public service provision:
 A comparative case study of Danish
and Swedish passenger rail 1990–2015
54. Kyoung(Kay) Sun Park
Three Essays on Financial Economics
2017
1. Mari Bjerck
 Apparel at work. Work uniforms and
women in male-dominated manual
occupations.
2. Christoph H. Flöthmann
 Who Manages Our Supply Chains?
 Backgrounds, Competencies and
Contributions of Human Resources in
Supply Chain Management
3. Aleksandra Anna Rzez´nik
Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing
4. Claes Bäckman
Essays on Housing Markets
5. Kirsti Reitan Andersen
 Stabilizing Sustainability
in the Textile and Fashion Industry
6. Kira Hoffmann
Cost Behavior: An Empirical Analysis
of Determinants and Consequences
of Asymmetries
7. Tobin Hanspal
Essays in Household Finance
8. Nina Lange
Correlation in Energy Markets
9. Anjum Fayyaz
Donor Interventions and SME
Networking in Industrial Clusters in
Punjab Province, Pakistan
10. Magnus Paulsen Hansen
 Trying the unemployed. Justiﬁ ca-
tion and critique, emancipation and
coercion towards the ‘active society’.
A study of contemporary reforms in
France and Denmark
11. Sameer Azizi
 Corporate Social Responsibility in
Afghanistan
 – a critical case study of the mobile
telecommunications industry
12. Malene Myhre
 The internationalization of small and
medium-sized enterprises:
A qualitative study
13. Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen
 The Signiﬁ cance of Normativity –
 Studies in Post-Kantian Philosophy and
Social Theory
14. Federico Clementi
 Essays on multinational production and
international trade
15. Lara Anne Hale
 Experimental Standards in Sustainability
Transitions: Insights from the Building
Sector
16. Richard Pucci
 Accounting for Financial Instruments in
an Uncertain World
 Controversies in IFRS in the Aftermath
of the 2008 Financial Crisis
17. Sarah Maria Denta
 Kommunale offentlige private
partnerskaber
Regulering I skyggen af Farumsagen
18. Christian Östlund
 Design for e-training
19. Amalie Martinus Hauge
 Organizing Valuations – a pragmatic
inquiry
20. Tim Holst Celik
 Tension-ﬁ lled Governance? Exploring
the Emergence, Consolidation and
Reconﬁ guration of Legitimatory and
Fiscal State-crafting
21. Christian Bason
 Leading Public Design: How managers
engage with design to transform public
governance
22. Davide Tomio
 Essays on Arbitrage and Market
Liquidity
23. Simone Stæhr
 Financial Analysts’ Forecasts
 Behavioral Aspects and the Impact of
Personal Characteristics
24. Mikkel Godt Gregersen
 Management Control, Intrinsic
Motivation and Creativity
– How Can They Coexist
25. Kristjan Johannes Suse Jespersen
 Advancing the Payments for Ecosystem
Service Discourse Through Institutional
Theory
26. Kristian Bondo Hansen
 Crowds and Speculation: A study of
crowd phenomena in the U.S. ﬁ nancial
markets 1890 to 1940
27. Lars Balslev
 Actors and practices – An institutional
study on management accounting
change in Air Greenland
28. Sven Klingler
 Essays on Asset Pricing with
Financial Frictions
29. Klement Ahrensbach Rasmussen
Business Model Innovation
The Role of Organizational Design
30. Giulio Zichella
 Entrepreneurial Cognition.
Three essays on entrepreneurial
behavior and cognition under risk
and uncertainty
31. Richard Ledborg Hansen
 En forkærlighed til det eksister-
ende – mellemlederens oplevelse af
forandringsmodstand i organisatoriske
forandringer
32. Vilhelm Stefan Holsting
Militært chefvirke: Kritik og
retfærdiggørelse mellem politik og
profession
33. Thomas Jensen
Shipping Information Pipeline:
 An information infrastructure to
improve international containerized
shipping
34. Dzmitry Bartalevich
Do economic theories inform policy?
 Analysis of the inﬂ uence of the Chicago
School on European Union competition
policy
35. Kristian Roed Nielsen
 Crowdfunding for Sustainability: A
study on the potential of reward-based
crowdfunding in supporting sustainable
entrepreneurship
36. Emil Husted
 There is always an alternative: A study
of control and commitment in political
organization
37. Anders Ludvig Sevelsted
 Interpreting Bonds and Boundaries of
Obligation. A genealogy of the emer-
gence and development of Protestant
voluntary social work in Denmark as
shown through the cases of the Co-
penhagen Home Mission and the Blue
Cross (1850 – 1950)
38. Niklas Kohl
Essays on Stock Issuance
39. Maya Christiane Flensborg Jensen
 BOUNDARIES OF
PROFESSIONALIZATION AT WORK
 An ethnography-inspired study of care
workers’ dilemmas at the margin
40. Andreas Kamstrup
 Crowdsourcing and the Architectural
Competition as Organisational
Technologies
41. Louise Lyngfeldt Gorm Hansen
 Triggering Earthquakes in Science,
Politics and Chinese Hydropower
- A Controversy Study
2018
1. Vishv Priya Kohli
Combatting Falsiﬁ cation and Coun-
terfeiting of Medicinal Products in
the E  uropean Union – A Legal
Analysis
2. Helle Haurum
 Customer Engagement Behavior
in the context of Continuous Service
Relationships
3. Nis Grünberg
The Party -state order: Essays on
China’s political organization and
political economic institutions
4. Jesper Christensen
A Behavioral Theory of Human
Capital Integration
5. Poula Marie Helth
Learning in practice
6. Rasmus Vendler Toft-Kehler
Entrepreneurship as a career? An
investigation of the relationship
between entrepreneurial experience
and entrepreneurial outcome
7. Szymon Furtak
Sensing the Future: Designing
sensor-based predictive information
systems for forecasting spare part
demand for diesel engines
8. Mette Brehm Johansen
Organizing patient involvement. An
ethnographic study
9. Iwona Sulinska
Complexities of Social Capital in
Boards of Directors
10. Cecilie Fanøe Petersen
Award of public contracts as a
means to conferring State aid: A
legal analysis of the interface
between public procurement law
and State aid law
11. Ahmad Ahmad Barirani
Three Experimental Studies on
Entrepreneurship
12. Carsten Allerslev Olsen
Financial Reporting Enforcement:
Impact and Consequences
13. Irene Christensen
New product fumbles – Organizing
for the Ramp-up process
14. Jacob Taarup-Esbensen
Managing communities – Mining
MNEs’ community risk
management practices
15. Lester Allan Lasrado
Set-Theoretic approach to maturity
models
16. Mia B. Münster
Intention vs. Perception of
Designed Atmospheres in Fashion
Stores
17. Anne Sluhan
Non-Financial Dimensions of Family
Firm Ownership: How
Socioemotional Wealth and
Familiness Influence
Internationalization
18. Henrik Yde Andersen
Essays on Debt and Pensions
19. Fabian Heinrich Müller
Valuation Reversed – When
Valuators are Valuated. An Analysis
of the Perception of and Reaction
to Reviewers in Fine-Dining
20. Martin Jarmatz
Organizing for Pricing
21. Niels Joachim Christfort Gormsen
Essays on Empirical Asset Pricing
22. Diego Zunino
Socio-Cognitive Perspectives in
Business Venturing
23. Benjamin Asmussen
Networks and Faces between
Copenhagen and Canton,
1730-1840
24. Dalia Bagdziunaite
Brains at Brand Touchpoints
A Consumer Neuroscience Study of
Information Processing of Brand
Advertisements and the Store
Environment in Compulsive Buying
25. Erol Kazan
Towards a Disruptive Digital Platform
Model
26. Andreas Bang Nielsen
Essays on Foreign Exchange and
Credit Risk
27. Anne Krebs
Accountable, Operable Knowledge
Toward Value Representations of
Individual Knowledge in Accounting
28. Matilde Fogh Kirkegaard
A firm- and demand-side perspective
on behavioral strategy for value
creation: Insights from the hearing
aid industry
29. Agnieszka Nowinska
SHIPS AND RELATION-SHIPS
Tie formation in the sector of
shipping intermediaries in shipping
30. Stine Evald Bentsen
The Comprehension of English Texts
by Native Speakers of English and
Japanese, Chinese and Russian
Speakers of English as a Lingua
Franca. An Empirical Study.
31. Stine Louise Daetz
Essays on Financial Frictions in
Lending Markets
32. Christian Skov Jensen
Essays on Asset Pricing
33. Anders Kryger
Aligning future employee action and
corporate strategy in a resource-
scarce environment
34.  Maitane Elorriaga-Rubio
 The behavioral foundations of
 strategic decision-making: A
 contextual perspective
35.  Roddy Walker
 Leadership Development as
 Organisational Rehabilitation:
 Shaping Middle-Managers as
 Double Agents
36.  Jinsun Bae
 Producing Garments for Global
 Markets Corporate social
 responsibility (CSR) in
 Myanmar’s export garment
 industry 2011–2015
37.  Queralt Prat-i-Pubill
 Axiological knowledge in a knowledge
 driven world. Considerations for
 organizations.
38.  Pia Mølgaard
 Essays on Corporate Loans and
 Credit Risk
39.  Marzia Aricò
 Service Design as a
 Transformative Force:
 Introduction and Adoption in an
 Organizational Context
40.  Christian Dyrlund Wåhlin-
 Jacobsen
 Constructing change initiatives
 in workplace voice activities
 Studies from a social interaction
 perspective
41.  Peter Kalum Schou
 Institutional Logics in
 Entrepreneurial Ventures: How
 Competing Logics arise and
 shape organizational processes
 and outcomes during scale-up
42.  Per Henriksen
 Enterprise Risk Management
 Rationaler og paradokser i en
 moderne ledelsesteknologi
43.  Maximilian Schellmann
 The Politics of Organizing
 Refugee Camps
44. Jacob Halvas Bjerre
 Excluding the Jews: The
 Aryanization of Danish-
 German Trade and German
 Anti-Jewish Policy in
 Denmark 1937-1943
45.  Ida Schrøder
 Hybridising accounting and
 caring: A symmetrical study
 of how costs and needs are
 connected in Danish child
 protection work
46.  Katrine Kunst
 Electronic Word of Behavior:
 Transforming digital traces of
 consumer behaviors into
 communicative content in
 product design
47.  Viktor Avlonitis
 Essays on the role of
 modularity in management:
 Towards a unified
 perspective of modular and
 integral design
48.  Anne Sofie Fischer
 Negotiating Spaces of
 Everyday Politics:
 -An ethnographic study of
 organizing for social
 transformation for women in
 urban poverty, Delhi, India
2019
1.  Shihan Du
 ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES
 BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE
 LABOUR  MARKET DATA
2.  Mart Laatsit
 Policy learning in innovation
 policy: A comparative analysis of
 European Union member states
3.  Peter J. Wynne
 Proactively Building Capabilities for
 the Post-Acquisition Integration
 of Information Systems
4.  Kalina S. Staykova
 Generative Mechanisms for Digital
 Platform Ecosystem Evolution
5.  Ieva Linkeviciute
 Essays on the Demand-Side
 Management in Electricity Markets
6.  Jonatan Echebarria Fernández
 Jurisdiction and Arbitration
 Agreements in Contracts for the
 Carriage of Goods by Sea –
 Limitations on Party Autonomy
7.  Louise Thorn Bøttkjær
 Votes for sale. Essays on
 clientelism in new democracies.
8.  Ditte Vilstrup Holm
 The Poetics of Participation:
 the organizing of participation in
 contemporary art
9.  Philip Rosenbaum
 Essays in Labor Markets –
 Gender, Fertility and Education
10.  Mia Olsen
 Mobile Betalinger - Succesfaktorer
 og Adfærdsmæssige Konsekvenser
11.  Adrián Luis Mérida Gutiérrez
 Entrepreneurial Careers:
 Determinants, Trajectories, and
 Outcomes
12. Frederik Regli 
 Essays on Crude Oil Tanker Markets
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1. Niels Kornum
 Servicesamkørsel – organisation, øko-
nomi og planlægningsmetode
1995
2. Verner Worm
Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
Kulturspeciﬁ kke interaktionsrelationer
ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i
Kina
1999
3. Mogens Bjerre
Key Account Management of Complex
Strategic Relationships
An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4. Lotte Darsø
Innovation in the Making
 Interaction Research with heteroge-
neous Groups of Knowledge Workers
creating new Knowledge and new
Leads
2001
5. Peter Hobolt Jensen
Managing Strategic Design Identities
 The case of the Lego Developer Net-
work
2002
6. Peter Lohmann
The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
Change – Moving Perspectives of the
Human
7. Anne Marie Jess Hansen
To lead from a distance: The dynamic
 interplay between strategy and strate-
gizing – A case study of the strategic
management process
2003
8. Lotte Henriksen
Videndeling
 – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæs-
sige udfordringer ved videndeling i
praksis
9. Niels Christian Nickelsen
 Arrangements of Knowing: Coordi-
nating Procedures Tools and Bodies in
Industrial Production – a case study of
the collective making of new products
2005
10. Carsten Ørts Hansen
 Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
effektivitet
TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN
2007
1. Peter Kastrup-Misir
Endeavoring to Understand Market
Orientation – and the concomitant
co-mutation of the researched, the
re searcher, the research itself and the
truth
2009
1. Torkild Leo Thellefsen
 Fundamental Signs and Signiﬁ cance
effects
A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental
Signs, Signiﬁ cance-effects, Knowledge
Proﬁ ling and their use in Knowledge
Organization and Branding
2. Daniel Ronzani
When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make
Them Trip. Technological Innovation
and the Role of Regulation by Law
in Information Systems Research: the
Case of Radio Frequency Identiﬁ cation
(RFID)
2010
1. Alexander Carnera
Magten over livet og livet som magt
Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens
